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Abstrat
In the skill-biased tehnologial hange literature, the market-size hannel
determines the tehnologial-knowledge bias that drives wage inequality, i .e.,
tehnologies that use the more abundant type of labour are favoured. We
develop an endogenous growth model with two tehnologies in whih: (i) a
spei quality of labour  low or high-skilled  is ombined with a spei set
of quality-adjusted intermediate goods; (ii) the market-size hannel is pra-
tially removed; (ii) labour endowments inuene tehnology-adoption osts
and learning-by-doing. By solving the transitional dynamis numerially, we
show that hanges in the relative supply of high-skilled labour aet learning-
by-doing and tehnology-adoption osts, whih, in turn, inuene the diretion
of tehnologial-knowledge and thus the skill premium. The proposed meha-
nisms an aommodate some fats that are not explained by the skill-biased
tehnologial hange literature, thereby supporting the idea that learning-by-
doing and tehnology-adoption osts an provide valuable insights into the
path of wage inequality.
Keywords: Learning-by-doing; Adoption osts; Tehnologial-knowledge
bias; Wage inequality; Numerial simulations.
JEL lassiation Codes: C61, J31, O31, O33.
iv
Contents
1 Introdution 1
2 Related literature 7
2.1 The skill-biased tehnologial hange hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Labour-market features and wage inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3 The role of eonomi openness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Learning-by-doing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.5 Tehnology-adoption osts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3 Model 26
3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3 Final-goods setor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.4 Intermediate-goods setor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.5 Quality-improving R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.6 The tehnologial readiness of labour . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4 Equilibria 39
4.1 Equilibrium given a tehnologial-knowledge level . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2 Equilibrium with R&D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3 Transition dynamis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.4 Steady-state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5 Analysis 50
5.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.2 Fixed-parameter alibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5.3 Variable-parameter alibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
5.4 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
6 Conlusions 65
Appendix A 67
Appendix B 70
Referenes 91
v
List of Figures
1 Relative supply of skills in nine OECD ountries, 1995-2005. . . . . . 4
2 Fixed-parameter simulations for the United States, 1973-1989. . . . . 52
3 Fixed-parameter simulations for Sweden and the U.K., 1973-1989. . . 54
4 Fixed-parameter simulations for Denmark, 1973-1989. . . . . . . . . . 55
5 Variable-parameter simulation for Denmark, 1973-1989. . . . . . . . . 55
6 Variable-parameter simulations for Belgium, 1985-1997. . . . . . . . . 56
7 Variable-parameter simulation for Chile, 1960-1996. . . . . . . . . . . 57
8 LBD and TAC eets under predominane of low-skilled labour. . . . 60
9 LBD and TAC eets under predominane of high-skilled labour. . . 62
10 LBD and the relative supply of high-skilled labour. . . . . . . . . . . 63
11 TAC and the relative supply of high-skilled labour. . . . . . . . . . . 64
vi
List of Tables
1 Baseline non-ore parameter values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2 Alternative simulations of transition dynamis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3 Simulation results for the United States, 1973 (I) . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4 Simulation results for the United States, 1989 (I) . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5 Simulation results for the United States, 1973 (II). . . . . . . . . . . . 73
6 Simulation results for the United States, 1989 (II). . . . . . . . . . . . 74
7 Simulation results for the United States, 1973 (III). . . . . . . . . . . 75
8 Simulation results for the United States, 1989 (III) . . . . . . . . . . 76
9 Simulation results for Sweden, 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
10 Simulation results for Sweden, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
11 Simulation results for the United Kingdom, 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
12 Simulation results for the United Kingdom, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
13 Simulation results for Denmark, 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
14 Simulation results for Denmark, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
15 Simulation results for Belgium, 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
16 Simulation results for Belgium, 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
17 Simulation results for Chile, 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
18 Simulation results for Chile, 1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
19 Simulation results for The Netherlands, 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
20 Simulation results for The Netherlands, 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
21 Simulation results for Canada, 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
22 Simulation results for Canada, 1997 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
vii
1 Introdution
During the 1980s and the 1990s the wage struture hanged in many developed
ountries. More-skilled workers have experiened a rise in their relative wage, and
the fration of the total wage bill devoted to paying them also inreased. In some
ases  for example, in the United States  these trends began forming as early as
1960, although sine then there have been times during whih the wage struture
remained fairly stable or hanges to it were partially reversed (see, e. g., Juhn et al.,
1993). And even though wage inequality sometimes fell or remained stable along
other dimensions  see, e. g., Card and DiNardo (2002) for evidene on male-female
and blak-white wage dierentials in the United States , skill-related wage dier-
entials inreased in most developed ountries.
In many ountries these hanges in the wage struture have been aompanied
by an inrease in the relative supply of more-skilled labour (see, e. g., Aemoglu,
2003a). In light of this fat, the hanges in wage struture seem a little puzzling.
All else equal, one would expet skill-related wage dierentials to deline in response
to an inrease in the supply of more-skilled workers.
These hanges in the supply of more-skilled labour and in skill-related wage
dierentials onstitute the fous of the present work. After presenting the patterns of
wage inequality and labour supply that are relevant for our study, we briey disuss
explanations whih aim at reoniling these apparently ontraditory trends. Sine
the dominant explanation links the rise in the relative wage of high-skilled workers
to the hange in the path of tehnologial-knowledge progress, we then develop a
new framework to address some issues not explored by previous works. Indeed, our
work builds on the skill-biased tehnologial hange literature (e. g., Aemoglu, 1998;
Afonso, 2006), omplemented with learning-by-doing and tehnology-adoption osts
eets.
A hanging wage struture: inreases in skill-related wage inequality
Several studies doument the rise in the relative wage of more-skilled workers us-
ing dierent proxies for skill. For example, Katz and Murphy (1992) report that
between 1979 and 1987, U. S. ollege graduates experiened an inrease in their
relative wage of 11% when ompared to high-shool graduates. Juhn et al. (1993)
in turn show that in the United States hourly and weekly wage dierentials be-
tween the 90th wage perentile (more-skilled workers) and 10th wage perentile
(less-skilled workers) rose steadily throughout the 1980s in the United States. By
1988 the wage dierential between these two groups was 42% higher than it was in
1
1959 (Juhn et al., 1993, p. 419).
In another study, Nikell and Bell (1996) report that during the 1980s the earn-
ings dierential between high and low-eduated males inreased by 4.4% in Germany,
7.8% in the United Kingdom and 10.2% in the United States. Similar patterns are
also doumented by Aemoglu (2003a), who oers an insight on the behaviour of
skill premium in many ountries.
1
Aemoglu shows that between the early 1980s
and the mid 1990s, the skill premium of male workers nearly doubled in the United
States, and inreased by roughly 42% in the United Kingdom; more modest inreases
ourred in Canada (17.4%) and in Germany (3.8%) between the late 1980s and the
mid 1990s (Aemoglu, 2003a, p. 123, Table 1b).
The skill premium also inreased in some newly industrialised (developing) oun-
tries during the 1980s and the 1990s. Zhu and Treer (2005) show this happened,
for example, in Hong Kong, India, Thailand and Uruguay. These results support the
ndings of Avalos and Savvides (2006), who point to an inrease in wage inequality
in Latin Ameria and East Asia between the mid 1970s and the mid 1990s. And
the study by Brainerd (1998) suggests that the wage dierential between the 90th
and 10th wage perentiles widened in Russia during the rst half of the 1990s.
The evolution of the share of more-skilled workers in the total wage bill is dou-
mented by Berman et al. (1998), among others. Aording to Berman et al. (1998,
Table 3) the wage bill share of non-prodution (more-skilled) workers inreased dur-
ing the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s in ten of a group of eleven open eonomies.
2
In ve
ases  notably Australia, Denmark, Finland, the United Kingdom and the United
States  the pae of this inrease even aelerated during the 1980s.
Some of these ndings are onrmed by Mahin and Van Reenen (1998), who
report that between 1973 and 1989 the wage bill share of non-prodution work-
ers inreased by approximately 11% in Sweden, 20% in Denmark, 22% in the
United States and 30% in the United Kingdom. Although limited to 1974-1985,
Mahin and Van Reenen's data on Japan also point to an inrease in the wage bill
share of non-prodution workers (approximately 9%).3 And like in the ase of skill
1
Aemoglu (2003a) denes the skill premium as the oeient on workers with at least a ollege
degree relative to high shool graduates in a regression of log real annual gross wages on four
eduation ategories and a quadrati in age.
2
The sample of Berman et al. (1998) inludes Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany.
Only Belgium experiened a deline in the wage bill share of non-prodution workers during the
1980s.
3
The wage bill share of non-prodution workers inreased 2.7 perentage points in Japan, 4
perentage points in Sweden, 6.6 perentage points in Denmark, 7.7 perentage points in the
United States and 9.7 perentage points in the United Kingdom (Mahin and Van Reenen, 1998,
Table 1).
2
premium patterns, these results still hold if we look at other proxies for skill. An
example is the study by Autor et al. (1998, Table 2), whih present data that do-
ument an inrease in the wage bill share of ollege eduated workers in the United
States between 1940 and 1996.
Inreases in the supply of more-skilled labour
In addition to these hanges in the wage struture, many developed ountries have
also experiened an inrease in the relative supply of more-skilled workers. For
example, Kranz (2006, Table 1) shows that the share of workers with more than
high shool inreased in Italy, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States
between the early 1980s and the early 1990s.
4
However, the inrease was more pro-
nouned in the United Kingdom (31.2% to 42.2%) and in the United States (39.52%
to 49.33%) than it was in Germany and Italy (17.49% to 21.48% and 6.08% to
7.35%, respetively).5 Changes like these also aeted other developed eonomies.
Aemoglu (2003a), for example, shows this happened in The Netherlands and Swe-
den between the early 1980s and the mid 1990s, and also in Norway, Belgium and
Finland during dierent periods of the 1980s and the 1990s.
Figure 1 shows that this trend ontinued into the 2000s. In all sample ountries
the relative supply of ollege graduates inreased between 1993 and 2005, although
it reahed substantially higher levels in Denmark, Finland and in the United States.
The data show that by 2005 the relative supply of ollege graduates was omparable
in Frane, Ireland, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, but also that 
within this group  its growth was more pronouned in Spain. In fat, between 1993
and 2005 the relative supply of ollege graduates inreased at an annual average rate
of 6.9% in Spain, whereas in the United Kingdom, for example, the annual average
growth rate was of 3.8%.6
The skill-biased tehnologial hange hypothesis
A possible explanation for the ontradition between the inreases in the relative
supply of skills and the rise in the skill premium has been provided by the skill-biased
tehnologial hange literature (e. g., Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy,
4
The denition workers with more than high shool omprises workers who obtained a ollege
degree or have some ollege experiene (see Table 1 in Kranz, 2006).
5
In Autor et al. (1998) and Aemoglu (2003b), we an see that the rise in the relative supply of
ollege eduated workers in the United States began around the 1940s, and that the growth was
partiularly strong during the 1970s.
6
Census data for Canada, for example, show that between 1996 and 2001 the relative supply of
ollege graduates inreased at an annual average rate growth rate of 1.8%.
3
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Figure 1: Relative supply of skills in nine OECD ountries, 1995-2005.
1992; Juhn et al., 1993). In simple terms, this strand of the literature argues that
tehnologial hange is biased towards more-skilled workers, and this indues an
inrease in the relative demand for them. The additional demand for more-skilled
workers exeeds any inrease in the relative supply that might exist, thus pushing
the skill premium up. An often quoted example of this proess is the introdution of
the personal omputer and other omputer related tehnologies (Card and DiNardo,
2002): some argue that this is linked to the rise in the skill premium that ourred
during the 1980s in the United States (e. g., Autor et al., 1998).
Aemoglu (1998, 2002) and Aemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) further enhane the
skill-biased tehnologial hange hypothesis by onsidering that tehnologial hange
responds to shifts in labour endowments. When the supply of a type of labour
inreases, the market for tehnologies that omplement it broadens and this, in turn,
reates additional inentives for onduting R&D aimed at those tehnologies. As
a result, tehnologial hange steers towards those tehnologies, and this inreases
the demand for the omplementary labour type. Hene, these reent ontributions
4
interpret the rise in the skill premium as a onsequene of the inrease in the relative
supply of more-skilled workers.
But, at least to some extent, there is empirial evidene that seems to ontradit
the explanation proposed by this partiular version of the skill-biased tehnologial
hange hypothesis. For example, Aemoglu (2003a) douments a deline in the skill
premium in Sweden and The Netherlands between the early 1980s and the mid
1990s. Yet, in both ountries the relative supply of skills inreased during the same
period. And in Canada the skill premium inreased between the late 1980s and the
late 1990s, in spite of a stable relative supply of skills (Aemoglu, 2003a, p. 123,
Table 1b).
Data from developing ountries reveal some additional problemati evidene.
Crinò (2005), for instane, shows that Hungary and Czeh Republi experiened an
inrease in the skill premium between 1993 and 2004, while at the same time the
relative employment of more skilled workers delined in those ountries. Another
example omes from Mexio, where in 19942002 the relative supply of highly-
eduated workers inreased and the wage dierential between the 90th and 10th
wage perentiles dereased (Robertson, 2004). And in the study by Zhu and Treer
(2005) we nd evidene that idential developments ourred in ountries suh as
Bolivia, South Korea and Philippines.
Building a new framework
In the present work we propose a model that aims at explaining dierent patterns of
skill premium and relative supply of skilled workers. More speially, we propose an
endogenous R&D growth model in whih learning-by-doing and tehnology-adoption
osts aet the diretion of tehnologial hange. Like in the skill-biased tehnolog-
ial hange literature, tehnologial hange then inuenes the relative demand for
high-skilled labour, and thus the skill premium. The model is losely related to the
ontributions of Aemoglu (1998, 2002), Aemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), and Afonso
(2006, 2007), but it diers from them in that it takes into aount the eets of
learning-by-doing and tehnology-adoption osts.
We onsider an eonomy in whih the perfetly ompetitive prodution of nal
goods an be aomplished by using two available tehnologies, eah taking as inputs
a spei set of intermediate goods and a spei type of labour. One tehnology
ombines low-skilled workers with low-spei intermediate goods, whereas the other
ouples high-skilled workers with high-spei intermediate goods. The prodution
funtion for nal goods is thus haraterised by omplementarity between inputs
and substitutability between the two tehnologies.
5
The output of the nal-goods setor an be used in onsumption, in the produ-
tion of intermediate goods, or in R&D ativities. Intermediate goods are produed
under monopolisti ompetition by ombining units of aggregate output and innova-
tive designs. Also, they are quality adjusted in line with the literature on Shumpete-
rian endogenous growth models (see, e. g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992). Innovation in
the intermediate-goods setor is driven by R&D, whih is stripped from sale eets
in line with the dominant literature (see, e. g., Jones, 1995a,b).
Distinguishing between low and high-skilled workers allows us to onsider pro-
dutivity dierenes between them. Aemoglu (1998, 2002), Aemoglu and Zilibotti
(2001), and Afonso (2006) onsider that high-skilled workers are more produtive
than low-skilled workers. While in our model we assume that high-skilled workers
have indeed an advantage over low-skilled workers, the eets of learning-by-doing
and tehnology-adoption osts provide room to onsider ases in whih low-skilled
workers exhibit higher produtivity than high-skilled workers.
Our simulation results show that ombining the eets of learning-by-doing
and tehnology-adoption osts with the skill-biased tehnologial hange framework
yields valuable insights on the dynamis of the skill premium. Aommodation of
dierent paths for the skill premium in response to a given shift in the relative
supply of skilled workers beomes possible, thereby reating riher dynamis than
those oered by previous works. Results from the sensitivity analysis demonstrate
that the eets of learning-by-doing and tehnology-adoption osts are variable and
interdependent, and that they might indue both inreases and dereases in the skill
premium.
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 provides an
overview of the skill-biased tehnologial hange literature and of alternative expla-
nations for the patterns of wage inequality and relative supply of skills mentioned
above. Sine our work ontributes to the literature by taking into aount the ef-
fets of learning-by-doing and tehnology-adoption osts, we briey illustrate the
importane of those onepts in the eonomi literature. In Chapter 3 we present a
model of the eonomy, and the equilibria and transitional dynamis underlying the
model are worked out in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 we use this framework to study
the behaviour of the skill premium in dierent senarios. Finally, Chapter 6 loses
the thesis with some onluding omments.
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2 Related literature
The purpose of this setion is twofold. First we present an overview of alternative
explanations for the trend of rising skill premium desribed in the previous hapter.
We start with the skill-biased tehnologial hange hypothesis, beause our work is
losely related to it, and beause it is the dominant explanation. Then, we present
some works that oer dierent  possibly omplementary  explanations for the
observed hanges in wage strutures: the roles of labour market features, eonomi
openness, and other fators are onsidered. Seond, sine our goal is to ontribute
to the literature by enhaning the skill-biased tehnologial hange hypothesis with
learning-by-doing and tehnology-adoption osts elements, we present some works
that illustrate the relevane of these two onepts to eonomis.
2.1 The skill-biased tehnologial hange hypothesis
It is ommonly aepted that the generi rise in the relative wage of high-skilled
workers has been aused by inreases in the relative demand for those workers
(Katz and Murphy, 1992; Freeman, 1995; Aemoglu, 2003b), but there is onsid-
erably more debate about what aused that demand shift. The skill-biased teh-
nologial hange literature argues that the surge in the relative demand for high-
skilled workers was brought about by hange in the nature of tehnologial progress.
(Johnson, 1997).
The work by Bound and Johnson (1992) is one of the early studies that points
to suh explanation for the rise in the skill-premium. Using data from the Current
Population Survey, Bound and Johnson study how trade-indued delines in manu-
faturing employment, dereased union power, slower growth in the supply of skilled
workers, and tehnologial hange ontributed to hange the United States wage
struture during the 1970s and 1980s. The main onlusion of this work is that the
most important fore behind the inrease of the skill premium in the United States
during the 1980s was tehnologial hange.
Aording to Bound and Johnson (1992), slower growth of the skilled-labour
supply doesn't seem to explain the rising skill premium, as their estimates show
that the supply shifts had similar eet on wages both in the 1970s and in the
1980s. Demand fators, in turn, seem to have had sizable, aelerating inuene
in the 1980s. The importane of tehnologial hange, in partiular, dwarfs that
of other demand-shifting fators, both in terms of the size of the eet and the
magnitude of its aeleration between the 1970s to the 1980s.
A similar, relevant work is that of Murphy and Welh (1992), who study the
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wages of white males in the United States between 1963 and 1989. They nd the
hanges observed in the wage struture during that period are inonsistent with a
stable struture of labour demand, and assess how international trade, eonomi
yliality or a trend fator might have indued labour demand shifts. In this work,
skill is proxied by eduation, trade-indued shifts in labour demand are proxied by
the net imports of durable goods as a share of GNP, and yle-related shifts are
proxied by innovations in aggregate unemployment.
Murphy and Welh's regression estimates show that international trade and yli-
al unemployment indeed played a role in shifting labour demand away from un-
skilled workers, and ontributed to redue its relative wage. But the results also
show a statistially signiant trend fator, suggesting that some other fore system-
atially inuened labour demand and wages. Pervasive skill-biased tehnologial
hange, as the authors aknowledge, is a likely andidate.
In addition to these two early studies, many other works point to skill-biased
tehnologial hange as the entral explanation for the rising skill premium. For
instane, Berman et al. (1998) reah suh onlusion analysing data from several
developed and developing ountries, thereby showing that skill-biased tehnologi-
al hange is not a loalised phenomenon ouring in a small group of ountries,
but rather a widespread fore aeting ountries throughout the world. Results in
line with this are provided by Mahin and Van Reenen (1998) for a smaller set of
OECD ountries. And data from the United States, by far the most studied ase,
is reurrently ited as evidene that skill-biased tehnologial hange is to blame 
as least partially  for the rise in wage inequality (e. g., Katz and Murphy, 1992;
Levy and Murnane, 1992; Juhn et al., 1993; Johnson, 1997).
In many of these early works, however, skill-biased tehnologial hange is on-
sidered to be exogenous and its presene is often measured indiretly (Kiley, 1999;
Levy and Murnane, 1996). This is a signiant shortoming beause it leaves the
question of why (and how) has tehnologial knowledge beome skill biased unan-
swered. Later works address this issue by studying mehanisms that ould inuene
the skill-bias of tehnology, thereby ontributing to the ompleteness of the skill-
biased tehnologial hange hypothesis.
The study by Kiley (1999) is one of suh ontributions. He develops a growth
model in whih the prodution of nal goods is ahieved by ombining skilled and
unskilled labour with spei sets of intermediate goods. Applied tehnologial
hange  driven by applied R&D ativities that explore the output of basi researh
 expands the set of intermediate goods that an be used with eah type of labour.
The explanation of how tehnology beomes inreasingly skill-biased is linked
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to the eonomi inentives surrounding R&D ativities. In the model, protability
of applied R&D ativities direted towards eah set of intermediate goods depends
positively on the endowment of the respetive type of omplementary labour. As
for the ost of onduting applied R&D, it inreases as the applied R&D ativities
exhaust the pool of ideas ontained in the output of basi researh. Only new output
from basi researh  whih is assumed to grow at a onstant rate  an alleviate
the ost of applied R&D.
Following an inrease in the supply of skilled labour, the skill premium falls
beause skilled workers have beome more abundant. In addition, the protability
of applied R&D ativities in skilled intermediate-goods inreases beause the market
for those goods has broadened. As a result, applied R&D resoures are shifted from
unskilled-spei intermediate goods to skilled-spei intermediate goods. The
additional applied R&D auses the basket of skill-omplementary intermediate goods
to inrease, thereby raising the produtivity and wage of skilled labour. Hene,
even though the relative wage of skilled labour initially falls in response to the
higher number of skilled workers, the skill premium gradually inreases as tehnology
beomes skill-biased. Kiley (1999) argues that this is onsistent with United States
data on wage inequality from 1970s onwards.
The mehanis by whih tehnology beomes inreasingly skill-biased in Kiley's
model are similar to the ones operating in the model by Aemoglu (1998). There,
too, unskilled (skilled) workers are oupled with a spei set of intermediate goods
to produe nal goods, and the protability of R&D eorts aimed at intermediate
goods is linked to labour endowments. Again, as the supply of one type of labour
inreases, protability of R&D in the respetive omplementary intermediate-goods
also inreases. The main dierene with respet to Kiley's proposal is that Aemoglu
(1998), instead of onsidering a model with an expanding variety of intermediate
goods, builds a quality-ladder model (Segerstrom et al., 1990; Aghion and Howitt,
1992; Grossman and Helpman, 1991a,b). In other words, in Aemoglu's model R&D
inreases the quality of existing intermediate goods, not the array of intermediate
goods that are produed.
Although with some minor dierenes, the ontributions of Aemoglu (1998),
Kiley (1999), and Aemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), among others, point to the market-
size hannel as the fundamental fator driving the tehnologial-knowledge bias, and
thus the skill premium. Afonso (2006, 2007), on the other hand, draws attention
to the role of the prie hannel. In an endogenous quality-ladder model in whih
the market-size hannel is removed from the R&D aimed at intermediate goods,
Afonso shows how shifts in labour endowments aet, through the prie hannel
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(of nal goods), the tehnologial-knowledge bias and the skill premium. Under the
assumption that R&D is more eient in intermediate goods that omplement high-
skilled labour  and that labour endowments inuene that eieny , an inrease
in the supply of high-skilled workers triggers a ow of innovations in those goods,
heightening the tehnologial-knowledge bias.
The inreased produtivity of high-spei intermediate goods inreases the wage
rate of the omplementary labour, widening the skill premium. However, the ad-
ditional produtivity also lowers the prodution ost (and relative prie) of nal
goods produed with skilled labour and skill-spei intermediate goods. This low-
ers the protability of R&D in those intermediate goods, and resoures start owing
for R&D ativities aimed at intermediate goods that omplement unskilled labour,
ausing a slowdown in the growth of the tehnologial-knowledge. Eventually, a
new steady state is reahed in whih both the skill-bias of tehnology and the skill
premium are higher.
The works disussed so far link the rise in the skill premium to a hange in
the nature of tehnology. A somewhat dierent, yet related, view is defended by
Nahuis and Smulders (2002), who argue that the inrease in the wage gap between
skilled and unskilled workers is a onsequene of strutural hanges aeting pro-
dution ativities. In their model, unskilled workers perform routine ativities to
produe nal goods, and their produtivity depends on their rms' knowledge stok.
Skilled workers, on the other hand, perform non-routine tasks that improve the
knowledge stok of their rm, and their produtivity inreases alongside that stokn.
Eah representative rm an expand its prodution either by exploring the exist-
ing knowledge stok more intensively or by expanding that stok. The former implies
the use of inreasing number of unskilled workers, and the latter requires employing
more skilled workers. The key feature is that knowledge is non-rival and partially
non-exludable, hene eah rm an only appropriate a part of the knowledge its
skilled workers generate.
The model by Nahuis and Smulders shows that the skill premium an inrease
if rms are able to appropriate a suient part of the knowledge they generate.
At rst, the expansion of the supply of skilled labour makes the respetive wage
rate fall, reduing the skill premium. But one more skilled workers are available,
the potential to reate new knowledge from the existing stok of knowledge an be
better explored. Firms have an inentive to follow this path and employ more skilled
workers  and also pay them higher wages  if the benets of additional knowledge
outweigh the osts of pursuing it (i. e., if rms an appropriate a suient part of
the new knowledge). Thus, aording to this vision, inreases in the skill-premium
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reet a shift to a more knowledge-intensive system of prodution.
Empirial evidene and ritique
As already mentioned, empirial support for the skill-biased tehnologial hange
hypothesis often results from indiret measurement. However, evidene from the
adoption of omputer-related innovations has been used by many as a more on-
rete example of skill-biased tehnologial hange. Krueger (1993), for example,
demonstrates evidene that workers who use omputers on their jobs earn higher
wages, and that high-skilled workers are more likely to use omputers at work.
Furthermore, aording to Krueger's estimates, the aeleration of omputer usage
in 1980s an aount for as muh as half of the inrease in the premium paid to
high-skilled workers in the United States.
Based on an analysis of the United States manufaturing setor in the 1980s,
Berman et al. (1994) present evidene that is onsistent with the ndings of Krueger
(1993). They doument a shift in aggregate labour demand towards skilled workers,
and show this is mainly aused by a pervasive within-industry trend, and not from
hanges in the industry omposition. Their results also demonstrate that the hanges
in labour demand are orrelated with higher investment in omputers and R&D,
implying that this ould be the reason behind the additional demand for skilled
workers.
These ndings are further supported by Autor et al. (1998), who develop one of
the most omprehensive studies regarding the link between omputer usage and the
skill premium. Using 1940-1996 data for the United States, they show that there has
been a steady inrease both in omputer usage rates and relative demand for skilled
workers. Again, the trend in skilled-labour demand results from within-industry
hanges and it has been stronger in industries in whih omputers are used more
intensively. Moreover, Autor et al. (1998) show that the skill upgrading at industry
level has been partiularly strong sine the 1970s and up to the 1980s, whih is
ompatible with the rapid inrease in the skill premium.
The analysis of omputer usage patterns has also been used as a basis for ritique
of the skill-biased tehnologial hange hypothesis. By onduting a detailed analy-
sis of data on omputer usage, Card and DiNardo (2002) detet some inonsistenies
in the explanation proposed by this partiular version of the skill-biased tehnolog-
ial hange literature.
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For example, they argue that omputer usage grew in the
United States during the 1990s, but wage inequality remained somewhat stable.
7
The study by Card and DiNardo (2002) analyses omputer usage and earnings aross age,
gender, rae and job experiene groups. It also takes into aount ross-industry dierenes.
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And omputer usage patterns an't orretly trak the losing of the gender wage
gap. Aordingly, Card and DiNardo (2002) argue that other fators ontributed to
shape wage inequality, namely labour market institutions.
Another issue subjet to some debate is whether skill-biased tehnologial hange
an persistently indue inreases in the skill premium. Some authors (e. g., Johnson,
1997) suggest that skill-biased tehnologial hange might already have deelerated
in the 1990s. In priniple, this ould t the proposal of Cio-Tille and Lehmann
(2004), who argue that tehnologial hange might not be permanently biased if
R&D resoures are alternately alloated towards skilled-intensive and unskilled-
intensive goods. The main idea underlying Cio-Tille and Lehmann's model is that
as R&D resoures ow to one type of good  the skilled-intensive good, for example
 the protability of R&D ativities in that good dereases, reating an inentive to
shift R&D resoures towards the other good.
Assuming that skill-unskilled labour wage dierentials are indeed inuened by
the skill-bias of tehnologial knowledge, an obvious impliation of this model is
that we should observe yles in both the tehnologial-knowledge bias and skill
premia. The derease in the United States skilled-unskilled wage gap during the
1970s, followed by a rapid inrease in that gap during the 1980s, ould provide
some support to this theory. However, tehnologial-knowledge hange is generally
onsidered to have been skill-biased (e. g., Autor et al., 2003).
To sum up, even though the skill-biased tehnologial hange hypothesis has met
some ritiism as the unique explanation for the widespread inrease in skill premia,
it seems to be the main fator behind it (Autor et al., 2005).
2.2 Labour-market features and wage inequality
Although hanges in the wage struture have been generally linked to the presene
of skill-biased tehnologial hange, other explanations have also emerged in the
eonomi literature. A relatively homogeneous body of studies stresses the role of
labour market features in shaping the observed hanges in the wage struture. Those
labour market features an be broadly ategorised into two dierent lasses: labour-
market institutions and ohort eets. The rst inludes things suh as minimum
wage and unionisation levels; the seond refers to dierenes aross groups of workers
that have been entering the labour market.
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Institutional Fators
The importane of institutional fators in the rise of wage inequality has been em-
phasised by many authors, espeially sine there is onsiderable evidene that they
inuene wages (e. g., Freeman, 1980).
The fall in the minimum wage, for example, is often ited as a soure of in-
reased wage inequality, inluding aross skill groups. The reasoning, of ourse, is
that the minimum wage oers some protetion for the earnings of the less skilled.
Some empirial evidene of the importane of minimum wage has indeed been pro-
vided by several studies. DiNardo et al. (1996), for instane, argue that redutions
in the United States federal minimum wage led to a more pronouned wage in-
equality. The thorough study by Lee (1999) seems to validate this onlusion. By
analysing regional data from the United States, Lee separates the eets of varia-
tions in the minimum wage from the eets of nationwide movements in underlying
wage inequality. The results show that the minimum wage is indeed the major fator
inuening wage dispersion in the lower tail of the wage distribution.
However, the minimum wage is not the only institutional fator aeting wage
inequality. Blau and Kahn (1996), for example, argue that a less entralised wage-
setting proess has led to a higher level of wage inequality in the United States when
ompared with other OECD ountries. Broadly in line with Lee (1999), they show
that wage dierenes between 90th and 10th perentiles are higher in the United
States, and that muh of this dierene is aused by higher wage dispersion at the
bottom of the wage distribution.
While the 90-50 perentile wage dierential of the United States only ranks
as the fourth highest when ompared to other ountries' dierentials, the 50-10
perentile wage gap is the largest of all ountries in the sample. Blau and Kahn
then point out several dierenes between the United States and the other ountries
in terms of institutional fators that aet wage-setting, showing they are weaker in
the United States. Moreover, they present evidene that the degree of wage-setting
entralisation is negatively orrelated with the overall wage dispersion and with the
50-10 perentile wage dierential.
Although the work of Blau and Kahn (1996) shows that the eet of weaker in-
stitutional arrangements on wage inequality in stronger in the United States, Mahin
(1997) argues that the deline in unionisation and minimum wages has ontributed
to inrease wage inequality in the United Kingdom in the 1980s and 1990s. In fat,
wage dispersion inreased more in setors not overed by a minimum wage system,
but Mahin's analysis doesn't provide an estimate of how muh of this trend an be
attributed to the abolishment of the minimum wage system.
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Also during the 1980s and 1990s, the United Kingdom's Conservative govern-
ment passed legislation that limited union ativity and unionisation fell onsiderably.
In the same period, wage dispersion inreased faster in setors without reognised
union, and these setors also inreased their relative size with respet to unionised
ones. As a result, overall wage inequality itself intensied.
Mahin's estimates suggest that unions had indeed some power to redue overall
wage dispersion, and also that this eet delined in the 1980s and 1990s beause
unionisation levels dereased, not beause union ativity lost impat. Nevertheless,
had unionisation levels remained unhanged and the eet of unions would only have
urtailed the inrease in wage inequality to about 60% of its atual value.
Explanations for the patterns of wage inequality based on institutional fators,
however, are not problem-free. An important problem is that in labour markets
that exhibit higher wage rigidity due to institutional fators, labour demand shoks
would, in priniple, lead to stronger adjustments in employment levels. Card et al.
(1999), for instane, ast some doubt upon this hypothesis by studying the labour
markets of the United States, Canada and Frane.
They argue that a deline in the relative demand for unskilled labour, simi-
lar to that whih led to lower wages for unskilled workers in the United States
(Juhn, 1992), ourred in Canada and Frane. In these two ountries, unskilled
employment adjustments should have been more pronouned  when ompared to
the United States  beause institutional fators seem to have indued higher wage
rigidity there. But the data presented by Card et al. (1999) oer little support for
this trade-o hypothesis. Indeed, during the 1980s the hanges in the wage stru-
ture were stronger in the United States than in Canada or Frane, but hanges in
unskilled (un)employment were omparable in all three ountries.
Cohort Eets
Another line of researh that links labour market features to wage inequality is
the one that studies how ohort-eets aet labour earnings. Using data for the
United States, some works argue that as the baby-boomers entered the labour mar-
ket, the wages of young workers fell relative to older workers (e.g., Welh, 1979;
Murphy and Welh, 1990). Aordingly, this would inrease wage inequality aross
several dimensions, inluding the aggregate skill premium. More reently, however,
Card and Lemieux (2001) proposed a dierent explanation: they link the observed
rise in the skill premium to the levels of eduational attainment of dierent ohorts.
The main feature of their model is that the ollege premium of a given age group
depends on the relative supply of ollege workers, both at age-group and aggregate
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level. Furthermore, in ontrast with other works (e. g., Katz and Murphy, 1992),
they assume imperfet substitution between young and old workers that have the
same eduational level. Card and Lemieux argue that if eduational attainment
among new ohorts arriving at the labour market is lower than that of older ohorts,
the skill premium will inrease over time.
If the proportion of skilled labour within a new, younger group of workers that
enters the labour market is lower than the proportion urrently existing in the
workfore, the skill premium in the new group tends to be higher than skill-premium
experiened by older ohorts. Beause there is imperfet substitution between skilled
workers of dierent age groups, the pressure for the skill premium to equalise aross
age groups  dereasing in the younger group and inreasing among older workers 
is limited. As more of these new, less skill-intensive ohorts enter the labour market
and beome a signiant, eventually dominant, part of the fore, the average skill
premium gradually rises.
Data for the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada provide some
support for the hypothesis proposed by Card and Lemieux (2001), but the authors
aknowledge that at least some sort of skill-biased tehnologial hange and rising
demand for skilled workers must also exist. If the demand for these workers remained
onstant and newer ohorts brought some additional skilled workers to the labour
fore, this would redue the skill premium in those age groups.
2.3 The role of eonomi openness
An alternative explanation for the observed hanges in the wage struture is linked
to eonomi openness. Based on the observation that, in developed ountries, the
fall in the relative demand for unskilled workers and the rise in wage inequality were
aompanied by an inrease in imports (e. g., Sahs and Shatz, 1994), a wide body
of literature linking openness to employment and wage hanges began to grow.
Early works along this line inlude Leamer (1994) and Wood (1995), for ex-
ample. Both works ontest that tehnologial hange ould be the main reason
behind the inreased wage inequality in the United States, oering an alternative
explanation in line with the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. The reasoning is simple:
inreased international trade with developing ountries lowered the domesti prie
of unskilled-intensive goods , thereby lowering the wage of unskilled workers. More-
over, Wood (1995) argues that eventual eets of tehnologial hange on wages
stem from the fat that tehnologial hange made international trade easier (e. g.,
lower transportations osts).
In a related study, Borjas and Ramey (1995) use o-integration tehniques to
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assess how variations in dierent variables are linked with variations in the United
States skill premium during the 1964-1991. They nd that hanges in dierent
aspets of labour fore omposition, immigration and unemployment exhibit little
onnetion with hanges in the ollege wage premium. Unionisation and R&D ex-
hibit a somewhat stronger onnetion, but hanges in the trade deit of durable
goods are the ones that seem most losely related to the hanges in the ollege
premium.
To further support the trade explanation, Leamer (1996) presents time-series
data of produer pries of textile and apparel in the United States between the
late 1940s and the mid-1990s. Relative to a produer prie index of a basket of
all produts, the prie of textile and apparel delined in that period. It dropped
signiantly in the 1970s, and remained fairly stable in the 1980s, having been
aompanied by inreases in imports of those goods in that rst deade.
Aording to Leamer (1996), the Stolper-Samuelson preditions would then imply
that the relative wages of workers in textile and apparel industries  traditionally,
less-skilled workers  should have delined strongly in the 1970s and remained stable
in the 1980s. However, this predition is at odds with the data, beause the relative
wage of less-skilled workers inreased in the 1970s and dereased in the 1980s (e. g.,
Aemoglu, 2003b). What Leamer, 1996 argues is that the onlusions of Stolper-
Samuelson theorem hold in equilibrium, and that it may take some time to reah
it. If true, this would justify why prie delines of unskilled-intensive goods in the
1970s only depressed the relative wage of unskilled workers a deade later.
Capital and tasks, not goods
Although there are many works linking hanges in the wage struture to trade,
the role of other dimensions of eonomi openness has also been studied. For ex-
ample, Feenstra and Hanson (1995)develop a two-ountry (North-South) model in
whih wage inequality is shaped by foreign investment and outsouring. Prodution
of some goods uses apital and skilled labour, whereas others are produed using
apital and unskilled workers. Capital is more abundant in the North, whih has
an advantage over the South in produing some skill-intensive goods, and the skill
premium is initially lower there.
Using this simple model, Feenstra and Hanson study the eet on wages of re-
moving barriers to apital. Capital initially ows from the North to the South
to take advantage of the higher return. This dereases apital return and, onse-
quently, prodution osts in the South. The prodution of some skill-intensive goods
beomes ompetitive in the South, and this inreases the relative demand for south-
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ern skilled-labour, inreasing their wage relative to unskilled workers. In addition,
the subset of skilled goods that the North produes is now more onentrated in
skill-intensive good and so the relative demand for unskilled labour falls, inreasing
the skill premium.
Putting this model against 1980s data for the United States (the North) and
Mexio (the South), Feenstra and Hanson's an explain about one-third of the in-
rease in the relative wage of the United States skilled workers. The fat that
outsouring inreased in the United States and foreign diret investment inreased
in Mexio seems to t their explanation. Furthermore, the authors argue that on-
sidering other forms of international ompetition in the model ould enhane its
explanatory power.
In a more reent work, Antràs et al. (2005) present an analysis related to that
of Feenstra and Hanson (1995), studying how ross-ountry division of tasks af-
fets work organisation and wages. They develop a two-ounty model in whih
ountries dier only in the skills of their populations. One ountry (the North) is
skill-abundant and the other (the South) has greater abundane of unskilled labour.
As in, e. g., Nahuis and Smulders (2002), skilled workers speialise in knowledge-
intensive, managerial tasks and unskilled workers speialise in prodution (routine)
tasks; physial inputs and knowledge are needed to arry out prodution ativities.
An additional (and ruial) assumption is that northern managers are more eient
than their southern peers.
The model points out that if ross-ountry teams of northern mangers and south-
ern prodution workers are allowed to form, wage inequality might rise in both oun-
tries. In the South, some unskilled workers are oupled with more eient northern
managers and experiene a boost in their produtivity (and wage rate) relative to
unskilled workers that interat with loal managers. Thus wage inequality among
southern unskilled workers inreases, widening ountry-wide wage inequality.
Northern wage dynamis are less linear. Unskilled workers fae ompetition from
their southern peers and this redues their wage. On the other hand, some northern
managers now manage southern workers, and thus there are fewer of them available
to manage northern unskilled labour. As a result, northern prodution workers
who onsume less managerial resoures beome more valuable and are better paid,
and this ontributes to derease overall wage inequality in the North. The path of
northern skill premium thus depends on the balane between these two opposite
eets.
Other works that link eonomi openness to patterns of skill premia address the
issue of labour migration. For example, Yabuuhi and Chaudhuri (2007) present a
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theoretial analysis of how international migration of labour an aet the wage gap
between skilled and unskilled workers in developing eonomies. They build a model
of a small developing eonomy with three setors: an informal, agriultural setor
uses unskilled labour and land; a setor that ombines (unionised) unskilled labour
and apital to obtain a low-skill manufaturing good; and a setor that produes a
high-skill manufaturing good, taking apital and skilled labour as inputs. Wages of
the unskilled setors are positively related, fators other than land and skilled labour
are mobile, and all markets (exept the labour market in the unskilled manufaturing
setor) are perfetly ompetitive.
Yabuuhi and Chaudhuri's paper suggests that, for example, emigration of skilled
labour might ontribute to lower wage inequality in developing eonomies, but this
depends on the apital intensity and institutional settings of markets where un-
skilled labour is employed. Speially, emigration of skilled workers dereases wage
inequality if apital intensity is higher in the unskilled manufaturing setor than in
the skilled manufaturing setor.
When skilled workers emigrate, they beome sarer and better paid, and so
in the skilled setor there is an inentive to substitute skilled-labour for apital.
Sine apital is sare, it must be drawn from the unskilled manufaturing setor.
As a result, in the unskilled manufaturing setor the demand for unskilled workers
rises, thereby inreasing unskilled wages. Yabuuhi and Chaudhuri show that, under
ertain onditions, this eet is stronger than the inrease in the wages of skilled
labour, thereby reduing the skill premium.
Empirial evidene onneting eonomi openness and wage inequality is mixed
(e. g., Haskel and Slaughter, 2001; Lawrene and Slaughter, 1993). For example,
Hijzen (2007) provides some evidene that the eets of openness are relevant, but
not entral in explaining the inrease in the skill premium. Following the method-
ology proposed by Feenstra and Hanson (1997), Hijzen (2007) studies the role of
tehnologial hange, outsouring and foreign ompetition in shaping the inrease
of wage inequality in the United Kingdom. Hijzen uses setor data for the period
1993-1998, and lassies labour into skilled and unskilled using the Standard Ou-
pational Categories Classiation.
His results show that both tehnologial hange and outsouring ontributed
to redue the wages of unskilled workers  with the eet of tehnologial hange
being roughly 70% stronger than that of outsouring , but there is no evidene
of the wages of skilled workers being aeted. Foreign ompetition, measured by
import pries, seems to have fored a slight redution in the wages of skilled workers,
therefore reduing wage inequality.
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And Wood (1997), for example, nds some ontraditory evidene for the role
of openness to trade in shaping wage inequality. Data from East Asia for the pe-
riod between the 1960s and 1970s lends some support to the idea that openness to
trade redues wage inequality in developing ountries, but data from Latin Amer-
ia for the late 1980s and early 1990s seems to say otherwise. In a more onrete
example by Arbahe et al. (2004), we nd evidene that openness to trade indeed
inreased returns to ollege eduation in Brazil. Interestingly, in their onluding
remarks Arbahe et al. (2004) argue that this is due to skill-biased tehnology being
transferred to Brazil through apital imports and foreign diret investment.
Summarising, skill-biased tehnologial hange, labour market features and eo-
nomi openness onstitute the main explanations to the reent widespread inrease of
skill premia. Moreover, a onsiderable onsensus exists in aknowledging the skill-
biased tehnologial hange hypothesis as the most robust explanation (Johnson,
1997). As in next hapter we study the behaviour of the skill premium through a
model in whih the skill-biased tehnologial hange literature is omplemented with
elements from the literature on tehnology-adoption osts and on learning-by-doing,
in the following setion we briey present the roots and many eonomi applia-
tions of the latter onept. We leave the disussion of tehnology-adoption osts for
setion 2.5.
2.4 Learning-by-doing
Muh of the interest on learning-by-doing mehanisms has been spawned by Arrow's
(1962) seminal paper. The ore of Arrow's work revolves around a simple, yet
important, observation onerning the industrial prodution osts. Arrow noties
that the ost of produing an additional unit dereases with the volume of past
ativity. Somehow, the experiene gained during the prodution proess ontributes
to improve produtive eieny, and to lower the ost of subsequent prodution.
Arrow (1962) argues that the improvement in eah rm's produtivity is inu-
ened by both industry-wide investment and industry-wide prodution due to: (i)
knowledge being reated as a by-produt of prodution and investment ativities;
(ii) eah rm being able to take advantage of that publily available knowledge.
Sine suh mehanism ould, potentially, generate endogenous growth, this simple
onnetion beame the basis for many later works that ontribute to what is alled
endogenous growth theory.
Furthermore, learning-by-doing mehanisms have also been used to study sub-
jets suh as international trade and real business yles, for example. The broad
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appliation of the onept of learning-by-doing, and the rihness of the eets it
generates, illustrates its importane in the eld of eonomis.
Learning-by-doing in the endogenous growth theory
One an say  with a reasonable degree of auray  that Arrow's work onstituted
a pathbreaking ontribution to growth theory. Given the dominant perspetive that
growth was exogenous (Solow, 1956), a mehanism apable of generating sustained
growth endogenously, while avoiding some known problems (as in, e. g., the AK
model), was nothing short of revolutionary.
The most notable ontribution that draws on the onept laid out by Arrow
(1962) is, arguably, the work by Romer (1986). In short, Romer spells out the build-
ing bloks that allow the reation of a model in whih rms generate knowledge while
they aumulate apital, thereby ontributing to generate endogenous growth. The
main feature of suh model is that prodution fators exhibit diminishing returns at
rm level, while at the same time they ontribute to reate knowledge that grows
ontinuously at eonomy level.
When rms arry out prodution and install apital, they take as given the ag-
gregate stok of knowledge, whih inuenes their produtivity. However, apital
aumulation at rm level generates knowledge that inreases the aggregate knowl-
edge stok. This, in turn, inreases rms' future produtivity levels, also implying
higher fator returns and apital aumulation in the future. Hene, apital au-
mulation at t stimulates further apital aumulation at t + 1, in a proess that
perpetuates itself. Provided that ertain onditions are met, in suh model the ex-
ternalities assoiated to apital aumulation are suient to generate a steady-state
in whih growth is determined endogenously.
A model losely related is the one proposed by Luas (1988). The main dierene
with respet to Romer (1986) is that Luas analyses the externalities assoiated with
human-apital aumulation, rather than with physial-apital aumulation. Al-
though not diretly onneted with Arrow's (1962) idea of learning-by-doing  in the
sense that knowledge reation is not assoiated with physial apital aumulation ,
the underlying mehanism is familiar. Human apital aumulation by individuals
inreases their own stok of human apital, and thus their own produtivity level.
However, individual deisions to aumulate human apital also ontribute to raise
the aggregate human apital level, whih Luas (1988) argues has a positive impat
on eah individual's produtivity. This aggregate eet then inreases the returns
to human apital, providing individuals with an inentive to invest more in it.
Other works (e. g., Stokey, 1988; Young, 1993) have drawn on the onept of
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learning-by-doing to generate endogenous-growth models signiantly dierent from
the ones proposed by Romer (1986) and Luas (1988). A entral harateristi of
those models is that the eonomy produes not just a single representative good,
but a basket of dierent goods. In these models, the seular proess of eonomi
growth doesn't simply translate into a mere inrease in the quantity of nal goods;
eonomi growth implies a hange in the basket of goods that the eonomy produes.
In the proposal by Stokey (1988), knowledge is ombined with labour to produe
a basket of nal goods. The higher the knowledge stok of the eonomy, the lower the
labour requirements to produe nal goods. Stokey assumes that knowledge reation
depends on both the existing knowledge stok and on the basket of goods that the
eonomy produes. In line with Arrow (1962), Stokey (1988) argues that knowledge
is reated as a by-produt of the prodution proess, and that the prodution of a
more sophistiated basket of goods ommands higher knowledge reation.
At a given time, the eonomy produes some goods and, in the proess, inreases
the knowledge stok. This lowers prodution osts (and pries) of nal goods, thus
allowing the eonomy to produe more omplex goods with the same resoures. As
Stokey (1988) aknowledges, for this proess to generate sustained eonomi growth
 in the sense of a ontinuously evolving basket of goods , onsumer preferenes
that favour more sophistiated goods are required.
Young (1993) ontributed to this strand of the literature by drawing attention
to the fat that, realistially, there might exist some limits to knowledge reation
from learning-by-doing. Young (1993) therefore proposes a model in whih the
eonomy produes an evolving basket of good, and learning-by-doing resulting from
the prodution of eah good is bounded. Furthermore, a signiant ontribution of
Young's work is that his model ombines learning-by-doing with innovation. Al-
though learning-by-doing an inrease the knowledge stok of the eonomy and
derease prodution osts, thereby freeing resoures to produe additional goods,
only deliberate invention eorts an make new goods available for prodution.
Other appliations of learning-by-doing
Learning-by-doing mehanisms have also been used within the endogenous growth
literature to build models in whih growth is not a ontinuous and stable proess,
but instead happens in yles. Although some works show that multi-setor growth
models an, in some ases, yield ylial growth (e. g., Benhabib and Nishimura,
1979), ylial growth is often thought to be related to what Shumpeter (1942)
dubbed as waves of reative destrution: revolutionary innovations  generated
endogenously within the eonomi system  make the eonomy move from its ur-
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rent equilibrium to a more advaned one. The eonomy goes through a proess
in whih existing eonomi strutures are initially destruted, thereby reating a
downward yle, so that new eonomi strutures an emerge, making way for a
yle of eonomi expansion. The use of learning-by-doing mehanisms to build en-
dogenous growth models that exhibit ylial growth an be found, for example, in
Greiner and Hanush (1994) and Greiner (1996).
Exploring ylial eets with learning-by-doing mehanisms, however, is not
onned to endogenous growth theory. In reent years similar eorts have been
made, for example, in real-business-yle theory (e. g., Cooper and Johri, 2002;
Chang et al., 2002). The standard real-business-yle model (e. g., King et al., 1988)
has some limitations when it omes to adequately repliate the persistent nature of
shoks that is observed in the data (Colgey and Nanson, 1995). To address this is-
sue, Cooper and Johri (2002) propose a framework in whih larning-by-doing meh-
anisms play a entral role in reating shoh-indued persistent utuations. In the
model learning-by-doing is linked to organisational apital, whih the authors as-
sume to be assoiated with rms, but also with workers (i. e., workers have knowledge
that is valuable to rms' ativities).
Based on simulation results, Cooper and Johri show that the learning-by-doing
mehanisms an indue muh stronger autoorrelation in maroeonomi variables
than the standard real-business-yle models. In the ase of i. i. d. shoks, for ex-
ample, the traditional real-business-yle model yields a smaller autoorrelation o-
eient on aggregate output than the model with learning-by-doing proposed by
Cooper and Johri. Depending on the formulation of the proess of aumulation of
organisational apital, these dierenes an be quite big.
An alternative approah to the inlusion of learning-by-doing in real-business-
yle models an be found, for example, in Chang et al. (2002). They propose
a model in whih workers' produtive experiene, whih drives their produtivity,
inreases with the number of hours they worked in the past. This formulation,
somewhat loser to the original onept of learning-by-doing proposed by Arrow
(1962), an also reate more persistent responses of output in response to exogenous
shoks.
Models of learning-by-doing have also been used to study international trade
(e. g., Young, 1991; Luas, 1993), providing a more thorough understanding of the
benets of trade. The work of Young (1991), for example, shows how trade inter-
ats with the learning-by-doing that eah ountry experienes while arrying out
prodution. Young's main ontribution is to point out that developing ountries
risk speializing in goods with limited learning-by-doing opportunities. Thus, the
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adverse dynami eets of trade might outweigh the stati gains obtained while
trading with more advaned ountries.
The appliations of learning-by-doing we have presented are a small illustration
of the importane that this onept has gained in eonomis. Beause learning-by-
doing mehanisms have proved to be intimately onneted with fator produtivity,
we believe they an be a fundamental tool in understanding the reent hanges in
labour demand and in the struture of wages.
2.5 Tehnology-adoption osts
The paper by Parente and Presott (1994) is the seminal work onerning ost of
tehnology-adoption.
8
In their work, Parente and Presott argue that ross-ountry
dierenes in barriers to tehnology adoption an  unlike dierenes in taxation
levels, for example  explain the vast inome disparity observed aross ountries.
The main assumption underpinning their results is that rms wishing to upgrade
their tehnologial level, and thus their produtivity, have to make an investment,
whih is, in essene, a sunken adoption-ost. Using data from a wide range of oun-
tries
9
, Parente and Presott show that small, plausible dierenes in the magnitude
of that investment an aount for the observed ross-ountry dierenes in inome
levels.
A similar argument, although built upon dierent assumptions, has been put up
by Easterly et al. (1994). Their model onsiders the ase in whih the prodution
of nal-goods is ahieved by ombining a ontinuum of intermediate goods and
labour. Barriers to tehnology adoption exist in this model beause the (aggregate)
level of human-apital limits the array of intermediate goods that an be used, and
Easterly et al. (1994) assume that upgrading the level of human apital is ostly
(i. e., it onsumes units of nal goods).
Firm-level evidene (e. g., Baldwin and Lin, 2002) suggests that there are in-
deed barriers to tehnology adoption, beause innovating implies a learning pro-
ess. Furthermore, some works point out that tehnology-adoption osts an a-
ount for the produtivity slowdown observed in the United States in the 1970s
(e. g., Greenwood and Yorukoglu, 1996; Kiley, 2001; Bessen, 2002). In priniple,
this ould stem from the doumented fat that adoption of information tehnologies
is assoiated with signiant hanges in the organisation of workplaes and pro-
dution proesses (see, e. g., Bresnahan et al., 1999; Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000;
8
Parente (1995) is also a relevant, losely related paper.
9
The ountries studied by Parente and Presott (1994) are the United States, Japan, Frane,
West Germany, South Korea and Taiwan.
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Blak and Lynh, 2001).
Furthermore, it is worth notiing that previous studies have already drawn on
the onept of tehnology-adoption osts to study the dynamis of wage inequality.
Dierenes in the ability to adopt innovative tehnologies  whih, naturally, imply
dierenes in the adoption osts  are at the ore of the work by Lloyd-Ellis (1999).
In this work, the inreases in the skill premium result from a deline in the growth
rate of the apaity of labour to absorb new tehnologies. In the model proposed
by Lloyd-Ellis (1999), for tehnologial innovations to enter the prodution proess
they must be adopted by workers that meet a minimum skill requirement. Moreover,
that skill requirement inreases as more omplex innovations arrive. On the other
hand, the skill distribution of the eonomy an also be updated over time, and thus
the apaity to absorb more omplex innovations may inrease.
Lloyd-Ellis's main onlusion is that if the omplexity of tehnologial innova-
tions grows faster than the mean absorptive apaity of labour, workers able to
implement the new tehnologies beome sarer, and thus more valuable and better
paid. In support of this result, Lloyd-Ellis (1999) points to the deline in the United
States eduational attainment doumented by Bishop (1979) and Jorgensen et al.
(1987).
Borghans and ter Weel (2007), on the other hand, stress that tehnology-adoption
osts at individual level might be at the heart of the dynamis of wage inequality.
They propose a model in whih they link the diusion of omputer tehnologies to
the hanges in the pattern of wage inequality and to the timing of those hanges.
In that model, skilled and unskilled workers, whih exhibit inter and intra-group
dierenes in produtivity, deide for the adoption of omputer tehnologies based
on an individual ost-benet analysis, omparing adoption-osts with produtiv-
ity benets. Borghans and ter Weel (2007) argue that these individual deisions
inuene the wages of skilled and unskilled workers dierently throughout time, ul-
timately aeting the path of wage inequality. A ruial assumption in the model
by Borghans and ter Weel (2007) is that the ost of adoption omputers falls exoge-
nously over time.
Initially, the omputer-related adoption osts are high and only some skilled
workers adopt them. This enhanes their produtivity, but also the aggregate sup-
ply of eient units of skilled labour. The latter eet outweighs the produtivity
inrease, depressing the wage of skilled workers (beause demand for eient units
of labour is stable). Sine initially few unskilled workers adopt the omputer teh-
nology, their wages are less aeted by the adverse eet aused by inreases in the
supply of eient units of unskilled labour. Therefore, wage inequality falls in the
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early stages of omputer adoption.
As the ost of adopting omputers falls, more unskilled workers begin adopting
that tehnology. Individually their produtivity inreases, and this inreases the
aggregate supply of eient units of unskilled labour. Like in the ase of skilled
workers, the adverse eet of additional supply outweighs the produtivity gains,
negatively aeting the wages of the unskilled. And even though some skilled workers
ontinue to adopt omputers, there are now few of them that are still non-adopters.
As a result, omputer adoption by those non-adopters has little impat on the wage
rate of skilled labour. Hene, in the latter stages of tehnology adoption the skill
premium inreases.
The work of Borghans and ter Weel (2007) has the merit of bringing out the fat
that beause tehnology adoption is ostly, the diusion of new tehnologies is not
an instant proess (see, e. g., Manseld, 1961, 1965; Davies (1979)) and as suh has
the potential to inuene the time path of produtivity and wages. Indeed, this
view is also defended by Caselli (1999), who argues that the ost of adopting new
tehnologies exists beause workers have to upgrade their skills. However, unlike
Borghans and ter Weel (2007), Caselli onsiders the ase in whih the nature of the
tehnologial hange an favour either skilled or unskilled labour.
In light of these ontributions, it seems lear that tehnology-adoption osts an
have a signiant, variable impat on growth, produtivity and wages. Therefore, it
seems unwise to ignore their eet when studying the path of wage inequality, and
we onsider it in the model developed in the following hapter. However, in ontrast
to some of the ontributions we presented here, we make no previous assumptions
on the relative magnitude of the tehnology-adoption osts experiened by eah type
of labour (skilled or unskilled). In our opinion, this feature is important to obtain
riher dynamis in terms of the path of wage inequality.
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3 Model
3.1 Overview
Throughout this hapter we build an endogenous growth model where R&D is the
driving fore behind eonomi growth. We draw on the framework laid out by
Afonso (2006, 2007), whih onnets the skill-biased tehnial hange literature (e. g.,
Aemoglu, 1998, 2002, 2003b) with the Shumpeterian approah to growth (e. g.,
Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman and Helpman (1991b); Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
2004). We expand this framework by onsidering the eets of learning-by-doing
(Arrow, 1962) and tehnology-adoption osts (Parente and Presott, 1994) upon
both the skill-bias of tehnology and wage inequality.
We onsider an eonomy populated by innitely-lived households, by rms that
produe a homogeneous nal good, and by rms that produe intermediate goods.
Population growth is zero, and time is ontinuously indexed by t on R+0 .
Households supply labour to the eonomy, onsume units of the aggregate output,
and own rm equity. Eah household's labour endowment is onstant, and sine
population growth is zero the total amount of labour supplied to the eonomy does
not vary over time.
In the nal-goods setor rms ombine labour and a ontinuum of quality-
adjusted intermediate goods to obtain their output. The prodution of nal goods
is perfetly ompetitive, and the output of all nal-goods rms onstitutes the eon-
omy's aggregate output.
Intermediate-goods produers use units of this aggregate output and blueprints
as their inputs. Blueprints onsist of information on how to produe and market
spei qualities of intermediate goods, and they are obtained through R&D, whih,
in turn, drives eonomi growth, the tehnologial-knowledge bias and the path of
wage inequality. The rm that rst introdues a new quality of an intermediate
good earns the perpetual right to be its sole produer. The legal protetion for
those prodution rights is established through a patent system.
3.2 Households
Households are endowed with ability a ∈ [0, 1] and supply one of two types of
labour. If a < a they supply low-skilled labour, La, otherwise they supply high-
skilled labour, Ha.
The total amount of low-skilled labour supplied to the eonomy, L, is given by∫ a
0
La da. The wage rate of this type of labour is wL (t). High-skilled labour, in turn,
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is paid at a wage rate of wH (t), and the amount of it supplied to the eonomy is
given by H =
∫ 1
a
Ha da. We assume that H + L = 1.
All households have idential preferenes and wish to maximize their lifetime
utility. Preferenes are haraterized by a onstant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility funtion. Thus, a household with ability a maximizes
∫
∞
0
Ca (t)
1−θ − 1
1− θ
· e−ρt dt, (3.1)
where Ca (t) is its onsumption at time t, ρ is the subjetive disount rate and θ
is the oeient of relative risk aversion. Parameter θ is also the inverse of the
inter-temporal elastiity of substitution.
Households aumulate assets (K) in the form of ownership of rms that produe
intermediate goods. Those assets earn returns at the interest rate r (t). A house-
hold's assets stok is aeted by its net savings, given by the dierene between its
inome  wages and interest  and its onsumption. The ow budget onstraint of
a household with ability a is given by:
K˙a (t) = r (t)Ka (t) + wz (t)Za (t)− Ca (t) , (3.2)
where K˙a (t) is the hange in the assets stok of household a, and:
Z =
{
L if a ≤ a
H if a > a
.
In addition, the borrowing and lending of every household is onstrained by a no
Ponzi games ondition: limt→∞Ka (t) e
−ρt = 0.
The households' problem is then to maximize (3.1) subjet to the onstraints
imposed by (3.2) and by the no Ponzi games ondition. The present value Hamil-
tonian for this problem is:
H (t) =
(
Ca (t)
1−θ − 1
1− θ
)
e−ρt + µ (t) [r (t)Ka (t) + wZ (t)Za (t)− Ca (t)] ,
and the rst order onditions are:
Ca (t)
−θ (t) e−ρt = µ (t) , and (3.3)
µ (t) r (t) = −µ˙ (t) . (3.4)
Dierentiating (3.3) with respet to time and substituting the result into equation
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(3.4) yields:
µ (t) r (t) = ρCa (t)
−θ e−ρt + θCa (t)
−θ−1 C˙a (t) e
−ρt
,
where C˙a (t) is the hange in the onsumption of a household with ability a. Dividing
this result by (3.3) gives the optimal path for onsumption of a household with ability
a:
C˙a (t)
Ca (t)
=
r (t)− ρ
θ
, (3.5)
whih is independent of the ability level. Aggregate onsumption, C (t), is given
by
∫ 1
0
Ca (t) da. Sine population growth is zero, the optimal path for aggregate
onsumption equals (3.5):
˙C (t)
C (t)
=
˙Ca (t)
Ca (t)
=
r (t)− ρ
θ
,
where C˙ (t) is the hange in aggregate onsumption. Consumption  as well as
resoures devoted to R&D, R (t), or to the prodution of intermediate goods, X (t)
 omes out of the aggregate output of the nal-goods setor, Y (t):
C (t) +X (t) +R (t) = Y (t) . (3.6)
3.3 Final-goods setor
Firms in this perfetly ompetitive setor are indexed by n over the range [0, 1]
and produe nal goods. Two substitute prodution tehnologies are available. A
low-omplexity tehnology  the L-tehnology  uses a ombination of low-skilled
labour and a ontinuum of intermediate goods indexed by j ∈ [0, J ]. We'll refer to
these goods as `low-spei intermediate goods'. A high-omplexity tehnology  the
H -tehnology  ombines high-skilled labour and a set of high-spei intermediate
goods, ontinuously indexed by j ∈ [J, 1].
All rms in the nal-goods setor have aess to the tehnologies desribed above,
and the prodution funtion of any rm n is given by:
Yn (t) = A
{
[(1− n)LnσL]
α
∫ J
0
(
Xjn (t) q
kj(t)
)1−α
dj
+ [nHnσH ]
α
∫ 1
J
(
Xjn (t) q
kj(t)
)1−α
dj
}
, (3.7)
where A is an overall eieny parameter, α ∈ ]0, 1[ is the share of labour in the
prodution, and Ln and Hn are the amounts of low and high-skilled labour used
by rm n. Both
∫ 1
0
Ln dn = L and
∫ 1
0
Hn dn = H hold at any point in time. The
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terms n and (1− n) imply that low-skilled labour is more produtive in produing
lower-index nal goods, whereas high-skilled labour is more produtive in produing
higher-index nal goods.
10
In line with the Shumpeterian growth models literature (e. g., Aghion and Howitt,
1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004), Xjn (t) is the quantity of intermediate good
j used by rm n, and qkj(t) measures the quality level of that intermediate good.
Qualities of intermediate goods are ordered along a quality ladder, and kj (t) is the
highest quality rung of intermediate good j available at time t.11 Parameter q,
greater than one, measures the quality improvement that ours in an intermediate
good when a new quality of it is introdued, i. e., when kj (t) inreases by one.
Finally, terms σL and σH measure the tehnologial readiness of low and high-
skilled labour. By tehnologial readiness of labour we mean how eiently workers
use the respetive omplementary intermediate goods, and how easily they adapt to
new, improved versions of those goods.
Although we leave a detailed analysis of σL and σH to setion 3.6, a short ex-
planation is now in order. We assume workers must gain some familiarity with the
intermediate goods in order to fully explore their potential. This draws on the idea
of learning-by-doing popularized by Arrow (1962), and muh of the mehanism we
propose is also related with the work of Luas (1988).
We assume that familiarity with intermediate goods, whih an be regarded
as a form of tait knowledge, is aquired in the prodution proess. We assume
that tait knowledge aquired by one worker is shared with other workers of the
same type. Moreover, at least to some extent, workers aquire dierent knowledge
during the interation with the intermediate goods, making knowledge exhange
beneial. Thus, labour endowments determine how muh tait knowledge is reated
and disseminated by eah group of workers. We assume that beause dierent sets of
intermediate goods are ombined with dierent kinds of workers, tait knowledge is
spei to eah type of labour. Finally, we assume that tait knowledge has a positive
eet on workers' eieny in using intermediate goods. Inreased familiarity with
intermediate goods improves labour produtivity.
Another issue to onsider is how workers ope with tehnologial progress, i. e.,
with the introdution of new versions of intermediate goods. We assume that beause
workers have to make an eort to adapt to new versions of intermediate goods, the
upgrading proess is ostly and has an eet upon the prodution of nal goods.
10
As we will see later on, a threshold nal good n ∈]0, 1[ exists suh that goods n < n are pro-
dued with one tehnology and the remaining nal goods are produed using the other tehnology.
11
We onsider an equilibrium in whih nal-goods produers only use the highest-quality inter-
mediate goods. Setion 3.4 provides further details.
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This assumption relates to the work of Parente and Presott (1994), who stress the
negative impat of barriers to tehnology-adoption in eonomi growth.
Rather than onsidering an expliit upgrading ost, we simply assume that part
of the prodution eorts are diverted to the proess of adapting to new versions of
intermediate goods, resulting in lower produtivity and output. Were tehnology-
adoption ostless and the introdution of new versions of intermediate goods would
result in a greater inrease in aggregate output.
To sum up, on the one hand the tehnologial readiness of labour is, in part, de-
termined by how eiently workers use the respetive omplementary intermediate
goods, in line with the idea of learning-by-doing popularised by Arrow (1962); and
on the other hand, it denotes how easily workers adapt to new, improved qualities
of intermediate goods, and this is assoiated with the negative impat of barriers to
tehnology adoption in eonomi growth stressed by Parente and Presott (1994).
For simpliity we omit the tehnial details underlying σL and σH until setion
3.6. This avoids some notational luttering and has no inuene on the results we
derive along the way.
The behaviour of nal-goods rms
Let Pn (t) be the prie of the nal good produed by rm n and Pj (t) denote the
prie of intermediate good j. Prots of any rm n, pin (t), are given by:
pin (t) = Pn (t) Yn (t)− wL (t)Ln (t)− wH (t)Hn (t)
−
∫ J
0
Xjn (t)Pj (t) dj −
∫ 1
J
Xjn (t)Pj (t) dj. (3.8)
Sine the nal-goods setor is perfetly ompetitive, any rm n takes the prie of
its own produt, the prie of intermediate goods, and labour wage rates as given. The
rst-order onditions of the prot maximization problem require that the marginal
ontribution of eah input to prots equals zero. Thus, dierentiating (3.8) with
respet to Xjn, equating the result to zero, and solving for Xjn yields:
12
Xjn = P
−1/α
j (PnA)
1/α [(1− n)LnσL] (1− α)
1/α (qkj)(1−α)/α , if 0 ≤ j ≤ J , (3.9)
and:
Xjn = P
−1/α
j (PnA)
1/α [nHnσH ] (1− α)
1/α (qkj)(1−α)/α , if J ≤ j ≤ 1. (3.10)
12
We drop the time arguments to simplify the notation, and we will do so whenever that is
onvenient and auses no onfusion.
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These two expressions represent, respetively, the demand of rm n for low-
spei and high-spei intermediate goods. Firms demand more intermediate
goods when the pries of their own goods inrease, or when intermediate-goods
pries derease. Also, rms use more intermediate goods when they employ more
workers, i. e., when Ln or Hn are higher. This eet is due to the omplementarity
between labour and intermediate goods in (3.7).
Using (3.9) and (3.10) to subsitute for Xjn in (3.7) we obtain:
Yn = A
{
[(1− n)LnσL]
[
(1− α)
Pj
](1−α)/α
(PnA)
(1−α)/α
∫ J
0
(
qkj
)(1−α)/α
dj
+ [nHnσH ]
[
(1− α)
Pj
](1−α)/α
(PnA)
(1−α)/α
∫ 1
J
(
qkj
)(1−α)/α
dj
}
.
The prie Pj doesn't enter the integral beause it is independent of j, as we will see
later on. After some manipulation, this expression simplies to:
Yn = A
1/α
[
Pn (1− α)
Pj
](1−α)/α
{[(1− n)LnσL]QL + [nHnσH ]QH} , (3.11)
where:
QL =
∫ J
0
(
qkj
)(1−α)/α
dj and QH =
∫ 1
J
(
qkj
)(1−α)/α
dj.
The terms QL and QH measure the aggregate quality of the intermediate goods that
omplement, respetively, low and high-skilled labour.
We an use the ratio QH/QL as a measure of the tehnologial knowledge bias.
For instane, a higher value for the ratio QH/QL implies that the aggregate qual-
ity of high-spei intermediate goods is higher than the aggregate quality of low-
spei intermediate goods. In this ase we say that tehnologial knowledge is
biased towards the H -tehnology. Whenever we refer to inreases (dereases) in the
tehnologial-knowledge bias, we mean inreases (dereases) of the QH/QL ratio.
The omposite nal good is taken as the eonomy's aggregate ouput, Y (t), whih
is thus given by:
Y =
∫ 1
0
PnYn dn, (3.12)
Finally, assuming the normalization exp
∫ 1
0
lnPn dn = 1, i. e., taking Y as numeraire
at eah time, we an write expression (3.12) as:
Y = exp
∫ 1
0
lnYn dn.
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3.4 Intermediate-goods setor
To obtain one unit of any quality-adjusted intermediate good, Xj, rms in this setor
use one unit of aggregate output. Hene, the marginal ost of produing intermediate
goods is independent of their quality, onstant aross intermediate goods and equal
to one.
Eah quality of an intermediate good is exlusively produed by the owner of its
patent. Suppose that at eah time t, the monopolist that holds the patent for the
highest quality of intermediate good j an (potentially) obtain a prot ow of:
pij (t) = (Pj (t)− 1)Xj (t) , (3.13)
where Xj (t) is the aggregate demand for the highest-quality intermediate good j.
The goal of the monopolist is to hoose the sequene of pries [Pj (t), Pj (t+ 1),
. . . ℄ that maximizes the present disounted value of all prot ows. Following
Aemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), we assume that intermediate goods bought by the
produers of nal goods fully depreiate at the end of eah period. Under suh
assumption, the monopolist faes no dynami onstraints and every period hooses
Pj (t) so as to maximize (3.13).
To determine the prie for the highest-quality intermediate good j, we start by
omputing the aggregate demand, Xj . Sine all rms in the nal-goods setor fae
the same intermediate-goods pries, we an immediately use (3.9) and (3.10) to
ompute Xj =
∫ 1
0
Xjn dn for all intermediate-goods j ∈ [0, 1]. This yields:
Xj = (Pj − 1)
[
A (1− α)
Pj
]1/α (
qkj
)(1−α)/α
σL
∫ 1
0
(1− n)Ln (Pn)
1/α dn, (3.14)
for intermediate goods j ∈ [0, J ], and:
Xj = (Pj − 1)
[
A (1− α)
Pj
]1/α (
qkj
)(1−α)/α
σH
∫ 1
0
nHn (Pn)
1/α dn, (3.15)
for intermediate goods j ∈ [J, 1].13 Taking into aount (3.14) and (3.15), the
maximization of (3.13) with respet to Pj yields:
Pj =
1
1− α
, (3.16)
for all j ∈ [0, 1]. The monopoly prie for any highest-quality intermediate-good is:
13
As it will beome lear later on, the integral terms in (3.14) and (3.15) will be∫ n
0
(1− n)Ln (Pn)
1/α
dn and
∫
1
n nLn (Pn)
1/α
dn, respetively.
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(i) a mark-up over the marginal ost of prodution, sine α ∈]0, 1[; (ii) onstant
aross intermediate goods and time invariant; and (iii) independent of the quality
level of the intermediate good.
Whether or not a monopolist an prie its output aording to (3.16) depends on
the substitutability between dierent qualities of a same intermediate good and on
the value of q. Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, hapter 7), we assume that
q > 1/ (1− α) and that monopolists set Pj aording to (3.16), eetively driving
the monopolists of lower qualities of intermediate-good j out of the market.14
3.5 Quality-improving R&D
Firms in the intermediate-goods setor arry out R&D ativities that are aimed at
improving the quality level of intermediate goods. Let δj (k, t) denote the probabil-
ity of the k-th quality of intermediate good j being introdued at time t, thereby
improving the quality level of that good from qk to qk+1. We assume that this
probability is given by
δj (k, t) = Rj (k, t) Ψj (k, t) ζj (t) ξj (k, t) , (3.17)
for all j ∈ [0, 1]. This funtion for the probability of suess of R&D is adapted
from Afonso (2006). We assume that this funtion is the same for low-spei and
high-spei intermediate goods, whereas Afonso's proposal onsiders the ase in
whih R&D aimed at high-spei intermediate goods is more eetive.
15
The term Rj (k, t) is the total amount of R&D spending aimed at improving in-
termediate good j. As desribed by (3.6), R&D spending omes out of the aggregate
output of the nal-goods setor. Beause aggregate output is an input of R&D ativ-
ities, this speiation ts in the lab-equipment lass that Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991) refer to.
In addition, our formulation implies that in equilibrium there will be onstant
returns to sale in R&D expenditures, in line with Romer (1993), for example. Em-
pirial evidene with respet to this is somewhat mixed (Kortum, 1993; Thompson,
1996; Morrison and Siegel, 1997).
As for the other terms, Ψj (k, t) represents the learning eet, ζj (t) is the adverse
14
For a detailed disussion of priing strategies and its relation with the value of q see
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, hapter 7). The alternative use of limit priing strategies would
not alter the nature of the results. Furthermore, it is shown that the monopolist gains a one-rung
quality advantage over its losest ompetitor.
15
Afonso (2006, p. 15) reets an absolute advantage of the high-skilled labour over low-skilled
labour to learn, assimilate and implement advaned tehnologial knowledge in the probability
funtion of R&D suess. We take a dierent approah, explained in detail in setion 3.6.
33
eet indued by the size of the market for intermediate goods, and ξj (k, t) is the
omplexity eet. We now explain eah one of them with more detail.
Learning eet
This eet relates past suessful R&D in an intermediate good with the probability
of suess of urrent R&D aimed that good. Two related assumptions shape this
eet. The rst is that tehnologial knowledge is non-rival, i. e., one disovered it
an be used by any rm. The seond assumption is that the legal system only gives
protetion to prodution rights.
In other words, it stops rms from produing qualities of intermediate goods
introdued by others, but it gives no protetion to the tehnologial knowledge
underlying those goods. Firms are free to resort to means suh as reverse engineering
to obtain the tehnologial knowledge embodied in an intermediate good and use it
in R&D ativities aimed at reating new qualities of that good.
The seond assumption, onneted with the rst, is that rms indeed learn from
past intermediate-goods innovations, and use that knowledge in their R&D eorts to
introdue new qualities of intermediate goods. Together with the rst assumption,
this implies that R&D eorts aimed at an intermediate good beome more eetive
as new qualities of that good are introdued.
Sine qkj(t) is a measure of the past suessful R&D in intermediate good j, we
model the learning eet as:
Ψj (k, t) = Γq
kj(t)
, (3.18)
where Γ > 0 is a learning oeient.
Market-size eet
Suessfully introduing a new quality of an intermediate good is a two-step proess.
A rm must invent the new quality of an intermediate good, but it must also market
it adequately. Many tasks involved in this last step are more diult to exeute in
larger markets: for example, as Beker and Murphy (1992) point out, o-ordination
among agents might be harder to ahieve with inreased market size. Furthermore,
information dissemination and proessing an beome more omplex as the mar-
ket grows, and innovators may experiene additional diulties in marketing their
produts.
Sine in our model nal-goods rms buy intermediate goods to use in ombi-
nation with labour, the eonomy's endowment of eah type of labour (L and H)
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provides a good measure of the size of the market for the respetive omplemen-
tary intermediate goods. Therefore, we model the adverse market-size eet on
innovation probability as:
ζj (t) = Z
−1
, (3.19)
where Z = L if j ≤ J and Z = H if j > J . This follows Dinopoulos and Thompson
(1999) in removing the sale eets from the R&D ativities, and is in line with the
literature on sale eets (e. g., Jones, 1995a,b).
Complexity eet
The omplexity eet an be expressed by:
ξj (k, t) = χ
−1q−(1/α)kj(t), (3.20)
where χ is a positive onstant. In line with Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, hapter
7), this eet reets an inreasing diulty to improve the quality of intermediate
goods as their quality level rises. All else equal, every time an improvement ours in
one intermediate good the probability of further R&D suess diminishes. A ommon
theoretial justiation provided for this assumption is that the rst qualities to be
introdued are the easiest to invent, therefore making innovation more diult by
emptying the pool of trivial ideas.
A onvenient feature of this eet is that, together with the learning eet,
steers the eonomy to a onstant growth rate over time, i. e., it helps the eonomy
to ahieve a steady state.
3.6 The tehnologial readiness of labour
In setion 3.3 we briey disussed the meaning of the terms σL and σH . There
we said they measure the tehnologial readiness of labour, i. e., they measure how
eiently workers use and adapt to new versions of intermediate-goods. We assumed
this was inuened both by fators related to learning-by-doing and adoption of new
versions of intermediate goods. In this setion we motivate and speify in greater
depth these two terms.
We model σL and σH as:
σL = L
l exp (φ1L) (3.21)
σH = c×H
h exp (φ2H) , (3.22)
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where φ1, φ2 < 0; l, h ≥ 1; and c ≥ 1. In both ases exp (·) aptures the eet of
tehnology adoption. The terms Ll and Hh are related to learning-by-doing eets.
Finally, c reets an absolute advantage of high-skilled labour over low-skilled labour
in terms of tehnologial readiness.
Tehnology learning
We assume that workers aquire tehnial expertise in intermediate good j (i. e.,
learn how to use it eiently) by interating with it during the prodution proess.
Furthermore, we assume that goods from the same tehnology share a ommon
tehnologial ground, making expertise gained while working with one good useful
for working with other goods of the same type. Due to these two assumptions, low
(high-)skilled workers aquire tehnial expertise in low (high-)spei intermediate
goods as a whole simply by working with one intermediate good of that type.
In addition, we assume that dierent workers learn dierent aspets of the teh-
nology, and that they exhange their tehnial expertise with other workers that use
goods of the same type. Moreover, we assume that this exhange is beneial for
the workers involved in it. Hene, the amount of tehnial expertise that exists in
the eonomy for eah type of intermediate goods is linked to the total amount of
labour that is being ombined with those goods. That is to say, the labour endow-
ments L and H inuene the amount of tehnial expertise that exists for low and
high-spei intermediate goods, respetively.
The parameters l and h help to shape this eet. For example, sine L takes
values over the range [0, 1], a parameter l lower than one would imply that as the
available eonomy-wide tehnial expertise in low-spei intermediate goods grows
(as L inreases), the benet that low-skilled workers obtain from it inreases at an
inreasing rate. On the other hand, assuming a value for l greater than one implies
that the benet inreases at a dereasing rate; we onsider this latter ase.
It is interesting to note that what we have desribed implies the existene of two
kinds of spillovers: one that involves intermediate goods of the same type and other
that involves workers of the same type. The spillovers aross intermediate goods
of the same type are similar to the ross-industry knowledge spillovers of earlier
models of endogenous growth with learning-by-doing (e. g., Stokey (1988); Young
(1993)). The spillovers involving workers of the same type are related, for example,
to what Luas (1988) proposes. In his work, Luas (1988) develops a model in
whih the average level of human apital, whih is inuened by eah individual's
human-apital stok, ontributes to the produtivity of all prodution fators (the
external eet of human apital). Here, we reate a mehanism through whih the
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produtivity of the prodution fators of one tehnology is aeted by the tehnial
expertise gathered by workers assoiated with that tehnology.
Summing up, learning-by-doing eets positively aet the tehnologial readi-
ness of labour, and thus inrease its produtivity. Finally, it should be noted that
beause workers and intermediate goods are omplementary in the prodution fun-
tion, these eets at not only upon the produtivity of labour, but also upon the
produtivity of the respetive omplementary intermediate goods. Thus, the pro-
dutivity of the L-tehnology (H -tehnology) as a whole is inuened by the learning
made by low-skilled (high-skilled) workers.
Tehnology adoption
In their analysis of the tehnology adoption phenomenon, Parente and Presott
(1994) argue that rms wishing to inrease their tehnologial-knowledge level fae
barriers to the adoption of the available tehnology. Aording to them, these barri-
ers an be aused, for example, by legal onstraints or strikes, and they play a role in
determining the output of an eonomy and its growth rate. Others have argued that
the adoption of new tehnologies auses rms to bear unmeasured adjustment osts.
Bessen (2002), for example, points out that these osts over things like adapting to
new organizational patterns or putting omplementary investments in plae.
16
As already stated, in our model we inlude the eets of barriers to tehnology
adoption. We assume that when new qualities of intermediate goods are introdued,
workers have to adapt to them and this redues their tehnologial readiness, thus
reduing their produtivity. As a result, the positive eet of the improvement in
the average quality of intermediate goods diminishes. Some produtive resoures are
eaten up by the proess of adapting to the new qualities of the intermediate goods,
and Y (t) inreases less than if the barriers to tehnology adoption were smaller.
Furthermore, we assume that these barriers are spei to eah type of teh-
nology, and that they are linked to the endowments of low-skilled and high-skilled
labour. For example, barriers to tehnology adoption in the L-tehnology are higher
when there are more low-skilled workers that need to adapt to new versions of low-
spei intermediate goods. Hene, a higher value of L implies a lower value (i. e.
more negative) of exp (φ1L).
For some values of L, H , φ1 and φ2, the barriers to tehnology adoption might be
greater in H -tehnology than in L-tehnology. This diers from approahes suh as
those of Caselli (1999) and Lloyd-Ellis (1999) in whih it is assumed that more-skilled
16
Bessen (2002) provides ompelling evidene that adjustment osts inreased during the shift
to the information tehnologies paradigm.
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workers have an advantage over less-skilled workers in adopting new tehnologies.
This perspetive overlooks the fat, whih, in our opinion, is not negligible, that
dierent types of workers use dierent types of tehnologies. For this reason, it
might happen that low-skilled workers are better prepared than high-skilled ones to
adapt to new qualities of the intermediate goods they use.
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4 Equilibria
We will now proeed with the analysis of the model presented in hapter 3. First we
derive the equilibrium for a given tehnologial-knowledge state, i. e., for given values
of the aggregate quality indexes QL and QH . Then we bring into onsideration the
R&D ativities, and derive the law of motion for both QL and QH . Later on, we
use these results to haraterise the steady-state and transitional dynamis of the
eonomy.
4.1 Equilibrium given a tehnologial-knowledge level
One feature of the prodution funtion desribed in (3.11) is that low-skilled workers
of the L-tehnology are more produtive in produing low-index nal goods, and
inputs of the H -tehnology are more produtive in produing high-index nal goods.
This suggests the existene of a threshold n suh that the prodution of nal
goods n ∈ [0, n] only uses the L-tehnology, while all the other nal goods are
produed exlusively with the H -tehnology. It turns out that this is true and we
an write the prodution funtion as:
17
Yn =


A1/α (1− n)LnσL
[
(1−α)Pn
1/(1−α)
](1−α)/α
QL if 0 ≤ n ≤ n
A1/αnHnσH
[
(1−α)Pn
1/(1−α)
](1−α)/α
QH if n < n ≤ 1
. (4.1)
As a result, we need to obtain the value of n before we an haraterise the equilib-
rium for a given level of tehnologial knowledge.
Final-goods threshold
In equilibrium, the marginal value produt of a given type of labour must be equal
aross all nal goods that are produed using it. Otherwise, there would be an
inentive to shift labour alloations aross nal goods whose prodution depends on
the same type of labour. We start by omputing the marginal value produts of low
and high-skilled labour. They are, respetively:
∂ (PnYn)
∂Ln
= (1− n) (PnA)
1/α
[
1− α
1/ (1− α)
](1−α)/α
σLQL, (4.2)
17
See Appendix A for a formal proof.
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and:
∂ (PnYn)
∂Hn
= n (PnA)
1/α
[
1− α
1/ (1− α)
](1−α)/α
σHQH . (4.3)
Notie that A, QL, QH , L, H , σL and σH are all independent of n. Hene, it must
be that in equilibrium (1− n) (Pn)
1/α
is onstant aross n ∈ [0, n], and n (Pn)
1/α
is
onstant aross n ∈ [n, 1].
Let us dene two onstant prie-indexes, PL and PH , as:
(PL)
1/α = (1− n) (Pn)
1/α
, if 0 ≤ n ≤ n, and (4.4)
(PH)
1/α = n (Pn)
1/α
, if n < n ≤ 1. (4.5)
Plugging these denitions into (4.1) we obtain:
Yn =


A1/α (1− n)1/α LnσL
[
(1−α)PL
1/(1−α)
](1−α)/α
QL if 0 ≤ n ≤ n
A1/αn1/αHnσH
[
(1−α)PH
1/(1−α)
](1−α)/α
QH if n < n ≤ 1
. (4.6)
From the onsumer's maximization problem we know that Pn (t) Yn (t) is equal
for all n. In turn, this implies that for nal goods n = 0 and n = 1 we an write:
P0 (t) Y0 (t) = P1 (t) Y1 (t) .
Substituting Y1 (t) and Y0 (t) using (4.6) and then applying some algebra to simplify
the expressions, we obtain:
(PL)
1/α L0σLQL = (PH)
1/αH1σHQH . (4.7)
In equilibrium Ln is onstant aross n ∈ [0, n], and Hn is onstant aross n ∈ [n, 1].
More speially:
18
Ln =
L
n
, (4.8)
for all n ∈ [0, n], and:
Hn =
H
1− n
, (4.9)
for all n ∈ [n, 1]. Using (4.8) and (4.9) to substitute for L0 and for H1 in (4.7), and
18
See Appendix A for a full derivation of these results.
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then rearranging terms, yields:
PH
PL
=
[
H
L
×
σH
σL
×
n
1− n
×
QH
QL
]
−α
. (4.10)
Finally, using (4.10) together with (4.4) and (4.5) gives us the value of n:
n =
{
1 +
[
H
L
×
σH
σL
×
QH
QL
]1/2}−1
. (4.11)
The share of nal goods that are produed using the H -tehnology depends on
the relative supply of low and high-skilled labour, on the tehnologial readiness of
low and high-skilled labour, and on the skill-bias of the tehnologial knowledge,
given by QH/QL.
Maroeonomi Aggregates
Having derived the value of n, we an now ompute equilibrium values for the
relevant maroeonomi aggregates. Sine we are determining the equilibrium for
a given tehnologial-knowledge level, no R&D ativities take plae and, for that
reason, R = 0. As a result, we only need to ompute X and Y , beause (3.6) then
impliitly denes the value of C.
The aggregate expenditure in the prodution of intermediate goods, X, is given
by:
X =
∫ 1
0
Xj =
∫ J
0
Xj dj +
∫ 1
J
Xj dj,
whereXj =
∫ 1
0
Xjn dn is the aggregate demand for (and expenditure in) intermediate
good j.
As we have seen before, the L-tehnology is only used to produe nal-goods
n ∈ [0, n], and so only nal-goods rms n ∈ [0, n] demand low-spei intermediate
goods. The same reasoning applies to high-spei intermediate goods, bought only
by nal-goods rms n ∈ [n, 1]. Therefore, the expression above is the same as:
X =
∫ J
0
∫ n
0
Xjn dn dj +
∫ 1
J
∫ 1
n
Xjn dn dj.
Using (3.14) and (3.10) to substitute for Xjn as neessary, this expression evaluates
to:
X =
[
A (1− α)
1/ (1− α)
]1/α [
L (PL)
1/α σLQL +H (PH)
1/α σHQH
]
. (4.12)
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Aggregate output is dened as:
Y =
∫ 1
0
PnYn dn =
∫ n
0
PnYn dn+
∫ 1
n
PnYn dn.
Substituting the value of Yn (t) aording to (4.6) and omputing the integrals yields:
Y = A1/α
[
1− α
1/ (1− α)
](1−α)/α [
L (PL)
1/α σLQL +H (PH)
1/α σHQH
]
. (4.13)
Expressions (4.12) and (4.13) an be written in a more ompat way. The prie
indexes PL and PH an be expressed as:
PL = e
−α
{
1 +
[
σH
σL
×
H
L
×
QH
QL
]1/2}α
, (4.14)
PH = e
−α
{
1 +
[
σH
σL
×
H
L
×
QH
QL
]
−1/2
}α
. (4.15)
Using these expressions together with (4.12) and (4.13) yields, at eah t:
X = e−1
[
A (1− α)
1/ (1− α)
]1/α [
(LσLQL)
1/2 + (HσHQH)
1/2
]2
, (4.16)
Y = e−1A1/α
[
1− α
1/ (1− α)
](1−α)/α [
(LσLQL)
1/2 + (HσHQH)
1/2
]2
. (4.17)
Wages
In equilibrium, prodution fators are paid at their marginal produtivities. Dier-
entiation of (4.17) with respet to L and H yields, respetively, the wage rates for
low and high-skilled labour:
wL =
λ
2
[
eφ1LL1+lQL
]
−1/2 [
φ1e
φ1LL1+lQL + e
φ1L (1 + l)LlQL
]
, (4.18)
wH =
λ
2
[
ceφ2HH1+hQH
]
−1/2 [
cφ2e
φ2HH1+hQH + ce
φ2H (1 + h)HhQH
]
, (4.19)
where:
λ = 2e−1
[
A (1− α)
1/ (1− α)
]1/α {[
eφ1LL1+lQL
]1/2
+
[
ceφ2HH1+φQH
]1/2}
.
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Finally, we an dene the wage ratio (skill premium), measuring intra-ountry wage
inequality at eah t:
wH
wL
=
[
eφ1LL1+l
ceφ2HH1+h
×
QL
QH
]1/2 [
ceφ2HHh
eφ1LLl
×
QH
QL
] [
φ2H + (1 + h)
φ1L+ (1 + l)
]
. (4.20)
As an be seen in this result, the skill premium depends both on labour endowments
and on the tehnologial-knowledge bias,
QH
QL
.
On the one hand, due to full employment and dereasing marginal produtivity
of labour, an inrease in H , for example, would reate pressure for wH (and wH/wL)
to fall. On the other hand, the inrease in H augments the tehnologial readiness
of high-skilled labour (see equation 3.22), inreasing its produtivity, and pushing
wH and the skill premium up. The initial reation of the skill premium thus depends
on the relative strength of these two eets.
Furthermore, in this ase n falls (see equation 4.11); i. e., more nal goods are
produed with the H -tehnology and sold at a relatively low prie.
19
Conversely, the
relative prie of nal goods produed with the L-tehnology inreases, and thus prot
opportunities in the prodution of intermediate goods to be used by the L-tehnology
also inrease. This indues a ow of resoures to R&D in low-spei intermediate
goods, thereby ausing a gradual slowdown in the tehnologial-knowledge bias,
whih is reeted in the skill premium, as an be seen in the expression above.
4.2 Equilibrium with R&D
To determine the aggregate spending in R&D, we must understand how R&D is
arried out in the intermediate-goods setor. Speially, we need to nd out whih
rms ondut R&D ativities, and determine the value of an innovation. Derivation
of the laws of motion of QL (t) and QH (t) is then a straightforward proess.
Innovator rms
Let τ denote the time when an innovation ours in intermediate good j, thereby
raising its quality level from qk−1 to qk. Suppose the innovation is introdued by an
outside rm seeking to displae the inumbent that urrently holds the monopoly
of that good. After displaing the old monopolist, this k-th innovator beomes the
new monopolist for intermediate good j.
Prior to the innovation, the prots of this k-th innovator were zero beause the
19
Together, equations 4.4 and 4.5 dene that
PH
PL
=
(
n
1−n
)α
.
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(k − 1)-th innovator ontrolled the market.20 After introduing the k-th quality, the
rm begins earning the prot ow desribed by equation (3.13). Aordingly, the
hange in this rm's prots is given by:
∆pij = pij (τ)− 0
= (Pj (τ)− 1)
{[
PzA (1− α)
Pj (τ)
]1/α
ZσZ
(
qkj(τ)
)(1−α)/α}
,
where Z = L if j ≤ J , otherwise Z = H .
Notie that beause the rm gains a one-rung quality advantage over its losest
ompetitor, then Pj (t) = 1/ (1− α) and the equation above beomes:
∆pij =
[
1
1− α
− 1
] [
PzA (1− α)
1/ (1− α)
]1/α
ZσZ
(
qkj(τ)
)(1−α)/α
. (4.21)
Consider now the senario in whih the latest innovator in intermediate good j
is the urrent monopolist in that good. Suppose this rm has a one-rung quality
advantage over its losest ompetitor. Prior to the innovation, the rm earns a prot
ow of:
pij (τ − 1) = (Pj (τ − 1)− 1)
{[
PzA (1− α)
Pj (τ − 1)
]1/α
ZσZ
(
qkj(τ−1)
)(1−α)/α}
. (4.22)
After the innovation is introdued, the rm's prot ow beomes (as impliit in eq.
4.21):
pij (τ) = (Pj (τ)− 1)
{[
PzA (1− α)
Pj (τ)
]1/α
ZσZ
(
qkj(τ)
)(1−α)/α}
. (4.23)
Sine innovation ours at time τ , kj (τ − 1) = kj (τ) − 1. We also know that
Pj (τ − 1) = 1/ (1− α) and Pj (τ) = [1/ (1− α)]
2
, beause the rm starts with a
one-rung quality advantage and the inreases it to two rungs. These informations,
together with equations (4.22) and (4.23), allow us to write the hange in this rm's
20
Remember that, in line with Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, hapter 7), we onsider that the
most reent innovators use monopoly priing strategies and drive previous innovators out of the
market. In equilibrium, only the highest quality of eah intermediate good is produed.
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prots:
∆pij = pij (τ)− pij (τ − 1)
= λ
{[
1
(1− α)
+ 1
] [
1
1− α
]
−1/α
− (q)−(1−α)/α
}
,
where:
λ =
[
1
(1− α)
− 1
] [
PzA (1− α)
1/ (1− α)
]1/α
ZσZ
(
qkj(t)
)(1−α)/α
.
Beause λ equals the right-hand side of (4.21), omparing the two senarios we
have desribed is straightforward. As long as:
[
1
(1− α)
+ 1
] [
1
1− α
]
−1/α
− (q)−(1−α)/α < 1,
introduing a new quality of intermediate good j is more protable to an outside
rm than it is to the urrent monopolist in that good.
Reall that we have assumed that q > 1/ (1− α). Let q−ε = [1/ (1− α)], where
ε > 0. Using this information and a little algebra we an write the above expression
as:
(1− α)1/α + (q − ε)(α−1)/α < 1 + (q)(α−1)/α .
This ondition is always true beause α ∈]0, 1[ and ε > 0. Thus, R&D ativities are
arried out by outside rms rather than by the urrent monopolists. This replae-
ment eet is a ommon feature of Shumpeterian models of quality ladders (see,
e. g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004).
At this point we established two important aspets of the innovation dynamis
in the intermediate-goods setor. First, R&D ativities in the intermediate-goods
setor are always arried out by outside rms. Seond, these rms build a one-rung
quality advantage over the monopolist they replae and set Pj (t) = 1/ (1− α). This
advantage is independent of the urrent quality level of the intermediate good, and
equal aross intermediate goods.
The value of an innovation
Let τ be the time when a rm introdues the quality k for intermediate good j, and
let τ + d denote the time when another rm introdues the quality k + 1 for that
same good. The rm that introdues the quality k beomes the monopolist between
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τ and τ + d, and earns a sum of prots given by:
Vj (k, t) =
∫ τ+d
τ
pij (k, t) e
−r(t) dt,
where pij (k, t) is the prot ow desribed by equation (4.21). Vj (k, t) is the reward
for introduing the k-th quality of intermediate good j.
The term d is both the duration of the monopoly of the k-th innovator, and
the time between two onseutive innovations. Beause innovations in intermediate
arrive randomly, d is undetermined and the true value of Vj (k, t) is unknown. How-
ever, when the interest rate r (t) is onstant between τ and τ + d, whih will be the
ase in equilibrium, we obtain:
E [Vj (k, t)] =
pij (k, t)
r (t) + δj (k, t)
. (4.24)
The expeted value of introduing the k-th quality of intermediate good j depends
positively on the dimension of the prots the innovator an earn, and is negatively
aeted by the interest rate and by the probability of quality (k + 1) being in-
trodued. This last term, δj (k, t), aptures the eet of Shumpeterian reative
destrution. The positive δj (k, t) reets the fat that new qualities of intermedi-
ate goods are eventually introdued in the market, implying that new rms destroy
the monopolies of old rms. A higher δj (k, t) auses this to happen faster, thereby
reduing the monopoly length and the monopolist's total prots.
Aggregate R&D spending
We assume free entry in the R&D ativities of the intermediate-goods setor . Firms
fae no legal or eonomi barriers if they deide to take-up or abandon R&D eorts,
hene there is no onstraint on the number of rms that might ondut R&D. In
addition, we assume that all rms have aess to the same R&D tehnology.
Furthermore, we assume that when an innovation is introdued as a onsequene
of the R&D eorts of many rms, the probability of a rm beoming the suessful
innovator is proportional to its share on aggregate R&D. For example, if R&D
spending is shared equally among one hundred rms, eah rm has a 1% probability
of being the innovator. With this assumption we an abstrat from the number
of rms that partiipate in the R&D eorts, and onentrate exlusively on the
aggregate level analysis.
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The aggregate level free-entry ondition an be written as:
Rj (k − 1, t) = E [Vj (k, t)] δj (k − 1, t) , (4.25)
whih means that the R&D spending aimed at improving intermediate good j should
equal the expeted payo generated by the innovation. Using (4.24) to substitute for
E [Vj (k, t)] and (3.17) to substitute for δj (k − 1, t) and δj (k, t) in this expression,
we obtain:
Rj (k, t) = pi (k, t)
Ψj (k − 1, t) ζj (t) ξj (k − 1, t)
Ψj (k, t) ζj (t) ξj (k, t)
−
r (t)
Ψj (k, t) ζj (t) ξj (k, t)
.
Finally, using equations (3.18), (3.19), (3.20) and (4.21) as well as the fat that
monopolists in the intermediate-goods setor set Pj (t) = 1/ (1− α), this expression
beomes:
Rj (k, t) =
{(
1
1− α
− 1
)[
PZ (t)A (1− α)
2]1/α σZq(1−α)/α
−r (t)
χ
Γ
}
Z
(
qkj(t)
)(1−α)/α
(4.26)
where Z follows the denition given before.
Equilibrium aggregate R&D spending, R (t), an now be omputed through:
R (t) =
∫ 1
0
Rj (k, t) dj =
∫ J
0
Rj (k, t) dj +
∫ 1
J
Rj (k, t) dj.
Using equation (4.26) to substitute for Rj (k, t) and applying the denitions of Z as
neessary, this expression beomes:
R = QLL
{(
1
1− α
− 1
)[
PLA (1− α)
2]1/α σL − rχ
Γ
}
+QHH
{(
1
1− α
− 1
)[
PHA (1− α)
2]1/α σH − rχ
Γ
}
. (4.27)
Laws of motion of QL and QH
To derive the laws of motion of QL (t) and QH (t), we an use the approah laid
out by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). Remember we have dened the aggregate
quality indexes as:
QL (t) =
∫ J
0
(
qkj(t)
)(1−α)/α
dj, and
QH (t) =
∫ 1
J
(
qkj(t)
)(1−α)/α
.
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Suppose a new quality of intermediate good j is introdued, all else remaining equal.
The hange in the orresponding aggregate quality index is given by:
∆QZ =
(
qkj+1
)(1−α)/α
−
(
qkj
)(1−α)/α
=
(
qkj
)(1−α)/α (
q(1−α)/α − 1
)
,
where Z = L if j [0, J ], otherwise Z = H . In addition, it is possible to show that
when the free-entry ondition holds, we have:
δj (k, t) =
{(
1
1− α
− α
)[
PL (t)A (1− α)
2]1/α σLq(1−α)/αΓ
χ
}
− r (t) = δL (t) ,
(4.28)
for all j ∈ [0, J ], and
δj (k, t) =
{(
1
1− α
− α
)[
PH (t)A (1− α)
2]1/α σHq(1−α)/αΓ
χ
}
− r (t) = δH (t) ,
(4.29)
for all j ∈ [J, 1]. Finally, using the fat that δL (t) and δH (t) are independent of j,
we an ompute:
Q˙L (t)
QL (t)
=
∫ J
0
δL
(
qkj
)(1−α)/α (
q(1−α)/α − 1
)
dj
QL (t)
≡ δL
(
q(1−α)/α − 1
)
, (4.30)
and
Q˙H (t)
QH (t)
=
∫ 1
J
δH
(
qkj
)(1−α)/α (
q(1−α)/α − 1
)
dj
QH (t)
≡ δH
(
q(1−α)/α − 1
)
. (4.31)
4.3 Transition dynamis
Sine in our model all maroeonomi aggregates an be expressed as multiples of
the aggregate quality indexes
21
, QL (t) and QH (t), the paths of all relevant vari-
ables outside the steady-state, inluding that of the wage ratio, depend on a single
dierential equation that governs the path of the tehnologial-knowledge bias, i. e.,
the path of
QH(t)
QL(t)
.
Thus, if we dene S as the tehnologial-knowledge bias (i. e., S = QH/QL), S
is governed by
ˆS (t) ≡ S˙(t)
S(t)
= Q˙H(t)
QH(t)
− Q˙L(t)
QL(t)
. Now, using (4.31), (4.30), (4.29), (4.28),
21
As an be seen in (3.12), (4.12) and (4.27), the maroeonomi aggregates Y , X and R an be
expressed as multiples of the aggregate quality indexes QL and QH . Then, sine Y = C +X +R
it is also possible to express C as a multiple of QL and QH .
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(4.15), (4.14), (3.22), (3.21) we obtain:
Sˆ =
[
q(1−α)/α − 1
]
×
{(
1
1−α
− 1
) [
A (1− α)2
]1/α
q(1−α)/α Γ
χ
}
× e−1
×
[
cHheφ2H
(
1 + cH
h+1eφ2H
Ll+1eφ1L
S
)
−1/2
− Lleφ1L
(
1 + cH
h+1eφ2H
Ll+1eφ1L
S
)1/2]
. (4.32)
4.4 Steady-state
Along the balaned growth path all variables grow at the same onstant rate. From
(3.5) we know that onsumption grows at the rate
r−ρ
θ
. Sine all other maroeo-
nomi aggregates must grow at this same onstant rate, whih we all g∗, we an
haraterise it by imposing that (where
∗
indiates steady-state):
g∗ ≡
Q˙∗L
Q∗L
=
Q˙∗H
Q∗H
=
r∗ − ρ
θ
,
from whih we an obtain the onstant steady-state interest rate, r∗. In addition,
from
Q˙∗
L
Q∗
L
=
Q˙∗
H
Q∗
H
we nd that nal-goods prie indexes, P ∗L and P
∗
H , the threshold
nal good, n∗, and the skill premium,
w∗H
w∗
L
, remain stable; i. e.,
˙P ∗
H
PH
=
P˙ ∗
L
PL
= n˙
∗
n∗
=
˙w∗
H
w∗
H
−
w˙∗
L
w∗
L
= 0. Also, wages rise steadily in line with the tehnologial-knowledge
progress; i. e.,
˙w∗
H
w∗
H
=
w˙∗
L
w∗
L
=
Q˙∗
L
Q∗
L
=
Q˙∗
H
Q∗
H
.
We note in partiular that in the steady state, a higher tehnial readiness of
high-skilled labour relative to that of low-skilled labour dereases the relative prie
of high-spei intermediate goods. The reason for this is that a higher
σH
σL
implies
that broader range of nal goods is produed using the H -tehnology  see (4.11) ,
thus inreasing the demand for high-spei intermediate goods. Hene, the relative
prie of those goods must be lower in order to equalise prots in both tehnologies.
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5 Analysis
5.1 Overview
In this setion we t our model to real data from a wide range of ountries and
periods. The goal is to understand to whih extent the behaviour of the skill pre-
mium an be explained by hanges in the relative supply of high-skilled workers,
in learning-by-doing, in tehnology-adoption osts, or by simultaneous hanges in
more than one of these dimensions. We follow the alibration approah pioneered by
Kydland and Presott (1982). For an overview of this tehnique see, for example,
Kydland and Presott (1996) and Dejong and Dave (2007, hapter 7).
Our alibration strategy is as follows. First, we distinguish between ore and non-
ore parameters. Core parameters are those whih are related to the main fous of
our study: how learning-by-doing and tehnology-adoption osts an inuene the
tehnologial-knowledge bias and wage inequality. Therefore, φ1, φ2, l , h and c are
onsidered ore parameters in our model.
The remaining parameters of our model are non-ore parameters, and we take
into onsideration previous literature to determine their values. Sine our model is
losely related to the one presented by Afonso (2006), we follow it whenever that
is possible. Table 1 presents the baseline values for non-ore parameters. After we
have set the values of the non-ore parameters, we searh the ore parameter spae
for values that allow us to reprodue the data observed for dierent ountries. In
order to assess the validity of the mehanism we propose, we then see if there is a
reasonably homogeneous set of ore parameter values that allows the repliation of
observed data for all ountries.
The proess of determining ore-parameter values is straightforward. From the
data available for a given ountry we gather information about the skill premium
and relative supply of high-skilled workers at the beginning and ending of a ertain
period. Then, we set
H
L
to the value observed in the beginning of that period, and
ompute steady-state skill premia obtained with dierent ombinations of c, φ1, φ2,
l and h. We repeat the same proedure while setting H
L
to the value observed in
the ending of the referene period. Our omputations are restrited to parameter
ombinations in whih: (i) φ1 = φ2; (ii) φ1, φ2 ∈ [−2, 0]; (iii) l = h; (iv) l, h ∈ [1, 2];
and (v) c ∈ [1, 1.5]. The results are then gathered in tables like the ones presented in
appendix B. Finally, we searh these tables for parameter values that an repliate
the initial and nal steady-state values of the skill premium, as well as the transition
dynamis between the two.
We fous our attention in two types of alibration. The rst one is that in
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whih a set of parameter values an repliate both the initial and nal onditions
observed in the data. We all this a xed-parameter alibration. We also onsider
ases in whih we start with a set of parameter values that repliates the initial
onditions, and then allow for slight hanges in either the learning-by-doing or the
tehnology-adoption parameters. When onsidering these hanges, we assume that
they our at the same time as the shift in
H
L
. This type of proedure, whih we
refer to as a variable-parameter alibration, attempts to reet the fat that the
learning-by-doing and tehnology-adoption osts might hange over time.
Parameter Value
A 1.5
q 3.33
α 0.7
ρ 0.02
θ 1.5
Γ 1.6
χ 4
Table 1: Baseline non-ore parameter values.
5.2 Fixed-parameter alibration
Using data from Mahin and Van Reenen (1998), we start by alibrating the model
to repliate the behaviour of the skill premium in the United States between 1973
and 1989. During this period, the employment share of non-prodution workers
inreased from 0.246 to 0.303, leading to a shift in the ratio H
L
from 0.326 to 0.435.22
In addition, the ratio between wages of non-prodution and prodution workers
rose from 1.553 to 1.623. Figure 2 presents the simulated paths of tehnologial-
knowledge bias and skill premium using two dierent model alibrations.
In the two top panels we an see the results obtained by setting c = 1.35,
l = h = 1.8 and φ1 = φ2 = −1.2. Given the initial value of
H
L
, the steady-state is
haraterised by a skill-premium of 1.556. When the relative supply of high-skilled
workers shifts from 0.326 to 0.435 (at t = 20), the eonomy leaves the steady state
and the skill premium immediately drops to 1.531. This drop in the skill-premium
results from the interation of two eets.
On the one hand, hanges in H and L indue hanges in the tehnologial readi-
ness of both types of labour. The inrease of H auses the tehnologial readiness
of high-skilled labour to inrease (σH shifts from 0.081 to 0.109), whereas that of
22
Workers alloated to non-prodution ativities are used as a proxy for high-skilled workers.
The inrease in H from 0.246 to 0.303 implies a derease in L from 0.754 to 0.697.
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Figure 2: Fixed-parameter simulations for the United States, 1973-1989.
low-skilled labour dereases with the derease of L (σL shifts from 0.243 to 0.226).
By themselves, these hanges to σL and σH would inrease the produtivity of
high-skilled labour, and lower the produtivity of low-skilled labour  see equa-
tion (3.11). Sine prodution fators are paid at their marginal produtivity, these
hanges would, in turn, reate a stimulus for the skill premium to inrease.
On the other hand, a higher value for
H
L
also means that high-skilled labour has
beome more abundant and low-skilled labour has beome sarer. With dereasing
marginal produtivity and full employment of L and H , this indues an inrease in
the marginal produtivity of L and a derease in the marginal produtivity of H ,
putting downward pressure upon the skill premium. In the present ase we an see
that this eet dominates the eet indued by the shifts in σL and σH , hene the
initial drop in
wH
wL
.
After the exogenous shift and orresponding short-run adjustments take plae,
a transition to a new steady state follows. As the top left panel shows, the shift in
the relative supply of high-skilled labour auses the tehnologial-knowledge bias to
start growing (at dereasing rates), and this indues an inrease in the skill premium.
This is beause labour is omplementary with intermediate goods  see, for example,
equation (3.7). As the aggregate quality of high-spei intermediate goods inreases
relative to that of low-spei intermediate goods, so does the produtivity of high-
skilled labour relative to that of low-skilled labour. Again, with prodution fators
being paid at their marginal produtivity, the skill premium rises. One the new
steady-state is reahed, the skill premium stabilises at 1.604, a value higher than
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that observed initially.
23
The simulation results seem to provide a reasonable approximation to the real
behaviour of the skill premium. On the one hand, the initial and ending values
are very lose to the ones reported by Mahin and Van Reenen (1998). On the
other hand, Mahin and Van Reenen's data also shows that an initial drop in the
skill premium indeed exists: from 1.556 in 1973, the ratio between the wages of
prodution and non-prodution workers drops to 1.531 in 1977.
The bottom panels of Figure 2 summarise the results from an alternative model
alibration (c = 1.45, φ1 = φ2 = −0.45, and l = h = 1.4). Simulated initial and
ending values of the skill premium are one again very lose to the real values. But
with this alibration the model is unable to repliate the drop in the skill premium
that follows the hange in the relative supply of high-skilled workers.
However, similar parameter values are useful in repliating the behaviour of the
skill premium in the United Kingdom and Sweden. Mahin and Van Reenen (1998)
show that between 1973 and 1989 the relative supply of non-prodution workers
inreased from 0.372 to 0.435, while their wage premium inreased from 1.487 to
1.509. In the United Kingdom H
L
shifted from 0.351 to 0.481 and wH
wL
inreased from
1.316 to 1.470.
Figure 3 shows simulation results using c = 1.45, φ1 = φ2 = −0.2 and l = h =
1.4, for the United Kingdom; and c = 1.4, φ1 = φ2 = −0.2 and l = h = 1.25, for
Sweden.
The results for Sweden obtained with our model point to an inrease in the skill
premium from 1.479 to 1.510 in response to the reported shift in the H
L
ratio. For
the United Kingdom our simulations show an inrease in the skill premium from to
1.318 to 1.441. The simulated values for Sweden are onsistent with the real ones,
but in the ase of the United Kingdom the t is poorer. Nevertheless, using a xed-
parameter alibration our model an explain roughly 80% of the inrease in the skill
premium that has ourred in the United Kingdom during the period 1973-1989.
It is interesting to note that in both ases there is an initial inrease in the
skill premium. This suggests that the eets of the hanges in the tehnologial
readiness of both types of labour were more important than the eets indued by
the hanges in the relative abundane of high-skilled workers. The data put forth by
Mahin and Van Reenen (1998) seems to support this kind of short-run adjustment
in the ase of Sweden, but evidene for the United Kingdom is somewhat mixed.
All the three previous ases we disussed link an inrease in the relative supply of
23
The relation between the tehnologial-knowledge bias and the skill premium an be learly
seen in equation (4.20): inreases in
QH
QL
ause
wH
wL
on the left-hand side to inrease.
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Figure 3: Fixed-parameter simulations for Sweden and the U.K., 1973-1989.
high-skilled labour to an inrease in the skill premium. But our model an also a-
ommodate ases like that of Denmark, in whih an inrease in
H
L
ratio appears asso-
iated with a derease in the skill premium.
24
Aording to Mahin and Van Reenen
(1998), between 1973 and 1989 the
H
L
ratio shifted from 0.335 to 0.466 and yet the
skill premium dereased from 1.511 to 1.437. Figure 4 shows the results of a simula-
tion aimed at repliating these fats in whih we have set c = 1.2, φ1 = φ2 = −0.55
and l = h = 1.25.
Simulation results repliate one again very aurately the path of the skill pre-
mium. The initial simulated skill-premium is equal to the observed value and our
simulation an aount for roughly 56% of the observed drop in it. Furthermore,
the drop in the skill premium and the small reovery that we see in the simulation
results ts well into the data from Mahin and Van Reenen (1998). In this ase,
ontrary to the senario simulated above for the United States, the inrease in
wL
wH
indued by the inrease in the tehnologial-knowledge bias isn't enough to oset
its initial drop.
The results we presented in this subsetion are a good approximation to the
observed fats. But there is some variability in the parameter values underlying
the dierent simulations, although it should be notied that the main divergene
in ore-parameter values is between the United States and the group of European
ountries.
24
Note that ases like that of Denmark are not aptured by the skill-biased tehnologial-hange
literature.
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Figure 4: Fixed-parameter simulations for Denmark, 1973-1989.
5.3 Variable-parameter alibration
In order to keep the analysis manageable, we perform two kinds of simulations.
First we perform simulations in whih we hold c, φ1 and φ2 onstant and allow
the learning-by-doing parameters to vary over time. We then simulate senarios in
whih we hold c, l and h onstant and allow for variations in φ1 and φ2. Throughout
these simulations we use a baseline value of 1.2 for the onstant c.
Figure 5 shows a simulation of the ase of Denmark (see Mahin and Van Reenen,
1998) in whih we alibrate φ1 = φ2 to −0.4, and onsider a derease in the learning-
by-doing eets by making l = h hange from 1.15 to 1.2.
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Figure 5: Variable-parameter simulation for Denmark, 1973-1989.
The results show that this alibration is t to explain the derease in the skill
premium that ourred in Denmark, although its simulated path between steady-
states somewhat deviates from the atually observed one (see previous subsetion).
Nevertheless, this is an example of how alterations in the learning-by-doing param-
eters an help to aount for  and are ompatible with  dierent kinds of hanges
in the skill premium when there are shifts in the
H
L
ratio.
Figure 6 shows the results from another simulation, this one aimed at repliating
Aemoglu's (2003a) data for Belgium: a derease in the skill premium from 1.419
to 1.365 and an slight inrease (from 0.105 to 0.119) in the H
L
ratio, during the
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period 1985-1997. We alibrate l = h to 1.15 and let φ1, φ2 hange from −0.35
at the initial steady-state to −0.3, i. e., we onsider a derease in the barriers to
tehnology adoption. Although our alibration slightly overestimates the initial
steady-state skill premium (by roughly 1%), it aurately repliates its subsequent
derease. Like in the learning-by-doing example presented above, simultaneous shifts
in labour endowments and in tehnology-adoption parameters an help to aount
for a derease in the skill premium.
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Figure 6: Variable-parameter simulations for Belgium, 1985-1997.
So far we have only presented variable-parameter simulations for ases in whih
the skill premium dereases in developed ountries. Table 2 provides some addi-
tional alibration ongurations and results that repliate the observed data for
Canada, The Netherlands and the United States. Together with the two ases men-
tioned before, these variable-parameter alibrations suggest that if we allow for small
variations in the learning-by-doing and tehnology adoption eets, our model an
repliate a wide range of dierent situations with a relatively homogeneous set of
parameters.
Sine strutural variations might indeed aet eonomies over time these senar-
ios are not only plausible, but they reinfore the idea that learning-by-doing and
tehnology adoption osts are important in understanding the evolution of skill-
related wage inequality.
We are also able to repliate the trajetory of developing ountries: a good exam-
ple would be the Chilean ase during 1960-1996. Aording to Beyer et al. (1999),
in 1960 around 7.5% of all heads of household in Chile had university eduation.
By 1996 that number had risen to 21.1%. Taking these gures as a proxy for the
relative abundane of high-skilled labour in Chile's eonomy, the ratio H/L shifted
from 0.081 in 1960 to 0.267 in 1996.
During the same period the average per-apita labour inome of heads of house-
hold with a university degree inreased from 176, 675 pesos in 1960 to 666, 813 pesos
in 1996, whereas for heads of households without a university degree the average
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Figure 7: Variable-parameter simulation for Chile, 1960-1996.
pay inreased from 47, 234 pesos to 169, 220 pesos.25 Hene, the ratio between the
wages of workers with university eduation (high-skilled labour) and wages of work-
ers without university eduation (low-skilled labour) inreased from 3.740 to 3.941.
In Figure 7 we an see the transition dynamis obtained in a simulation in whih
learning-by-doing parameters deline (i.e., all else equal learning-by-doing eets be-
ome stronger). We onsider φ1 = φ2 = −1.55 and c = 1.2, and that l, h are initially
1.45 and then shift to 1.3. The initial and ending simulated skill premia are, respe-
tively, 3.639 and 3.975. Although the initial skill premia deviates moderately from
its real value (about 3% lower), the simulation provides a satisfatory repliation of
the transition that oured in Chile. The skill premium initially drops in response
to the inrease in H/L and the derease in l, h, but as the tehnologial-knowledge
bias inreases the wH/wL ratio also piks up.
The inrease in the tehnologial-knowledge bias is due to a stronger inrease
in σH than in σL. The shift in H/L alone would indue an inrease (derease) in
the tehnologial readiness of high-skilled (low-skilled) labour, but the eets of a
derease in learning-by-doing parameters prevent σL from falling. However, whereas
for high-skilled labour both eets at to push σH up, for low-skilled labour the drop
in its relative abundane works against the positive eet of a lower l, ausing σL
to inrease only slightly.
25
The average per apita labour inome gures are quoted in 1996 pesos.
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Country Initial
H
L Final
H
L Initial
wH
wL
Final
wH
wL
φ1 = φ2 l = h new φ1 = φ2 new l = h
The Netherlands
a 0.087 0.337 1.359 1.305 −0.7 1.35 −0.5 1.35
1983-1994 (1.354) (1.296)
Canada
a 0.241 0.256 1.303 1.379 −0.3 1.2 −0.35 1.2
1987-1997 (1.299) (1.364)
The United States
b 0.326 0.435 1.533 1.623 −0.75 1.35 −0.75 1.3
1973-1989 (1.578) (1.604)
a
Original ountry data is from Aemoglu (2003a).
b
Original ountry data is from Mahin and van Reenen (1998).
Simulated skill premia are given in parenthesis.
Table 2: Alternative simulations of transition dynamis.
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5.4 Sensitivity analysis
In this setion we analyse in greater depth how the tehnologial-knowledge bias
and H -premium respond to dierent values of: (i) ore parameters and; (ii) relative
supply of high-skilled labour. More speially, we try to understand how hanges
in these parameters and variables inuene the tehnologial-knowledge bias and
the H -premium, by aeting the tehnologial readiness of labour.
We start by omputing steady-states for various ombinations of (l, h) and (φ2, φ2)
while keeping H/L onstant. We onsider a ase in whih low-skilled labour is rela-
tively more abundant (setting H/L =0.25), and other in whih high-skilled labour is
relatively more abundant (setting H/L = 4).26 Thus we an analyse how learning-
by-doing and tehnology-adoption osts shape the tehnologial-knowledge bias and
the H -premium in a senario of relatively more abundant low (high)-skilled labour.
Then we perform the similar omputations, but this time we keep one type of
parameters xed and onsider dierent ombinations of H/L and values for param-
eters of the other type. Using these simulations we an see how learning-by-doing
and tehnology-adoption osts inuene the steady-state under dierent levels of
relative abundane of high-skilled labour, and vie-versa.
There is a aveat, though: when omparing how dierent values ofH/L inuene
the steady-state we must remember that the H -premium is aeted by means of
two hannels. First, the labour endowments aet the tehnologial readiness of
eah type of labour, and this in turn inuenes the diretion of the tehnologial-
knowledge bias and the H -premium. Seond, wages  and thus the H -premium 
also respond to supply-demand interations in labour markets.
Throughout these omputations we assume that c = 1, i. e., we assume that
there is no absolute advantage of high-skilled labour over low-skilled labour. This
assumption simplies the analysis without qualitatively hanging the results. Fur-
thermore, we assume again that l = h and φ1 = φ2, so that the results don't reet
dierenes in the sensitivity of eah type of labour to the eets of learning-by-doing
(LBD) and tehnology adoption osts (TAC).
LBD and TAC eets under predominane of low-skilled labour
As an be seen in Figure 8, in a ase in whih low-skilled labour is relatively
more abundant, the steady-state levels of the tehnologial-knowledge bias and
H -premium are higher: (i)when learning-by-doing parameters are lower; (ii)when
tehnology-adoption osts parameters are lower, i. e., more negative.
26
Sine we assumed that H + L = 1 and H,L ∈ [0, 1], in the rst ase we have L = 0.8 and
H = 0.2, and in the seond L = 0.2 and H = 0.8.
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al-knowledge bias and H -premium for dierent values of the learning-
by-doing and tehnology-adoption osts parameters, assuming predominane of low-skilled labour. Results are from
simulations based on L = 0.8, H = 0.2, c = 1.
Figure 8: LBD and TAC eets under predominane of low-skilled labour.
All else equal, lower tehnology-adoption osts parameters ause exp (φ1L) and
exp (φ2H) to be lower for given values of L and H . This implies a stronger adverse
eet of tehnology-adoption osts, whih in turn redues the tehnologial readiness
and the produtivity of labour (see 3.21). Beause the adverse eet of tehnology
adoption osts is also dependent on the size of labour endowments, the inuene of
lower values of φ1 and φ2 is enhaned by the size of L and H , respetively. Hene,
low-skilled labour is more aeted beause it is relatively more abundant, and the
drag on its produtivity is stronger than it is for high-skilled labour.
These eets have two onsequenes. First, sine prodution fators are paid
at their marginal produtivity, the downward pressure on wages is stronger for
low-skilled labour, ausing the H -premium to inrease. Seond, beause the prof-
itability of R&D ativities also depends on the tehnologial readiness of labour
 see equations 4.21 and 4.24, its stronger derease in low-skilled labour makes
R&D in high-spei intermediate goods relatively more attrative. This leads to
a higher tehnologial-knowledge bias, whih also ontributes to the inrease of the
H -premium  see equation (4.20).
Lower learning-by-doing parameters also indue an inrease in the H -premium,
but the underlying mehanism is dierent. Lower values for l, h imply a stronger
learning-by-doing eet for given values of L and H , i. e., Ll and Hh are higher.27
But sine the size of learning-by-doing eets is also related to labour endowments,
the greater the number of workers of a given type in the eonomy, the stronger the
learning-by-doing eet they experiene.
27
Reall that L and H take values over the range [0, 1]. Therefore, for values of l (h) loser to
one, Ll (Hh) is higher for eah given value of L (H).
60
In a situation in whih L is high, muh of the learning-by-doing experiened by
low-skilled labour is determined by the size of L, with the parameter l playing only
a minor role. For the relatively sarer high-skilled the opposite happens: sine H
is low the parameter h plays a bigger role in determining the size of the learning-
by-doing eet. Therefore, the inrease in learning-by-doing that results from lower
values of l and h is more signiant for high-skilled labour.28
The tehnologial readiness and produtivity of labour reat aordingly: in-
reases are more pronouned for high-skilled labour. Again, this raises the H -
premium beause the produtivity ratio hanges in favour of high-skilled labour,
but also beause of eets upon R&D. It beomes relatively more attrative to do
R&D in high-spei intermediate goods beause σH inreases relatively more than
σL, and this means that QH/QL and the H -premium inrease.
LBD and TAC eets under predominane of high-skilled labour
As expeted, the simulations for the ase in whih high-skilled labour is relatively
more abundant produe opposite results (see Figure 9). Lower values of l and h lead
to a lower tehnologial-knowledge bias and a lower H -premium. This is beause the
derease in the learning-by-doing parameters now favours low-skilled labour more
intensely: given that L is smaller than H , dereases in l improve Ll more than
dereases in h improve Hh. The onnetion between learning-by-doing eets and
wages (through labour produtivity and through the inuene of the tehnologial-
knowledge bias) then implies that the wage of low-skilled labour rises more than the
wage of high-skilled labour, thus reduing the H -premium.
Lower tehnology-adoption osts parameters also produe a lower tehnologial-
knowledge bias and a lower H -premium. SineH is greater than L, an equal derease
in h and l produes a more pronouned deline in the tehnologial readiness of high-
skilled labour than in that of low-skilled labour. Again, this is beause the adverse
eet of tehnology-adoption osts  whih inuene σL and σH  also depend on
the size of L and H . Given lower values of σH/σL, R&D beomes relatively more
attrative in low-spei intermediate goods, thus induing lower values for the
tehnologial-knowledge bias and H -premium. The lowering of high-skilled workers'
wage is also due to the derease in its relative produtivity.
28
Assume that L = 0.8 and H = 0.2. When l and h both shift from 1.3 to 1.1, for example, Ll
shifts from 0.748 to 0.782 and Hh shifts from 0.123 to 0.170. The derease in the learning-by-doing
parameter is muh more relevant for high-skilled. Furthermore, Hh/Ll inreases and so does the
ratio between the tehnologial readiness of high and low-skilled labour (assuming that φ1 = φ2,
i. e., there are no dierenes in the parameters of the tehnology-adoption osts).
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Simulated steady-state values of the tehnologial-knowledge bias and H -premium for dierent values of the learning-
by-doing and tehnology-adoption osts parameters, assuming predominane of high-skilled labour. Results are from
simulations based on L = 0.2, H = 0.8, c = 1.
Figure 9: LBD and TAC eets under predominane of high-skilled labour.
Interation between LBD and the relative supply of high-skilled labour
In Figure 10 we an see how dierent H/L ratios and learning-by-doing parameters
interat to shape the tehnologial-knowledge bias and H -premium. In line with the
results disussed previously  and shown in Figures 8 and 9 , dereases in learning-
by-doing parameters are assoiated with lower tehnologial-knowledge biases and
H -premia when high-skilled labour is relatively more abundant (high H/L), and
lead to higher tehnologial-knowledge biases and H -premia when H/L is low.
Simulation results also show under whih onditions does a higher relative abun-
dane of high-skilled labour implies higher values of QH/QL and wH/wL. We an
see that the H -premia and tehnologial-knowledge biases tend to be lower in the
presene of higher H/L ratios if learning-by-doing parameters are low. Conversely,
they tend to be higher in the presene of higher H/L ratios if l and h are also high.
Hene, for given values of φ1 and φ2, the tehnologial-knowledge bias and wage ra-
tio favour of the more abundant type of labour when learning-by-doing parameters
are higher.
The reason behind this last result has already been disussed. When learning-
by-doing parameters are high, the size of labour endowments is responsible for deter-
mining muh of the (positive) learning-by-doing eets. Hene, the more abundant
labour type experienes greater learning-by-doing and this in turn benets its teh-
nologial readiness, produtivity and relative wage rate.
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Simulated steady-state values of the tehnologial-knowledge bias and H -premium for dierent values of H/L and
learning-by-doing parameters. Results are from simulations based on φ1 = φ2 = −0.4 and c = 1.
Figure 10: LBD and the relative supply of high-skilled labour.
Interation between TAC and the relative supply of high-skilled labour
Now we onentrate our attention on how dierent ombinations of tehnology-
adoption osts parameters and H/L ratios shape the bias of the tehnologial-
knowledge and wH/wL (see Figure 11). Simulation results show that, all else equal,
there is a lower tehnologial-knowledge biases and H -premia when high-skilled
labour is relatively more abundant only if tehnology-adoption osts parameters
are suiently negative.
The reason for this  as disussed above  is that the adverse eet of tehnology-
adoption osts depends on both the abundane of the underlying type of labour and
on tehnology-adoption osts parameters. If the latter are small (i. e., lose to zero)
the inrease in the adverse eet of tehnology-adoption osts indued by an inrease
of H is also small. This leaves room for the positive eet of learning-by-doing 
whih is positively inuened by the size of the H  to dominate the adverse eet of
tehnology-adoption osts. The hanges in the tehnologial readiness of H (and L)
then imply that the tehnologial-knowledge bias and wage ratio favour high-skilled
labour.
Aordingly, lower (i. e., more negative) values of φ1 and φ2 are assoiated with
stronger tehnologial-knowledge biases and higher H -premia only if L is relatively
more abundant. The lower values of φ1 and φ2 indue a stronger adverse eet of
tehnology adoption osts for the most abundant type of labour, thus dereasing its
tehnologial readiness, produtivity and relative wage more signiantly. This is
onsistent with the ndings disussed previously and depited in Figures 8 and 9.
In the ase in whih L = 0.8 (Figure 8), low values of φ1 and φ2 appear assoiated
with higher tehnologial-knowledge biases and H -premia, whereas in the ase in
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Simulated steady-state values of the tehnologial-knowledge bias and H -premium for dierent values of H/L and
tehnology-adoption osts parameters. Results are from simulations based on l = h = 1.3 and c = 1.
Figure 11: TAC and the relative supply of high-skilled labour.
whih L = 0.2 they appear assoiated with lower tehnologial-knowledge biases
and H -premia (Figure 9).
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6 Conlusions
In this thesis we have presented some reent fats onerning trends in skill-related
wage inequality and in the relative supply of more-skilled workers. The inrease of
the skill premium in spite of a higher abundane of more-skilled workers has been
the dominant trend. However, other paths of skill premium and skill-labour supply
also exist.
We have reviewed some fators that might have shaped the apparently ontra-
ditory rise in skill-labour supplies and skill premia. Namely, we have presented
explanations based on eonomi openness, labour market features and skill-biased
tehnologial hange, and we observe that the latter is the main explanation. Fur-
thermore, we have illustrated the eonomi importane of learning-by-doing and
tehnology-adoption osts. These two onepts are then onneted with the skill-
biased tehnologial hange framework in order to build a model to study the path
of wage inequality.
We have proposed an endogenous growth model in whih individuals deide on in-
ome alloation between onsumption and savings, and two prodution tehnologies
are used in the perfetly ompetitive nal-goods setor. One ombines low-skilled
labour with a spei set of (omplementary) quality-adjusted intermediate goods,
and the other uses high-skilled omplemented with a ontinuum of high-spei
quality adjusted intermediate goods. Intermediate goods, whih are improved by
R&D, are produed in monopolisti ompetition. Labour endowments are linked
with learning-by-doing and tehnology-adoption osts to measure the tehnologial
readiness of eah type of labour. Tehnologial readiness of labour is onneted with
the diretion of tehnologial-knowledge progress and, thus, with wage inequality.
Our simulation results an be interpreted in omparison with previous literature
about skill-biased tehnologial hange. In that literature, the bias that drive wage
inequality is mainly indued through the market-size hannel. In our model, the
path of wage inequality is similarly inuened by the diretion of tehnologial-
knowledge progress, but this diretion, however, is strongly inuened by the prie
hannel and the eets of the tehnologial readiness of labour.
In ontrast with the skill-biased tehnologial hange literature, the operation
of the prie hannel under tehnologial readiness of labour an aommodate the
reent hanges in wage inequality that have been observed both in developed and
developing ountries. Speially, whereas in the skill-biased tehnologial hange
literature an exogenous inrease in the relative abundane of high-skilled labour
always inreases the skill premium, in our model it an either indue inreases or
dereases of that premium.
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The proposed theoretial framework an also be extended to explore, in par-
tiular, the eets of several other dimensions of tehnologial readiness of labour.
Thus, for example, the onsideration of (i) human-apital aumulation, (ii) govern-
mental intervention, and (iii) R&D also supported by leader rms (by onsidering
that they have smaller osts in R&D ativities) are avenues for further researh.
That is, these fats an be readily inorporated into the model, and their eets on
tehnologial-knowledge bias, wage inequality and growth an be examined.
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Appendix A
Proof of the existene of a nal-goods threshold
Let piLn denote the prots of a representative nal-goods rm n that produes its
output using only L-tehnology. Then,
piLn = PnYn − wLLn −
∫ J
0
PjXjn dj.
Now substitute Xjn using (3.9) and Yn using the adequate omponents of (3.11).
This yields:
piLn = Pn
{
λ
[
Pn (1− α)
PJ
](1−α)/α
QL
}
− wLLn − Pj
{
λ
[
Pn (1− α)
PJ
]1/α
QL
}
,
where λ = A1/α (1− n) σL. Dividing the expression for Ln and then rearranging
terms gives us:
piLn
Ln
= α (PnA)
1/α (1− n)σL
[
1− α
Pj
](1−α)/α
QL − wL. (6.1)
This result represents the prots per unit of low-skilled labour obtained by a
nal-goods rm n that uses only L-tehnology. A similar derivation an be applied
to a representative nal-goods rm that uses exlusively the H -tehnology. This
yields:
piHn
Hn
= α (PnA)
1/α nσH
[
1− α
Pj
](1−α)/α
QH − wH . (6.2)
In equilibrium, omptetion implies that piLn ≤ 0 and pi
H
n ≤ 0, hene eah produer
makes zero prots per unit of labour (low or high-skilled). Furthermore, sine all
nal goods have to be produed, it must be that piLn = 0, pi
H
n = 0 or both. In
other words, eah nal good has to be produeed, and rms have to use either the
L-tehnology, the H -tehnology, or both.
Moreover, equations (6.2) and (6.1) imply that, in equilibrium, low (high-)skilled
workers annot be unemployed, as this would imply that their wage would fall to
zero, thus reating a protable deviation in using the L (H -)tehnology. Then it
must be that eah tehnology is used to produe at least some of the nal goods.
In addition, notie that the dierene between (6.2) and (6.1) is given by:
piHn
Hn
−
piLn
Ln
= α (PnA)
1/α
[
1− α
Pj
](1−α)/α
[n (σLQL + σHQH)− σLQL] + wL − wH ,
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whih is an inreasing funtion of n ∈ [0, 1]. It follows from here that a threshold
nal-good n must exist suh that nal goods n < n are produed using exlusively
the L-tehnology, and nal goods n > n are produed using exlusively the H -
tehnology. QED
Proof of equations (4.8) and (4.9)
From the onsumer's utility maximization we know that Pn (t) Yn (t) is onstant
aross n. We also know from (4.4) that Pn = PL (1− n)
−α
for all n ∈ [0, n].
Therefore, for nal good n = 0 and another nal good n ∈ [0, n] we an write:
PLY0 = PL (1− n)
−α Yn.
We an substitute Y0 and Yn in this expression using equation (4.6), and rearrange
terms to obtain:
PLL0σLA
1/α
[
PL (1− α)
Pj
](1−α)/α
QL = PLLnσLA
1/α
[
PL (1− α)
Pj
](1−α)/α
QL.
This holds only if L0 = Ln for all other n ∈ [0, n]. Thus, it must be that all rms
n ∈ [0, n] use the same amount of low-skilled labour. Sine the total amount of
low-skilled labour available in the eonomy is L, then:
Ln =
L
n
.
Equation (4.5), in turn, tells us that Pn = PH (n)
−α
for all n ∈ [n, 1]. Then, for nal
good n = 1 and another nal good n ∈ [n, 1] we an write:
PHY1 = PH (n)
−α Yn.
Using (4.6) to substitute for Y1 and Yn yields:
PHH1σHA
1/α
[
PH (1− α)
Pj
][(1−α)/α]
QH = PLHnσHA
1/α
[
PH (1− α)
Pj
][(1−α)/α]
QH .
So, for this equality to hold it must be H1 = Hn for all other n ∈ [n, 1]. Hene:
Hn =
H
1− n
,
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where H is the total amount of high-skilled labour available in the eonomy and
(1− n) is the number of rms using it. QED
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Appendix B
In this appendix we present the tables that gather simulatied skill premia for the
ountries analysed in hapter 5. Tables 3 to 8 present simulation results based on
Mahin and Van Reenen's (1998) data for the United States during the period 1973-
1989. Conerning this same period, Tables 9 and 10 present (simulation) results for
Sweden, Tables 11 and 12 present results for the United Kingdom, and Tables 13
and 14 present results for Denmark.
Simulated skill premia for Belgium onerning the period between 1985 and
1997 an be found in Tables 15 and 16, and in Tables 17 and 18 the results for Chile
1960-1990 are presented. Tables 19 and 20 hold the results for The Netherlands with
respet to the period 1983-1994. Finally, in Tables 21 and 22 we present simulated
skill premia for Canada during the period 1987-1997.
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l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.568 1.483 1.402 1.325 1.254 1.185 1.121 1.060 1.002 0.947 0.896 0.847 0.801 0.757 0.716 0.677 0.640 0.605 0.572 0.541 0.511
-0.050 1.630 1.540 1.456 1.376 1.301 1.230 1.162 1.099 1.039 0.982 0.928 0.877 0.829 0.784 0.741 0.701 0.662 0.626 0.592 0.560 0.529
-0.100 1.694 1.600 1.512 1.429 1.351 1.276 1.206 1.140 1.077 1.018 0.962 0.909 0.859 0.812 0.768 0.726 0.686 0.648 0.613 0.579 0.548
-0.150 1.761 1.664 1.571 1.484 1.402 1.325 1.252 1.183 1.117 1.056 0.997 0.942 0.891 0.842 0.795 0.752 0.710 0.671 0.634 0.599 0.566
-0.200 1.832 1.729 1.633 1.542 1.457 1.376 1.299 1.227 1.159 1.095 1.034 0.977 0.923 0.872 0.824 0.779 0.736 0.695 0.657 0.620 0.586
-0.250 1.905 1.799 1.698 1.603 1.513 1.429 1.349 1.274 1.203 1.137 1.073 1.013 0.957 0.904 0.854 0.807 0.762 0.720 0.680 0.642 0.607
-0.300 1.984 1.872 1.766 1.667 1.573 1.484 1.401 1.323 1.248 1.179 1.113 1.051 0.992 0.937 0.885 0.836 0.789 0.746 0.704 0.665 0.628
-0.350 2.065 1.948 1.837 1.733 1.635 1.543 1.456 1.374 1.297 1.224 1.155 1.091 1.029 0.972 0.918 0.866 0.818 0.773 0.730 0.689 0.651
-0.400 2.152 2.029 1.913 1.803 1.701 1.604 1.513 1.427 1.347 1.271 1.199 1.132 1.068 1.008 0.952 0.898 0.848 0.801 0.756 0.714 0.674
-0.450 2.243 2.114 1.992 1.877 1.769 1.668 1.573 1.483 1.398 1.320 1.245 1.175 1.109 1.046 0.987 0.931 0.879 0.830 0.783 0.739 0.698
-0.500 2.339 2.203 2.075 1.954 1.842 1.735 1.635 1.542 1.454 1.371 1.293 1.220 1.150 1.085 1.024 0.966 0.912 0.860 0.812 0.766 0.723
-0.550 2.440 2.297 2.162 2.036 1.917 1.806 1.702 1.604 1.512 1.424 1.343 1.267 1.195 1.127 1.063 1.002 0.945 0.892 0.842 0.794 0.749
-0.600 2.547 2.396 2.254 2.121 1.997 1.881 1.771 1.668 1.572 1.481 1.396 1.316 1.240 1.170 1.103 1.040 0.981 0.925 0.873 0.823 0.777
-0.650 2.660 2.501 2.351 2.212 2.081 1.959 1.844 1.736 1.635 1.540 1.451 1.367 1.289 1.215 1.145 1.079 1.018 0.960 0.905 0.854 0.805
-0.700 2.779 2.611 2.454 2.307 2.170 2.041 1.920 1.808 1.702 1.602 1.509 1.421 1.339 1.262 1.189 1.121 1.056 0.996 0.939 0.885 0.835
-0.750 2.907 2.729 2.563 2.408 2.263 2.128 2.001 1.883 1.772 1.667 1.570 1.478 1.392 1.311 1.235 1.164 1.097 1.034 0.974 0.918 0.866
-0.800 3.041 2.853 2.678 2.514 2.362 2.219 2.086 1.962 1.845 1.736 1.633 1.537 1.447 1.363 1.283 1.209 1.139 1.073 1.011 0.953 0.898
-0.850 3.184 2.985 2.800 2.627 2.466 2.316 2.176 2.045 1.922 1.808 1.700 1.600 1.505 1.417 1.334 1.256 1.183 1.114 1.050 0.989 0.932
-0.900 3.336 3.125 2.928 2.746 2.576 2.418 2.270 2.132 2.004 1.883 1.771 1.665 1.566 1.474 1.387 1.305 1.229 1.157 1.090 1.027 0.967
-0.950 3.499 3.273 3.066 2.873 2.693 2.526 2.370 2.225 2.089 1.963 1.845 1.734 1.630 1.533 1.442 1.357 1.277 1.202 1.132 1.066 1.004
-1.000 3.672 3.433 3.211 3.006 2.817 2.640 2.476 2.323 2.180 2.047 1.922 1.806 1.698 1.596 1.501 1.412 1.328 1.250 1.176 1.107 1.043
-1.050 3.854 3.602 3.366 3.149 2.948 2.761 2.587 2.426 2.275 2.135 2.004 1.882 1.768 1.662 1.562 1.469 1.381 1.299 1.222 1.150 1.083
-1.100 4.054 3.782 3.532 3.301 3.087 2.889 2.706 2.535 2.376 2.229 2.091 1.963 1.843 1.731 1.626 1.528 1.437 1.351 1.271 1.195 1.125
-1.150 4.266 3.976 3.709 3.463 3.236 3.026 2.831 2.651 2.483 2.327 2.182 2.047 1.921 1.804 1.694 1.591 1.495 1.405 1.321 1.243 1.169
-1.200 4.495 4.183 3.898 3.635 3.394 3.170 2.964 2.773 2.596 2.431 2.279 2.136 2.004 1.880 1.765 1.657 1.557 1.463 1.375 1.292 1.215
-1.250 4.740 4.406 4.100 3.820 3.562 3.325 3.106 2.903 2.716 2.542 2.380 2.230 2.091 1.961 1.840 1.727 1.621 1.523 1.430 1.344 1.263
-1.300 5.005 4.646 4.318 4.018 3.742 3.489 3.257 3.042 2.843 2.659 2.488 2.330 2.183 2.046 1.918 1.800 1.689 1.585 1.489 1.399 1.314
-1.350 5.292 4.904 4.552 4.230 3.935 3.665 3.417 3.189 2.978 2.783 2.602 2.435 2.280 2.136 2.002 1.877 1.760 1.652 1.550 1.456 1.367
-1.400 5.604 5.184 4.804 4.458 4.142 3.854 3.589 3.346 3.122 2.915 2.724 2.547 2.383 2.231 2.089 1.958 1.835 1.721 1.615 1.516 1.423
-1.450 5.943 5.487 5.076 4.703 4.365 4.055 3.772 3.513 3.275 3.055 2.852 2.665 2.492 2.331 2.182 2.043 1.915 1.795 1.683 1.579 1.482
-1.500 6.313 5.817 5.371 4.969 4.604 4.272 3.969 3.692 3.438 3.204 2.989 2.791 2.607 2.437 2.280 2.134 1.998 1.872 1.755 1.645 1.543
-1.550 6.718 6.177 5.692 5.256 4.862 4.505 4.180 3.884 3.612 3.363 3.135 2.924 2.730 2.550 2.384 2.229 2.086 1.954 1.830 1.715 1.608
-1.600 7.164 6.570 6.041 5.568 5.142 4.757 4.407 4.089 3.799 3.534 3.290 3.066 2.860 2.669 2.493 2.330 2.180 2.040 1.910 1.789 1.676
-1.650 7.656 7.002 6.423 5.907 5.445 5.029 4.652 4.310 3.999 3.716 3.456 3.217 2.998 2.796 2.610 2.438 2.278 2.131 1.994 1.866 1.748
-1.700 8.202 7.479 6.842 6.278 5.775 5.323 4.916 4.549 4.215 3.911 3.633 3.379 3.145 2.931 2.733 2.551 2.383 2.227 2.082 1.948 1.824
-1.750 8.810 8.007 7.304 6.684 6.134 5.643 5.203 4.806 4.446 4.120 3.823 3.551 3.303 3.075 2.865 2.672 2.493 2.328 2.176 2.035 1.904
-1.800 9.492 8.594 7.815 7.131 6.528 5.992 5.514 5.084 4.696 4.345 4.027 3.736 3.471 3.228 3.005 2.800 2.611 2.436 2.275 2.126 1.988
-1.850 10.262 9.252 8.382 7.625 6.961 6.374 5.852 5.386 4.966 4.588 4.246 3.934 3.651 3.391 3.154 2.936 2.735 2.551 2.380 2.223 2.077
-1.900 11.137 9.992 9.016 8.173 7.438 6.793 6.222 5.714 5.259 4.851 4.482 4.147 3.843 3.566 3.313 3.081 2.868 2.672 2.492 2.325 2.171
-1.950 12.139 10.832 9.728 8.784 7.967 7.255 6.628 6.073 5.578 5.135 4.737 4.377 4.050 3.754 3.483 3.236 3.009 2.801 2.610 2.434 2.271
-2.000 13.298 11.791 10.534 9.469 8.556 7.765 7.074 6.465 5.925 5.444 5.013 4.624 4.273 3.955 3.666 3.402 3.160 2.939 2.736 2.549 2.376
Table 3: Simulation results for the United States, 1973 (I) (H/L = 0.326; c = 1.35).
7
1
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.569 1.505 1.443 1.384 1.328 1.274 1.222 1.172 1.124 1.079 1.035 0.992 0.952 0.913 0.876 0.840 0.806 0.773 0.742 0.711 0.682
-0.050 1.616 1.549 1.486 1.425 1.367 1.311 1.257 1.206 1.156 1.109 1.064 1.020 0.978 0.938 0.900 0.863 0.828 0.794 0.762 0.731 0.701
-0.100 1.665 1.596 1.530 1.467 1.407 1.349 1.293 1.240 1.189 1.141 1.094 1.049 1.006 0.964 0.925 0.887 0.850 0.816 0.782 0.750 0.719
-0.150 1.716 1.644 1.576 1.511 1.448 1.389 1.331 1.276 1.223 1.173 1.125 1.078 1.034 0.992 0.950 0.911 0.874 0.838 0.803 0.770 0.739
-0.200 1.769 1.695 1.624 1.556 1.491 1.430 1.370 1.313 1.259 1.207 1.157 1.109 1.063 1.019 0.977 0.936 0.898 0.861 0.825 0.791 0.759
-0.250 1.824 1.747 1.674 1.604 1.537 1.472 1.410 1.352 1.296 1.241 1.190 1.140 1.093 1.048 1.004 0.963 0.923 0.885 0.848 0.813 0.779
-0.300 1.881 1.802 1.726 1.653 1.583 1.517 1.453 1.392 1.334 1.277 1.224 1.173 1.124 1.077 1.033 0.990 0.948 0.909 0.871 0.835 0.800
-0.350 1.942 1.858 1.780 1.704 1.631 1.563 1.496 1.433 1.373 1.315 1.260 1.207 1.157 1.108 1.062 1.018 0.975 0.934 0.895 0.858 0.822
-0.400 2.004 1.918 1.835 1.757 1.682 1.610 1.542 1.476 1.414 1.354 1.297 1.242 1.190 1.140 1.092 1.046 1.002 0.960 0.920 0.882 0.845
-0.450 2.069 1.980 1.894 1.812 1.734 1.660 1.589 1.521 1.456 1.394 1.335 1.279 1.225 1.173 1.123 1.076 1.031 0.987 0.946 0.906 0.868
-0.500 2.138 2.044 1.955 1.870 1.789 1.712 1.638 1.567 1.500 1.436 1.375 1.316 1.260 1.207 1.156 1.107 1.060 1.015 0.973 0.932 0.892
-0.550 2.208 2.111 2.018 1.929 1.846 1.765 1.689 1.616 1.546 1.480 1.416 1.355 1.298 1.242 1.189 1.139 1.091 1.044 1.000 0.958 0.917
-0.600 2.283 2.181 2.085 1.992 1.905 1.821 1.742 1.666 1.594 1.524 1.459 1.396 1.336 1.279 1.224 1.172 1.122 1.074 1.029 0.985 0.943
-0.650 2.361 2.255 2.154 2.058 1.966 1.880 1.797 1.718 1.643 1.571 1.503 1.438 1.376 1.317 1.260 1.206 1.155 1.105 1.058 1.013 0.970
-0.700 2.442 2.332 2.226 2.126 2.031 1.941 1.855 1.772 1.695 1.620 1.549 1.482 1.418 1.356 1.298 1.242 1.188 1.137 1.089 1.042 0.997
-0.750 2.529 2.412 2.302 2.197 2.098 2.004 1.914 1.829 1.748 1.671 1.597 1.527 1.461 1.397 1.336 1.278 1.223 1.170 1.120 1.072 1.026
-0.800 2.618 2.497 2.381 2.272 2.168 2.070 1.977 1.888 1.804 1.724 1.647 1.575 1.506 1.440 1.377 1.317 1.259 1.205 1.153 1.103 1.056
-0.850 2.713 2.585 2.464 2.350 2.242 2.140 2.042 1.950 1.862 1.779 1.699 1.624 1.552 1.484 1.418 1.356 1.297 1.241 1.187 1.135 1.086
-0.900 2.812 2.678 2.552 2.432 2.319 2.212 2.111 2.014 1.923 1.836 1.753 1.675 1.600 1.529 1.462 1.397 1.336 1.278 1.222 1.169 1.118
-0.950 2.917 2.776 2.644 2.518 2.399 2.288 2.182 2.081 1.986 1.896 1.810 1.728 1.651 1.577 1.507 1.440 1.376 1.316 1.258 1.203 1.151
-1.000 3.028 2.880 2.740 2.608 2.484 2.367 2.256 2.152 2.052 1.958 1.869 1.784 1.703 1.627 1.554 1.484 1.418 1.356 1.296 1.239 1.185
-1.050 3.145 2.988 2.841 2.703 2.573 2.450 2.335 2.225 2.121 2.023 1.930 1.842 1.758 1.678 1.603 1.531 1.462 1.397 1.335 1.276 1.220
-1.100 3.268 3.103 2.948 2.803 2.667 2.538 2.416 2.302 2.194 2.091 1.994 1.902 1.815 1.732 1.653 1.579 1.507 1.440 1.376 1.315 1.256
-1.150 3.399 3.224 3.061 2.908 2.765 2.629 2.502 2.382 2.269 2.162 2.061 1.965 1.874 1.788 1.706 1.628 1.555 1.485 1.418 1.354 1.294
-1.200 3.537 3.353 3.180 3.019 2.868 2.726 2.593 2.467 2.348 2.236 2.131 2.031 1.936 1.846 1.761 1.680 1.604 1.531 1.462 1.396 1.333
-1.250 3.685 3.489 3.306 3.136 2.977 2.828 2.687 2.556 2.431 2.314 2.204 2.099 2.000 1.907 1.818 1.734 1.655 1.579 1.507 1.439 1.374
-1.300 3.841 3.633 3.440 3.260 3.092 2.935 2.787 2.649 2.518 2.396 2.280 2.171 2.068 1.971 1.878 1.791 1.708 1.629 1.555 1.484 1.417
-1.350 4.008 3.787 3.581 3.391 3.214 3.048 2.892 2.747 2.610 2.481 2.360 2.246 2.139 2.037 1.941 1.850 1.763 1.682 1.604 1.531 1.461
-1.400 4.186 3.951 3.732 3.530 3.342 3.167 3.003 2.850 2.706 2.571 2.445 2.325 2.213 2.106 2.006 1.911 1.821 1.736 1.656 1.579 1.507
-1.450 4.378 4.125 3.893 3.678 3.478 3.293 3.120 2.959 2.808 2.666 2.533 2.408 2.290 2.179 2.074 1.975 1.881 1.793 1.709 1.630 1.554
-1.500 4.583 4.312 4.064 3.835 3.623 3.427 3.244 3.074 2.914 2.765 2.626 2.494 2.371 2.255 2.145 2.042 1.944 1.852 1.765 1.682 1.604
-1.550 4.803 4.513 4.247 4.003 3.777 3.569 3.375 3.195 3.027 2.870 2.723 2.585 2.456 2.334 2.220 2.112 2.010 1.914 1.823 1.737 1.655
-1.600 5.041 4.728 4.443 4.181 3.941 3.719 3.514 3.323 3.146 2.981 2.826 2.681 2.545 2.418 2.298 2.185 2.079 1.979 1.884 1.794 1.709
-1.650 5.299 4.961 4.653 4.373 4.116 3.880 3.662 3.459 3.272 3.097 2.934 2.782 2.639 2.506 2.380 2.262 2.151 2.046 1.947 1.854 1.765
-1.700 5.578 5.211 4.880 4.578 4.303 4.051 3.819 3.604 3.405 3.220 3.049 2.888 2.738 2.598 2.466 2.342 2.226 2.117 2.013 1.916 1.824
-1.750 5.882 5.483 5.124 4.799 4.504 4.234 3.986 3.758 3.547 3.351 3.169 3.000 2.842 2.695 2.557 2.427 2.305 2.191 2.083 1.981 1.885
-1.800 6.215 5.779 5.389 5.038 4.719 4.430 4.165 3.921 3.697 3.489 3.297 3.119 2.952 2.797 2.652 2.515 2.388 2.268 2.155 2.049 1.949
-1.850 6.580 6.102 5.676 5.295 4.952 4.640 4.356 4.096 3.857 3.637 3.433 3.244 3.068 2.904 2.752 2.609 2.475 2.349 2.231 2.120 2.016
-1.900 6.982 6.455 5.990 5.575 5.202 4.866 4.561 4.283 4.027 3.793 3.577 3.376 3.191 3.018 2.857 2.707 2.566 2.434 2.311 2.195 2.085
-1.950 7.428 6.844 6.332 5.879 5.474 5.110 4.781 4.483 4.210 3.960 3.729 3.517 3.320 3.138 2.968 2.810 2.662 2.524 2.394 2.273 2.158
-2.000 7.925 7.275 6.709 6.211 5.769 5.374 5.019 4.697 4.405 4.137 3.892 3.666 3.458 3.265 3.085 2.919 2.763 2.618 2.482 2.354 2.235
Table 4: Simulation results for the United States, 1989 (I) (H/L = 0.435; c = 1.35).
7
2
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.746 1.651 1.561 1.476 1.395 1.319 1.247 1.180 1.115 1.054 0.997 0.943 0.891 0.843 0.797 0.753 0.712 0.673 0.637 0.602 0.569
-0.050 1.814 1.715 1.621 1.532 1.448 1.369 1.293 1.223 1.156 1.093 1.033 0.977 0.923 0.873 0.825 0.780 0.737 0.697 0.659 0.623 0.589
-0.100 1.886 1.782 1.683 1.591 1.503 1.421 1.342 1.269 1.199 1.133 1.071 1.012 0.957 0.904 0.855 0.808 0.763 0.722 0.682 0.645 0.609
-0.150 1.960 1.852 1.749 1.652 1.561 1.475 1.393 1.316 1.244 1.175 1.111 1.049 0.991 0.937 0.885 0.837 0.791 0.747 0.706 0.667 0.631
-0.200 2.039 1.925 1.818 1.717 1.621 1.531 1.446 1.366 1.290 1.219 1.151 1.088 1.028 0.971 0.917 0.867 0.819 0.774 0.731 0.691 0.653
-0.250 2.122 2.002 1.890 1.784 1.684 1.590 1.502 1.418 1.339 1.265 1.195 1.128 1.066 1.006 0.950 0.898 0.848 0.801 0.757 0.715 0.676
-0.300 2.208 2.083 1.966 1.855 1.751 1.652 1.560 1.472 1.390 1.312 1.239 1.170 1.105 1.043 0.985 0.930 0.879 0.830 0.784 0.740 0.699
-0.350 2.300 2.168 2.046 1.929 1.820 1.717 1.621 1.529 1.443 1.362 1.286 1.214 1.146 1.082 1.022 0.965 0.911 0.860 0.812 0.767 0.724
-0.400 2.396 2.258 2.129 2.008 1.893 1.785 1.684 1.589 1.499 1.414 1.335 1.260 1.189 1.122 1.059 1.000 0.944 0.891 0.841 0.794 0.750
-0.450 2.497 2.353 2.217 2.089 1.970 1.857 1.750 1.651 1.557 1.469 1.386 1.308 1.234 1.164 1.099 1.037 0.979 0.924 0.872 0.823 0.777
-0.500 2.604 2.452 2.309 2.176 2.050 1.932 1.821 1.716 1.618 1.526 1.439 1.357 1.281 1.208 1.140 1.075 1.015 0.958 0.904 0.853 0.805
-0.550 2.715 2.556 2.407 2.265 2.134 2.010 1.894 1.785 1.683 1.586 1.495 1.410 1.330 1.254 1.183 1.116 1.052 0.993 0.937 0.884 0.834
-0.600 2.835 2.666 2.509 2.362 2.222 2.093 1.971 1.857 1.750 1.649 1.554 1.465 1.381 1.302 1.228 1.158 1.092 1.030 0.971 0.916 0.865
-0.650 2.960 2.784 2.617 2.462 2.317 2.181 2.053 1.933 1.820 1.714 1.615 1.522 1.434 1.352 1.274 1.202 1.133 1.068 1.008 0.950 0.896
-0.700 3.094 2.906 2.732 2.569 2.416 2.272 2.138 2.012 1.894 1.783 1.680 1.582 1.491 1.404 1.324 1.247 1.176 1.109 1.045 0.986 0.929
-0.750 3.236 3.038 2.853 2.680 2.519 2.369 2.227 2.096 1.972 1.856 1.747 1.645 1.549 1.459 1.375 1.295 1.221 1.151 1.084 1.022 0.964
-0.800 3.385 3.176 2.981 2.799 2.629 2.470 2.322 2.184 2.053 1.932 1.818 1.711 1.611 1.517 1.429 1.346 1.268 1.194 1.126 1.061 1.000
-0.850 3.545 3.323 3.116 2.924 2.745 2.577 2.422 2.276 2.140 2.012 1.893 1.781 1.676 1.577 1.485 1.398 1.317 1.240 1.168 1.101 1.037
-0.900 3.714 3.479 3.260 3.057 2.868 2.691 2.527 2.373 2.230 2.096 1.971 1.853 1.744 1.640 1.544 1.453 1.368 1.288 1.213 1.143 1.077
-0.950 3.894 3.644 3.412 3.197 2.998 2.812 2.637 2.477 2.326 2.185 2.053 1.930 1.815 1.707 1.606 1.511 1.422 1.339 1.260 1.187 1.118
-1.000 4.087 3.821 3.575 3.347 3.135 2.939 2.756 2.585 2.427 2.278 2.140 2.011 1.890 1.776 1.671 1.571 1.478 1.391 1.309 1.233 1.160
-1.050 4.292 4.008 3.748 3.505 3.281 3.073 2.880 2.700 2.533 2.377 2.231 2.095 1.968 1.850 1.739 1.635 1.537 1.446 1.361 1.281 1.205
-1.100 4.513 4.210 3.932 3.674 3.436 3.216 3.012 2.822 2.645 2.481 2.327 2.185 2.051 1.927 1.810 1.701 1.599 1.504 1.415 1.331 1.252
-1.150 4.749 4.426 4.128 3.854 3.602 3.368 3.151 2.950 2.764 2.590 2.429 2.279 2.138 2.008 1.885 1.771 1.664 1.564 1.471 1.383 1.301
-1.200 5.002 4.656 4.338 4.047 3.777 3.529 3.300 3.087 2.890 2.707 2.536 2.378 2.230 2.093 1.965 1.845 1.733 1.628 1.530 1.438 1.353
-1.250 5.277 4.904 4.564 4.252 3.965 3.701 3.457 3.232 3.023 2.829 2.650 2.483 2.327 2.183 2.048 1.922 1.805 1.695 1.592 1.496 1.406
-1.300 5.572 5.170 4.806 4.472 4.166 3.884 3.625 3.386 3.164 2.960 2.770 2.594 2.430 2.277 2.136 2.003 1.880 1.765 1.657 1.557 1.463
-1.350 5.891 5.459 5.066 4.708 4.381 4.080 3.804 3.550 3.315 3.098 2.897 2.711 2.538 2.377 2.228 2.089 1.959 1.839 1.726 1.620 1.522
-1.400 6.237 5.771 5.347 4.962 4.611 4.290 3.995 3.724 3.475 3.245 3.032 2.835 2.652 2.483 2.326 2.179 2.043 1.916 1.798 1.687 1.584
-1.450 6.615 6.108 5.650 5.236 4.858 4.514 4.199 3.911 3.645 3.401 3.175 2.967 2.774 2.595 2.429 2.275 2.131 1.998 1.873 1.758 1.649
-1.500 7.027 6.475 5.979 5.531 5.125 4.755 4.418 4.110 3.827 3.567 3.327 3.106 2.902 2.713 2.538 2.375 2.224 2.084 1.953 1.831 1.718
-1.550 7.478 6.876 6.336 5.851 5.412 5.015 4.653 4.323 4.021 3.744 3.489 3.255 3.038 2.838 2.653 2.482 2.322 2.175 2.037 1.909 1.790
-1.600 7.974 7.314 6.725 6.198 5.724 5.295 4.906 4.552 4.229 3.933 3.662 3.413 3.183 2.971 2.775 2.594 2.426 2.270 2.126 1.991 1.866
-1.650 8.522 7.795 7.150 6.576 6.061 5.597 5.178 4.798 4.452 4.136 3.847 3.581 3.337 3.112 2.905 2.713 2.536 2.372 2.219 2.077 1.946
-1.700 9.130 8.325 7.617 6.988 6.428 5.925 5.473 5.063 4.691 4.353 4.044 3.761 3.501 3.263 3.043 2.840 2.652 2.479 2.318 2.169 2.030
-1.750 9.807 8.913 8.130 7.441 6.828 6.282 5.791 5.349 4.949 4.586 4.255 3.953 3.676 3.422 3.189 2.974 2.775 2.592 2.422 2.265 2.119
-1.800 10.566 9.567 8.699 7.938 7.267 6.670 6.138 5.659 5.228 4.837 4.482 4.159 3.863 3.593 3.345 3.116 2.906 2.712 2.533 2.367 2.213
-1.850 11.423 10.299 9.330 8.488 7.749 7.095 6.514 5.995 5.528 5.107 4.726 4.379 4.064 3.775 3.511 3.268 3.045 2.839 2.650 2.474 2.312
-1.900 12.397 11.123 10.036 9.098 8.280 7.562 6.926 6.361 5.855 5.400 4.989 4.617 4.278 3.970 3.688 3.430 3.193 2.975 2.774 2.588 2.417
-1.950 13.512 12.057 10.829 9.778 8.869 8.076 7.378 6.760 6.209 5.716 5.272 4.872 4.509 4.179 3.877 3.602 3.350 3.118 2.905 2.709 2.528
-2.000 14.802 13.125 11.726 10.541 9.524 8.644 7.875 7.197 6.596 6.060 5.580 5.147 4.757 4.403 4.080 3.786 3.518 3.271 3.045 2.837 2.645
Table 5: Simulation results for the United States, 1973 (II) (H/L = 0.326; c = 1.45).
7
3
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.746 1.675 1.606 1.541 1.478 1.418 1.360 1.305 1.252 1.201 1.152 1.105 1.060 1.016 0.975 0.935 0.897 0.861 0.826 0.792 0.760
-0.050 1.798 1.725 1.654 1.586 1.521 1.459 1.399 1.342 1.286 1.234 1.184 1.135 1.089 1.045 1.002 0.961 0.922 0.884 0.848 0.813 0.780
-0.100 1.853 1.777 1.703 1.633 1.566 1.502 1.440 1.381 1.324 1.269 1.217 1.167 1.120 1.073 1.030 0.987 0.947 0.908 0.871 0.835 0.801
-0.150 1.910 1.831 1.755 1.682 1.612 1.546 1.482 1.421 1.362 1.306 1.252 1.200 1.151 1.104 1.058 1.014 0.973 0.933 0.894 0.857 0.822
-0.200 1.969 1.887 1.808 1.733 1.660 1.591 1.525 1.462 1.401 1.343 1.287 1.234 1.183 1.134 1.087 1.042 0.999 0.959 0.919 0.881 0.844
-0.250 2.031 1.945 1.863 1.785 1.710 1.639 1.570 1.505 1.442 1.382 1.324 1.269 1.217 1.166 1.118 1.071 1.027 0.985 0.944 0.905 0.867
-0.300 2.094 2.005 1.921 1.840 1.762 1.688 1.617 1.549 1.484 1.422 1.363 1.306 1.251 1.199 1.149 1.102 1.056 1.012 0.970 0.930 0.891
-0.350 2.161 2.069 1.981 1.897 1.816 1.739 1.665 1.596 1.528 1.464 1.402 1.343 1.287 1.234 1.182 1.133 1.085 1.040 0.997 0.955 0.915
-0.400 2.231 2.134 2.043 1.956 1.872 1.792 1.716 1.643 1.574 1.507 1.444 1.383 1.324 1.269 1.216 1.165 1.116 1.069 1.024 0.982 0.941
-0.450 2.303 2.204 2.108 2.017 1.930 1.848 1.769 1.693 1.621 1.552 1.486 1.423 1.362 1.305 1.250 1.198 1.148 1.099 1.053 1.009 0.967
-0.500 2.379 2.275 2.176 2.081 1.991 1.905 1.823 1.745 1.670 1.599 1.530 1.465 1.403 1.343 1.287 1.232 1.180 1.130 1.083 1.037 0.993
-0.550 2.458 2.349 2.247 2.148 2.054 1.965 1.880 1.799 1.721 1.647 1.576 1.509 1.444 1.382 1.324 1.268 1.214 1.162 1.113 1.066 1.021
-0.600 2.541 2.428 2.320 2.218 2.120 2.026 1.939 1.854 1.774 1.697 1.624 1.554 1.487 1.423 1.363 1.305 1.249 1.196 1.145 1.096 1.050
-0.650 2.628 2.510 2.398 2.291 2.189 2.092 2.000 1.913 1.829 1.749 1.673 1.601 1.532 1.466 1.403 1.343 1.285 1.230 1.178 1.128 1.080
-0.700 2.719 2.595 2.478 2.367 2.260 2.160 2.064 1.973 1.886 1.804 1.725 1.650 1.578 1.510 1.444 1.382 1.323 1.266 1.212 1.160 1.110
-0.750 2.815 2.685 2.562 2.446 2.336 2.231 2.131 2.036 1.946 1.860 1.778 1.700 1.626 1.555 1.488 1.423 1.362 1.303 1.247 1.193 1.142
-0.800 2.915 2.779 2.651 2.529 2.414 2.304 2.200 2.102 2.008 1.919 1.834 1.753 1.676 1.602 1.532 1.466 1.402 1.341 1.283 1.228 1.175
-0.850 3.020 2.878 2.744 2.616 2.496 2.382 2.272 2.170 2.073 1.980 1.892 1.808 1.728 1.651 1.579 1.510 1.444 1.381 1.321 1.264 1.209
-0.900 3.131 2.981 2.841 2.708 2.581 2.462 2.349 2.242 2.140 2.044 1.952 1.865 1.782 1.702 1.627 1.556 1.487 1.422 1.360 1.301 1.244
-0.950 3.248 3.091 2.943 2.803 2.671 2.547 2.429 2.317 2.211 2.110 2.015 1.924 1.838 1.755 1.677 1.603 1.532 1.465 1.400 1.339 1.281
-1.000 3.371 3.205 3.050 2.903 2.766 2.635 2.512 2.395 2.284 2.180 2.080 1.986 1.896 1.811 1.730 1.652 1.579 1.509 1.442 1.379 1.319
-1.050 3.500 3.326 3.163 3.009 2.864 2.728 2.599 2.477 2.361 2.252 2.148 2.050 1.957 1.868 1.784 1.704 1.628 1.555 1.486 1.420 1.358
-1.100 3.638 3.454 3.282 3.120 2.968 2.825 2.690 2.562 2.442 2.328 2.220 2.117 2.020 1.928 1.840 1.757 1.678 1.603 1.531 1.463 1.398
-1.150 3.783 3.589 3.407 3.237 3.077 2.927 2.785 2.652 2.526 2.407 2.294 2.187 2.086 1.990 1.899 1.813 1.731 1.653 1.578 1.508 1.441
-1.200 3.937 3.732 3.540 3.361 3.192 3.034 2.886 2.746 2.614 2.489 2.372 2.260 2.155 2.055 1.960 1.870 1.785 1.704 1.627 1.554 1.484
-1.250 4.101 3.884 3.680 3.491 3.313 3.148 2.991 2.845 2.706 2.576 2.453 2.337 2.227 2.123 2.024 1.931 1.842 1.758 1.678 1.602 1.530
-1.300 4.275 4.044 3.829 3.629 3.442 3.267 3.103 2.948 2.803 2.667 2.538 2.417 2.302 2.193 2.091 1.993 1.901 1.814 1.731 1.652 1.577
-1.350 4.462 4.215 3.987 3.775 3.577 3.392 3.220 3.057 2.905 2.762 2.627 2.500 2.381 2.267 2.160 2.059 1.963 1.872 1.786 1.704 1.626
-1.400 4.660 4.397 4.155 3.930 3.720 3.525 3.343 3.172 3.012 2.862 2.721 2.588 2.463 2.345 2.233 2.127 2.027 1.933 1.843 1.758 1.677
-1.450 4.873 4.592 4.333 4.094 3.872 3.666 3.473 3.293 3.125 2.967 2.819 2.680 2.549 2.425 2.309 2.199 2.094 1.996 1.902 1.814 1.730
-1.500 5.100 4.800 4.524 4.269 4.033 3.814 3.611 3.421 3.244 3.078 2.923 2.777 2.639 2.510 2.388 2.273 2.164 2.062 1.964 1.872 1.785
-1.550 5.347 5.023 4.727 4.455 4.204 3.972 3.757 3.556 3.369 3.195 3.031 2.878 2.734 2.599 2.471 2.351 2.238 2.131 2.029 1.933 1.843
-1.600 5.612 5.263 4.946 4.655 4.387 4.140 3.911 3.699 3.502 3.318 3.146 2.985 2.833 2.692 2.558 2.433 2.314 2.202 2.097 1.997 1.903
-1.650 5.898 5.522 5.180 4.868 4.582 4.319 4.076 3.851 3.642 3.448 3.266 3.097 2.938 2.789 2.649 2.518 2.394 2.278 2.167 2.063 1.965
-1.700 6.209 5.801 5.432 5.097 4.790 4.509 4.251 4.012 3.790 3.585 3.393 3.215 3.048 2.892 2.745 2.607 2.478 2.356 2.241 2.133 2.030
-1.750 6.548 6.104 5.704 5.342 5.014 4.713 4.437 4.183 3.948 3.730 3.528 3.340 3.164 3.000 2.846 2.701 2.566 2.438 2.318 2.205 2.098
-1.800 6.918 6.433 5.999 5.608 5.253 4.931 4.636 4.365 4.115 3.884 3.670 3.471 3.286 3.113 2.952 2.800 2.658 2.525 2.399 2.281 2.169
-1.850 7.324 6.792 6.319 5.894 5.512 5.165 4.849 4.559 4.293 4.048 3.821 3.611 3.415 3.233 3.063 2.904 2.755 2.615 2.484 2.360 2.244
-1.900 7.772 7.186 6.667 6.205 5.791 5.417 5.077 4.767 4.483 4.222 3.981 3.758 3.552 3.359 3.180 3.013 2.856 2.710 2.572 2.443 2.321
-1.950 8.269 7.619 7.049 6.544 6.093 5.689 5.322 4.990 4.686 4.408 4.151 3.915 3.696 3.493 3.304 3.128 2.963 2.809 2.665 2.530 2.403
-2.000 8.822 8.098 7.468 6.914 6.422 5.983 5.587 5.229 4.903 4.606 4.333 4.081 3.849 3.634 3.435 3.249 3.076 2.914 2.763 2.621 2.488
Table 6: Simulation results for the United States, 1989 (II) (H/L = 0.435; c = 1.45).
7
4
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.315 1.243 1.175 1.111 1.051 0.993 0.939 0.888 0.840 0.794 0.751 0.710 0.671 0.635 0.600 0.567 0.536 0.507 0.479 0.453 0.429
-0.050 1.366 1.291 1.220 1.153 1.091 1.031 0.974 0.921 0.871 0.823 0.778 0.736 0.695 0.657 0.621 0.587 0.555 0.525 0.496 0.469 0.443
-0.100 1.420 1.341 1.267 1.198 1.132 1.070 1.011 0.955 0.903 0.853 0.806 0.762 0.720 0.681 0.644 0.608 0.575 0.543 0.513 0.485 0.459
-0.150 1.476 1.394 1.317 1.244 1.175 1.110 1.049 0.991 0.936 0.885 0.836 0.790 0.746 0.705 0.666 0.630 0.595 0.562 0.532 0.502 0.475
-0.200 1.535 1.449 1.369 1.293 1.221 1.153 1.089 1.029 0.971 0.918 0.867 0.819 0.774 0.731 0.691 0.652 0.616 0.582 0.550 0.520 0.491
-0.250 1.597 1.508 1.423 1.343 1.268 1.197 1.131 1.068 1.008 0.952 0.899 0.849 0.802 0.758 0.716 0.676 0.639 0.603 0.570 0.538 0.509
-0.300 1.663 1.569 1.480 1.397 1.318 1.244 1.174 1.109 1.047 0.988 0.933 0.881 0.832 0.786 0.742 0.701 0.662 0.625 0.590 0.557 0.527
-0.350 1.731 1.633 1.540 1.453 1.370 1.293 1.220 1.151 1.087 1.026 0.968 0.914 0.863 0.814 0.769 0.726 0.686 0.647 0.611 0.577 0.545
-0.400 1.804 1.700 1.603 1.511 1.425 1.344 1.268 1.196 1.129 1.065 1.005 0.949 0.895 0.845 0.797 0.753 0.711 0.671 0.633 0.598 0.565
-0.450 1.880 1.771 1.669 1.573 1.483 1.398 1.318 1.243 1.173 1.106 1.044 0.984 0.929 0.876 0.827 0.781 0.737 0.695 0.656 0.620 0.585
-0.500 1.960 1.846 1.739 1.638 1.543 1.455 1.371 1.292 1.219 1.149 1.084 1.022 0.964 0.909 0.858 0.810 0.764 0.721 0.680 0.642 0.606
-0.550 2.045 1.924 1.812 1.706 1.606 1.514 1.426 1.344 1.266 1.194 1.126 1.062 1.001 0.944 0.890 0.840 0.792 0.748 0.705 0.666 0.628
-0.600 2.135 2.008 1.889 1.778 1.674 1.576 1.484 1.398 1.317 1.242 1.170 1.103 1.040 0.980 0.924 0.872 0.822 0.775 0.731 0.690 0.651
-0.650 2.229 2.095 1.971 1.854 1.744 1.642 1.545 1.455 1.370 1.291 1.216 1.146 1.080 1.018 0.959 0.905 0.853 0.804 0.759 0.715 0.675
-0.700 2.330 2.188 2.057 1.934 1.819 1.711 1.609 1.515 1.426 1.343 1.265 1.191 1.122 1.057 0.996 0.939 0.885 0.835 0.787 0.742 0.700
-0.750 2.436 2.287 2.148 2.018 1.896 1.783 1.677 1.578 1.485 1.397 1.315 1.239 1.166 1.099 1.035 0.975 0.919 0.866 0.816 0.770 0.726
-0.800 2.549 2.391 2.244 2.107 1.979 1.860 1.748 1.644 1.546 1.455 1.369 1.288 1.213 1.142 1.076 1.013 0.954 0.899 0.847 0.799 0.753
-0.850 2.669 2.502 2.346 2.201 2.067 1.941 1.823 1.714 1.611 1.515 1.425 1.341 1.262 1.187 1.118 1.053 0.991 0.934 0.880 0.829 0.781
-0.900 2.796 2.619 2.454 2.301 2.159 2.026 1.903 1.787 1.679 1.578 1.484 1.395 1.313 1.235 1.162 1.094 1.030 0.970 0.913 0.860 0.811
-0.950 2.932 2.744 2.569 2.407 2.256 2.117 1.986 1.865 1.751 1.645 1.546 1.453 1.366 1.285 1.209 1.137 1.071 1.008 0.949 0.893 0.841
-1.000 3.077 2.877 2.691 2.520 2.360 2.212 2.075 1.946 1.827 1.715 1.611 1.514 1.423 1.337 1.258 1.183 1.113 1.047 0.986 0.928 0.874
-1.050 3.232 3.018 2.821 2.639 2.470 2.314 2.168 2.033 1.907 1.789 1.680 1.578 1.482 1.393 1.309 1.231 1.157 1.089 1.024 0.964 0.907
-1.100 3.397 3.170 2.960 2.766 2.587 2.421 2.267 2.124 1.991 1.868 1.752 1.645 1.544 1.451 1.363 1.281 1.204 1.132 1.065 1.002 0.943
-1.150 3.576 3.332 3.108 2.902 2.712 2.536 2.373 2.221 2.081 1.950 1.829 1.716 1.610 1.511 1.419 1.333 1.253 1.178 1.107 1.041 0.980
-1.200 3.767 3.506 3.267 3.047 2.844 2.657 2.484 2.324 2.176 2.038 1.910 1.790 1.679 1.576 1.479 1.389 1.305 1.226 1.152 1.083 1.018
-1.250 3.973 3.692 3.436 3.201 2.985 2.786 2.603 2.433 2.276 2.130 1.995 1.869 1.752 1.643 1.542 1.447 1.359 1.276 1.199 1.126 1.059
-1.300 4.195 3.893 3.618 3.367 3.136 2.924 2.729 2.549 2.382 2.228 2.085 1.953 1.829 1.715 1.608 1.508 1.415 1.329 1.248 1.172 1.101
-1.350 4.436 4.110 3.814 3.545 3.298 3.072 2.864 2.672 2.496 2.332 2.181 2.041 1.911 1.790 1.677 1.573 1.475 1.384 1.299 1.220 1.146
-1.400 4.697 4.345 4.026 3.736 3.471 3.230 3.008 2.804 2.616 2.443 2.283 2.134 1.997 1.869 1.751 1.641 1.538 1.443 1.353 1.270 1.193
-1.450 4.981 4.599 4.254 3.942 3.658 3.399 3.162 2.944 2.744 2.560 2.390 2.233 2.088 1.954 1.829 1.713 1.605 1.504 1.410 1.323 1.242
-1.500 5.291 4.875 4.501 4.164 3.858 3.580 3.326 3.094 2.881 2.685 2.505 2.339 2.185 2.043 1.911 1.788 1.675 1.569 1.470 1.379 1.293
-1.550 5.630 5.176 4.770 4.405 4.075 3.776 3.503 3.255 3.027 2.819 2.627 2.450 2.287 2.137 1.998 1.868 1.749 1.637 1.534 1.437 1.348
-1.600 6.004 5.506 5.063 4.666 4.309 3.986 3.694 3.427 3.184 2.961 2.757 2.569 2.397 2.237 2.090 1.953 1.827 1.709 1.600 1.499 1.405
-1.650 6.416 5.868 5.383 4.951 4.563 4.214 3.899 3.612 3.352 3.114 2.896 2.696 2.512 2.343 2.187 2.043 1.909 1.786 1.671 1.564 1.465
-1.700 6.873 6.268 5.734 5.261 4.839 4.461 4.120 3.812 3.532 3.277 3.045 2.832 2.636 2.456 2.291 2.138 1.997 1.866 1.745 1.633 1.528
-1.750 7.383 6.710 6.121 5.602 5.141 4.729 4.360 4.027 3.726 3.453 3.204 2.976 2.768 2.577 2.401 2.239 2.089 1.951 1.824 1.705 1.595
-1.800 7.955 7.203 6.549 5.976 5.471 5.022 4.621 4.261 3.936 3.642 3.374 3.131 2.909 2.705 2.518 2.346 2.188 2.042 1.907 1.782 1.666
-1.850 8.600 7.754 7.024 6.390 5.834 5.342 4.905 4.514 4.162 3.845 3.558 3.297 3.059 2.842 2.643 2.460 2.292 2.138 1.995 1.863 1.741
-1.900 9.333 8.374 7.556 6.849 6.234 5.693 5.215 4.789 4.408 4.065 3.756 3.476 3.221 2.989 2.777 2.582 2.404 2.239 2.088 1.949 1.819
-1.950 10.173 9.078 8.153 7.361 6.677 6.080 5.555 5.089 4.675 4.303 3.970 3.668 3.394 3.146 2.919 2.712 2.522 2.348 2.187 2.039 1.903
-2.000 11.144 9.881 8.828 7.936 7.171 6.508 5.929 5.418 4.966 4.562 4.201 3.875 3.581 3.315 3.072 2.851 2.648 2.463 2.293 2.136 1.992
Table 7: Simulation results for the United States, 1973 (III) (H/L = 0.326; c = 1.2).
7
5
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.315 1.261 1.210 1.160 1.113 1.068 1.024 0.982 0.942 0.904 0.867 0.832 0.798 0.765 0.734 0.704 0.675 0.648 0.621 0.596 0.572
-0.050 1.354 1.298 1.245 1.194 1.145 1.099 1.054 1.010 0.969 0.929 0.892 0.855 0.820 0.786 0.754 0.723 0.694 0.665 0.638 0.612 0.587
-0.100 1.395 1.337 1.283 1.230 1.179 1.130 1.084 1.040 0.997 0.956 0.917 0.879 0.843 0.808 0.775 0.743 0.713 0.684 0.655 0.629 0.603
-0.150 1.438 1.378 1.321 1.266 1.214 1.164 1.116 1.070 1.026 0.983 0.943 0.904 0.866 0.831 0.796 0.764 0.732 0.702 0.673 0.646 0.619
-0.200 1.482 1.420 1.361 1.304 1.250 1.198 1.148 1.101 1.055 1.011 0.969 0.929 0.891 0.854 0.819 0.785 0.752 0.721 0.692 0.663 0.636
-0.250 1.529 1.464 1.403 1.344 1.288 1.234 1.182 1.133 1.086 1.041 0.997 0.956 0.916 0.878 0.842 0.807 0.773 0.741 0.711 0.681 0.653
-0.300 1.577 1.510 1.446 1.385 1.326 1.271 1.218 1.166 1.118 1.071 1.026 0.983 0.942 0.903 0.866 0.829 0.795 0.762 0.730 0.700 0.671
-0.350 1.627 1.557 1.491 1.428 1.367 1.309 1.254 1.201 1.151 1.103 1.056 1.012 0.969 0.929 0.890 0.853 0.817 0.783 0.750 0.719 0.689
-0.400 1.680 1.607 1.538 1.472 1.410 1.349 1.291 1.237 1.185 1.135 1.087 1.041 0.998 0.955 0.915 0.877 0.840 0.805 0.771 0.739 0.708
-0.450 1.734 1.659 1.587 1.519 1.453 1.391 1.332 1.275 1.220 1.169 1.119 1.072 1.026 0.983 0.941 0.902 0.864 0.828 0.793 0.760 0.728
-0.500 1.791 1.713 1.638 1.567 1.499 1.434 1.373 1.314 1.257 1.204 1.152 1.103 1.056 1.012 0.969 0.928 0.888 0.851 0.815 0.781 0.748
-0.550 1.851 1.769 1.691 1.617 1.547 1.479 1.415 1.354 1.296 1.240 1.187 1.136 1.088 1.041 0.997 0.954 0.914 0.875 0.838 0.803 0.769
-0.600 1.913 1.828 1.747 1.670 1.596 1.526 1.460 1.396 1.335 1.278 1.223 1.170 1.120 1.072 1.026 0.982 0.940 0.900 0.862 0.825 0.790
-0.650 1.979 1.890 1.805 1.725 1.648 1.575 1.506 1.440 1.377 1.317 1.260 1.205 1.153 1.104 1.056 1.011 0.968 0.926 0.887 0.849 0.813
-0.700 2.047 1.954 1.866 1.782 1.702 1.626 1.554 1.485 1.420 1.358 1.299 1.242 1.188 1.137 1.087 1.041 0.996 0.953 0.912 0.873 0.836
-0.750 2.119 2.021 1.929 1.841 1.758 1.679 1.604 1.533 1.465 1.400 1.339 1.280 1.224 1.171 1.120 1.071 1.025 0.981 0.939 0.898 0.860
-0.800 2.193 2.092 1.996 1.904 1.817 1.735 1.657 1.583 1.512 1.445 1.381 1.320 1.262 1.206 1.154 1.103 1.056 1.010 0.966 0.924 0.885
-0.850 2.274 2.167 2.065 1.969 1.879 1.793 1.711 1.634 1.561 1.491 1.424 1.361 1.301 1.243 1.189 1.137 1.087 1.040 0.994 0.951 0.910
-0.900 2.357 2.245 2.139 2.038 1.944 1.854 1.769 1.688 1.611 1.539 1.470 1.404 1.341 1.282 1.225 1.171 1.120 1.071 1.024 0.979 0.937
-0.950 2.445 2.327 2.215 2.110 2.011 1.917 1.828 1.744 1.664 1.589 1.517 1.448 1.383 1.322 1.263 1.207 1.154 1.103 1.054 1.008 0.964
-1.000 2.538 2.413 2.296 2.186 2.082 1.984 1.891 1.803 1.720 1.641 1.566 1.495 1.427 1.363 1.302 1.244 1.189 1.136 1.086 1.038 0.993
-1.050 2.635 2.504 2.381 2.266 2.156 2.054 1.957 1.865 1.778 1.695 1.617 1.543 1.473 1.406 1.343 1.283 1.225 1.171 1.119 1.069 1.022
-1.100 2.739 2.600 2.471 2.349 2.235 2.127 2.025 1.929 1.838 1.752 1.671 1.594 1.521 1.451 1.385 1.323 1.263 1.207 1.153 1.102 1.053
-1.150 2.848 2.702 2.565 2.437 2.317 2.204 2.097 1.997 1.902 1.812 1.727 1.647 1.570 1.498 1.430 1.365 1.303 1.244 1.188 1.135 1.085
-1.200 2.964 2.810 2.665 2.530 2.404 2.285 2.173 2.067 1.968 1.874 1.786 1.702 1.622 1.547 1.476 1.408 1.344 1.283 1.225 1.170 1.118
-1.250 3.088 2.924 2.771 2.628 2.495 2.370 2.252 2.142 2.038 1.939 1.847 1.759 1.677 1.598 1.524 1.454 1.387 1.323 1.263 1.206 1.152
-1.300 3.219 3.045 2.883 2.732 2.591 2.459 2.336 2.220 2.111 2.008 1.911 1.820 1.733 1.651 1.574 1.501 1.431 1.366 1.303 1.244 1.187
-1.350 3.359 3.174 3.002 2.842 2.693 2.554 2.424 2.302 2.187 2.080 1.978 1.883 1.792 1.707 1.626 1.550 1.478 1.409 1.344 1.283 1.224
-1.400 3.509 3.311 3.128 2.959 2.801 2.654 2.517 2.388 2.268 2.155 2.049 1.949 1.854 1.765 1.681 1.602 1.526 1.455 1.387 1.323 1.263
-1.450 3.669 3.457 3.262 3.082 2.915 2.760 2.615 2.480 2.353 2.234 2.123 2.018 1.919 1.826 1.738 1.655 1.577 1.503 1.432 1.366 1.303
-1.500 3.841 3.614 3.406 3.214 3.036 2.872 2.719 2.576 2.442 2.317 2.200 2.090 1.987 1.890 1.798 1.711 1.630 1.552 1.479 1.410 1.344
-1.550 4.026 3.782 3.559 3.354 3.165 2.991 2.828 2.677 2.537 2.405 2.282 2.167 2.058 1.956 1.860 1.770 1.685 1.604 1.528 1.456 1.387
-1.600 4.225 3.963 3.723 3.504 3.303 3.117 2.945 2.785 2.636 2.498 2.368 2.247 2.133 2.026 1.926 1.831 1.742 1.658 1.579 1.504 1.432
-1.650 4.441 4.157 3.900 3.665 3.450 3.251 3.069 2.899 2.742 2.596 2.459 2.331 2.212 2.100 1.995 1.896 1.803 1.715 1.632 1.554 1.479
-1.700 4.675 4.367 4.090 3.837 3.606 3.395 3.200 3.020 2.854 2.699 2.555 2.420 2.295 2.177 2.067 1.963 1.866 1.774 1.687 1.606 1.529
-1.750 4.930 4.595 4.294 4.022 3.775 3.548 3.340 3.149 2.972 2.808 2.656 2.514 2.382 2.258 2.143 2.034 1.932 1.836 1.745 1.660 1.580
-1.800 5.208 4.843 4.516 4.222 3.955 3.712 3.490 3.286 3.098 2.924 2.763 2.614 2.474 2.344 2.222 2.108 2.001 1.901 1.806 1.717 1.633
-1.850 5.514 5.114 4.757 4.438 4.150 3.889 3.650 3.433 3.232 3.048 2.877 2.718 2.571 2.434 2.306 2.186 2.074 1.969 1.870 1.777 1.689
-1.900 5.851 5.410 5.020 4.672 4.360 4.078 3.822 3.589 3.375 3.179 2.997 2.830 2.674 2.529 2.394 2.268 2.150 2.040 1.936 1.839 1.748
-1.950 6.225 5.736 5.307 4.927 4.588 4.283 4.007 3.757 3.528 3.318 3.125 2.947 2.783 2.630 2.487 2.355 2.231 2.115 2.006 1.905 1.809
-2.000 6.642 6.097 5.622 5.205 4.835 4.504 4.206 3.937 3.691 3.467 3.262 3.073 2.898 2.736 2.586 2.446 2.316 2.194 2.080 1.973 1.873
Table 8: Simulation results for the United States, 1989 (III) (H/L = 0.435; c = 1.2).
7
6
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.657 1.576 1.501 1.428 1.359 1.294 1.231 1.172 1.115 1.062 1.010 0.962 0.915 0.871 0.829 0.789 0.751 0.715 0.680 0.647 0.616
-0.050 1.714 1.631 1.552 1.477 1.405 1.337 1.272 1.211 1.152 1.096 1.043 0.993 0.945 0.899 0.856 0.814 0.775 0.737 0.702 0.668 0.636
-0.100 1.775 1.689 1.606 1.528 1.453 1.383 1.315 1.251 1.191 1.133 1.078 1.025 0.976 0.928 0.883 0.840 0.799 0.761 0.724 0.689 0.655
-0.150 1.839 1.748 1.663 1.581 1.504 1.430 1.360 1.294 1.230 1.171 1.113 1.059 1.007 0.958 0.912 0.867 0.825 0.785 0.747 0.710 0.676
-0.200 1.905 1.811 1.721 1.637 1.555 1.479 1.407 1.338 1.272 1.210 1.150 1.094 1.041 0.989 0.941 0.895 0.851 0.810 0.770 0.733 0.697
-0.250 1.974 1.876 1.783 1.694 1.610 1.531 1.455 1.383 1.315 1.250 1.189 1.130 1.075 1.022 0.972 0.924 0.879 0.836 0.795 0.756 0.719
-0.300 2.047 1.944 1.847 1.755 1.667 1.584 1.506 1.431 1.360 1.293 1.229 1.169 1.111 1.056 1.004 0.954 0.908 0.863 0.820 0.780 0.742
-0.350 2.123 2.015 1.914 1.818 1.726 1.640 1.558 1.481 1.407 1.337 1.271 1.208 1.148 1.091 1.037 0.986 0.937 0.891 0.847 0.805 0.766
-0.400 2.202 2.091 1.984 1.884 1.789 1.698 1.613 1.532 1.456 1.383 1.314 1.248 1.187 1.128 1.072 1.018 0.968 0.920 0.874 0.831 0.790
-0.450 2.286 2.169 2.058 1.953 1.854 1.760 1.671 1.586 1.507 1.431 1.359 1.291 1.227 1.165 1.107 1.052 1.000 0.950 0.903 0.858 0.816
-0.500 2.374 2.251 2.135 2.026 1.922 1.824 1.731 1.643 1.560 1.481 1.406 1.335 1.268 1.205 1.144 1.087 1.033 0.981 0.932 0.886 0.842
-0.550 2.466 2.338 2.216 2.100 1.993 1.890 1.794 1.702 1.615 1.533 1.455 1.382 1.312 1.246 1.183 1.124 1.067 1.014 0.963 0.915 0.869
-0.600 2.563 2.427 2.301 2.181 2.067 1.960 1.859 1.764 1.673 1.588 1.507 1.430 1.357 1.289 1.224 1.162 1.103 1.048 0.995 0.945 0.898
-0.650 2.665 2.524 2.390 2.264 2.146 2.034 1.928 1.828 1.734 1.644 1.560 1.480 1.405 1.333 1.266 1.201 1.141 1.083 1.028 0.977 0.927
-0.700 2.773 2.624 2.484 2.351 2.228 2.110 2.000 1.895 1.797 1.704 1.616 1.533 1.454 1.380 1.309 1.243 1.179 1.120 1.063 1.009 0.958
-0.750 2.886 2.729 2.583 2.444 2.314 2.191 2.075 1.966 1.863 1.766 1.674 1.588 1.506 1.428 1.355 1.286 1.220 1.158 1.099 1.043 0.990
-0.800 3.006 2.841 2.686 2.541 2.404 2.275 2.154 2.040 1.933 1.831 1.735 1.645 1.560 1.479 1.403 1.330 1.262 1.197 1.136 1.078 1.023
-0.850 3.133 2.958 2.796 2.643 2.499 2.363 2.237 2.118 2.005 1.899 1.799 1.705 1.616 1.532 1.452 1.377 1.306 1.239 1.175 1.115 1.058
-0.900 3.267 3.084 2.912 2.750 2.600 2.458 2.325 2.199 2.082 1.971 1.866 1.768 1.675 1.587 1.504 1.426 1.352 1.282 1.216 1.153 1.094
-0.950 3.410 3.215 3.034 2.864 2.705 2.556 2.416 2.285 2.162 2.046 1.936 1.833 1.736 1.644 1.558 1.476 1.399 1.327 1.258 1.193 1.131
-1.000 3.561 3.355 3.163 2.984 2.816 2.660 2.513 2.375 2.246 2.124 2.010 1.902 1.800 1.705 1.615 1.530 1.449 1.373 1.302 1.234 1.170
-1.050 3.721 3.503 3.300 3.111 2.934 2.769 2.615 2.470 2.334 2.206 2.086 1.974 1.868 1.768 1.674 1.585 1.501 1.422 1.348 1.277 1.211
-1.100 3.892 3.661 3.445 3.245 3.059 2.884 2.722 2.569 2.427 2.293 2.167 2.049 1.938 1.834 1.736 1.643 1.556 1.473 1.396 1.322 1.253
-1.150 4.072 3.828 3.600 3.388 3.190 3.006 2.835 2.675 2.524 2.384 2.252 2.128 2.012 1.903 1.800 1.703 1.612 1.527 1.446 1.369 1.297
-1.200 4.269 4.007 3.764 3.539 3.330 3.135 2.954 2.785 2.627 2.480 2.341 2.212 2.090 1.975 1.868 1.767 1.672 1.582 1.498 1.418 1.343
-1.250 4.477 4.197 3.939 3.700 3.478 3.272 3.081 2.902 2.736 2.581 2.435 2.299 2.171 2.052 1.939 1.833 1.734 1.640 1.552 1.469 1.391
-1.300 4.701 4.401 4.125 3.871 3.635 3.417 3.215 3.026 2.851 2.687 2.534 2.391 2.257 2.131 2.014 1.903 1.799 1.701 1.609 1.523 1.441
-1.350 4.942 4.619 4.325 4.053 3.803 3.571 3.357 3.157 2.972 2.799 2.638 2.488 2.347 2.215 2.092 1.976 1.867 1.765 1.669 1.579 1.494
-1.400 5.200 4.855 4.539 4.248 3.981 3.735 3.507 3.296 3.100 2.918 2.748 2.590 2.442 2.303 2.174 2.053 1.939 1.832 1.731 1.637 1.548
-1.450 5.480 5.108 4.768 4.457 4.172 3.910 3.668 3.444 3.236 3.044 2.864 2.697 2.542 2.396 2.260 2.133 2.014 1.902 1.797 1.698 1.605
-1.500 5.784 5.381 5.015 4.681 4.376 4.096 3.838 3.601 3.381 3.177 2.987 2.811 2.647 2.494 2.351 2.218 2.092 1.975 1.865 1.762 1.665
-1.550 6.113 5.676 5.281 4.922 4.595 4.296 4.021 3.768 3.534 3.318 3.117 2.931 2.758 2.597 2.447 2.306 2.175 2.052 1.937 1.829 1.728
-1.600 6.472 5.997 5.569 5.182 4.830 4.509 4.215 3.945 3.697 3.468 3.255 3.059 2.876 2.706 2.548 2.400 2.262 2.133 2.013 1.900 1.794
-1.650 6.864 6.346 5.881 5.462 5.083 4.738 4.424 4.136 3.871 3.627 3.402 3.194 3.000 2.821 2.654 2.499 2.354 2.218 2.092 1.973 1.862
-1.700 7.295 6.727 6.220 5.766 5.356 4.985 4.647 4.339 4.056 3.797 3.558 3.337 3.132 2.943 2.767 2.603 2.450 2.308 2.175 2.051 1.935
-1.750 7.771 7.145 6.591 6.096 5.652 5.251 4.888 4.557 4.255 3.978 3.723 3.489 3.272 3.071 2.886 2.713 2.552 2.402 2.263 2.132 2.011
-1.800 8.297 7.605 6.996 6.456 5.973 5.539 5.147 4.791 4.467 4.171 3.900 3.651 3.421 3.208 3.011 2.829 2.660 2.502 2.355 2.218 2.090
-1.850 8.884 8.115 7.442 6.849 6.322 5.851 5.427 5.044 4.696 4.379 4.089 3.823 3.579 3.353 3.145 2.952 2.773 2.607 2.452 2.308 2.174
-1.900 9.541 8.681 7.935 7.281 6.704 6.190 5.730 5.316 4.941 4.601 4.291 4.007 3.747 3.507 3.286 3.082 2.893 2.718 2.555 2.403 2.262
-1.950 10.282 9.313 8.481 7.757 7.122 6.560 6.059 5.611 5.206 4.840 4.508 4.204 3.926 3.671 3.437 3.220 3.020 2.835 2.663 2.504 2.355
-2.000 11.123 10.025 9.091 8.285 7.583 6.965 6.418 5.931 5.493 5.098 4.740 4.415 4.118 3.846 3.597 3.367 3.155 2.959 2.778 2.609 2.453
Table 9: Simulation results for Sweden, 1973 (H/L = 0.372; c = 1.4).
7
7
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.656 1.589 1.524 1.462 1.402 1.345 1.290 1.238 1.187 1.139 1.093 1.048 1.005 0.964 0.925 0.887 0.851 0.816 0.783 0.751 0.721
-0.050 1.706 1.636 1.569 1.505 1.443 1.384 1.328 1.273 1.221 1.171 1.123 1.077 1.033 0.991 0.950 0.912 0.874 0.838 0.804 0.771 0.740
-0.100 1.758 1.686 1.616 1.550 1.486 1.425 1.366 1.309 1.256 1.204 1.155 1.108 1.062 1.018 0.977 0.936 0.898 0.861 0.826 0.792 0.760
-0.150 1.812 1.737 1.665 1.596 1.530 1.466 1.406 1.348 1.292 1.238 1.188 1.139 1.092 1.047 1.004 0.962 0.923 0.885 0.848 0.813 0.780
-0.200 1.868 1.790 1.715 1.644 1.575 1.510 1.447 1.387 1.329 1.274 1.222 1.171 1.123 1.076 1.032 0.989 0.948 0.909 0.872 0.836 0.801
-0.250 1.926 1.845 1.768 1.694 1.623 1.555 1.490 1.428 1.368 1.311 1.257 1.205 1.155 1.106 1.061 1.017 0.974 0.934 0.895 0.858 0.823
-0.300 1.987 1.903 1.822 1.746 1.672 1.602 1.534 1.470 1.408 1.349 1.293 1.239 1.187 1.138 1.090 1.045 1.002 0.960 0.920 0.882 0.845
-0.350 2.050 1.963 1.879 1.799 1.723 1.650 1.580 1.514 1.450 1.389 1.330 1.275 1.221 1.171 1.122 1.075 1.030 0.987 0.946 0.906 0.868
-0.400 2.116 2.025 1.938 1.855 1.776 1.700 1.628 1.559 1.493 1.430 1.369 1.312 1.257 1.204 1.153 1.105 1.059 1.014 0.972 0.931 0.892
-0.450 2.185 2.091 2.000 1.914 1.832 1.753 1.678 1.606 1.538 1.472 1.410 1.350 1.293 1.239 1.187 1.136 1.089 1.043 0.999 0.957 0.917
-0.500 2.257 2.158 2.064 1.975 1.889 1.808 1.729 1.655 1.584 1.516 1.452 1.390 1.331 1.275 1.221 1.169 1.120 1.072 1.027 0.984 0.943
-0.550 2.332 2.230 2.131 2.038 1.949 1.864 1.783 1.706 1.633 1.563 1.495 1.431 1.370 1.312 1.256 1.203 1.152 1.103 1.056 1.012 0.969
-0.600 2.410 2.303 2.201 2.104 2.011 1.923 1.839 1.759 1.683 1.610 1.541 1.474 1.411 1.350 1.293 1.238 1.185 1.134 1.086 1.040 0.996
-0.650 2.493 2.381 2.275 2.173 2.076 1.985 1.898 1.815 1.735 1.660 1.588 1.519 1.453 1.391 1.331 1.274 1.219 1.167 1.117 1.070 1.024
-0.700 2.579 2.462 2.351 2.245 2.145 2.049 1.958 1.872 1.790 1.711 1.636 1.565 1.497 1.432 1.370 1.311 1.255 1.201 1.150 1.100 1.053
-0.750 2.670 2.547 2.431 2.320 2.216 2.116 2.022 1.931 1.846 1.764 1.687 1.613 1.543 1.475 1.411 1.350 1.292 1.236 1.183 1.132 1.084
-0.800 2.765 2.636 2.515 2.399 2.290 2.186 2.088 1.994 1.905 1.820 1.740 1.663 1.590 1.520 1.454 1.390 1.330 1.272 1.217 1.165 1.115
-0.850 2.865 2.730 2.603 2.482 2.368 2.259 2.156 2.059 1.966 1.878 1.795 1.715 1.639 1.567 1.498 1.432 1.370 1.310 1.253 1.199 1.147
-0.900 2.970 2.829 2.695 2.569 2.449 2.335 2.229 2.127 2.031 1.939 1.852 1.769 1.690 1.615 1.544 1.476 1.411 1.349 1.290 1.234 1.180
-0.950 3.081 2.932 2.792 2.659 2.534 2.416 2.304 2.198 2.097 2.002 1.911 1.825 1.743 1.665 1.591 1.521 1.454 1.390 1.329 1.271 1.215
-1.000 3.198 3.041 2.894 2.755 2.624 2.500 2.383 2.272 2.167 2.068 1.973 1.884 1.799 1.718 1.641 1.568 1.498 1.432 1.369 1.308 1.251
-1.050 3.321 3.156 3.001 2.855 2.717 2.588 2.465 2.350 2.240 2.136 2.038 1.945 1.856 1.772 1.692 1.616 1.544 1.475 1.410 1.348 1.288
-1.100 3.451 3.277 3.114 2.960 2.816 2.680 2.552 2.431 2.316 2.208 2.106 2.009 1.916 1.829 1.746 1.667 1.592 1.521 1.453 1.388 1.327
-1.150 3.589 3.405 3.233 3.071 2.920 2.777 2.643 2.516 2.396 2.283 2.176 2.075 1.979 1.888 1.802 1.720 1.642 1.568 1.497 1.430 1.367
-1.200 3.735 3.541 3.359 3.188 3.029 2.879 2.738 2.605 2.480 2.362 2.250 2.144 2.044 1.950 1.860 1.775 1.694 1.617 1.544 1.474 1.408
-1.250 3.891 3.684 3.492 3.312 3.144 2.986 2.838 2.699 2.568 2.444 2.327 2.217 2.113 2.014 1.920 1.832 1.748 1.668 1.592 1.520 1.451
-1.300 4.057 3.837 3.633 3.442 3.265 3.099 2.943 2.797 2.660 2.530 2.408 2.293 2.184 2.081 1.984 1.891 1.804 1.721 1.642 1.567 1.496
-1.350 4.233 3.999 3.782 3.581 3.394 3.218 3.054 2.901 2.756 2.621 2.493 2.372 2.259 2.151 2.049 1.953 1.862 1.776 1.694 1.616 1.543
-1.400 4.421 4.172 3.942 3.728 3.530 3.344 3.171 3.010 2.858 2.716 2.582 2.455 2.337 2.224 2.118 2.018 1.923 1.833 1.748 1.668 1.591
-1.450 4.623 4.357 4.111 3.884 3.673 3.478 3.295 3.125 2.965 2.815 2.675 2.543 2.418 2.301 2.190 2.086 1.987 1.893 1.805 1.721 1.641
-1.500 4.839 4.554 4.292 4.050 3.826 3.619 3.426 3.246 3.078 2.920 2.773 2.634 2.504 2.381 2.266 2.157 2.053 1.956 1.864 1.776 1.694
-1.550 5.073 4.766 4.485 4.227 3.989 3.769 3.564 3.374 3.197 3.031 2.876 2.730 2.594 2.465 2.344 2.230 2.123 2.021 1.925 1.834 1.748
-1.600 5.324 4.993 4.692 4.416 4.162 3.928 3.711 3.510 3.322 3.148 2.984 2.832 2.688 2.554 2.427 2.308 2.195 2.089 1.989 1.895 1.805
-1.650 5.596 5.239 4.914 4.618 4.347 4.097 3.867 3.653 3.455 3.271 3.099 2.938 2.787 2.646 2.514 2.389 2.271 2.161 2.056 1.958 1.864
-1.700 5.891 5.504 5.153 4.835 4.545 4.278 4.033 3.806 3.596 3.401 3.219 3.050 2.892 2.743 2.604 2.474 2.351 2.235 2.126 2.023 1.926
-1.750 6.212 5.791 5.412 5.069 4.756 4.471 4.209 3.968 3.745 3.539 3.347 3.168 3.002 2.846 2.700 2.563 2.434 2.313 2.199 2.092 1.991
-1.800 6.563 6.103 5.691 5.320 4.984 4.678 4.398 4.141 3.904 3.685 3.482 3.293 3.118 2.954 2.800 2.656 2.522 2.395 2.276 2.164 2.058
-1.850 6.949 6.444 5.995 5.592 5.229 4.900 4.600 4.325 4.073 3.840 3.625 3.426 3.240 3.067 2.906 2.755 2.613 2.481 2.356 2.239 2.129
-1.900 7.374 6.817 6.325 5.887 5.494 5.139 4.817 4.523 4.253 4.006 3.777 3.566 3.369 3.187 3.017 2.858 2.710 2.571 2.440 2.318 2.202
-1.950 7.845 7.228 6.687 6.208 5.781 5.397 5.050 4.734 4.446 4.182 3.938 3.714 3.506 3.314 3.134 2.967 2.811 2.665 2.528 2.400 2.279
-2.000 8.369 7.683 7.085 6.559 6.093 5.676 5.300 4.961 4.652 4.369 4.110 3.872 3.652 3.448 3.258 3.082 2.918 2.765 2.621 2.486 2.360
Table 10: Simulation results for Sweden, 1989 (H/L = 0.435; c = 1.4).
7
8
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.746 1.657 1.572 1.492 1.416 1.344 1.275 1.210 1.149 1.090 1.035 0.982 0.932 0.884 0.839 0.796 0.756 0.717 0.681 0.646 0.613
-0.050 1.810 1.717 1.629 1.546 1.467 1.391 1.320 1.252 1.189 1.128 1.070 1.015 0.963 0.914 0.868 0.823 0.781 0.741 0.703 0.667 0.633
-0.100 1.878 1.781 1.689 1.602 1.519 1.441 1.367 1.296 1.230 1.167 1.107 1.050 0.996 0.945 0.896 0.850 0.807 0.765 0.726 0.689 0.654
-0.150 1.948 1.847 1.751 1.660 1.574 1.493 1.416 1.343 1.273 1.208 1.145 1.087 1.030 0.977 0.927 0.879 0.834 0.791 0.750 0.712 0.675
-0.200 2.022 1.916 1.816 1.722 1.632 1.547 1.467 1.391 1.318 1.250 1.185 1.124 1.066 1.011 0.958 0.909 0.862 0.818 0.776 0.736 0.698
-0.250 2.099 1.988 1.884 1.785 1.692 1.604 1.520 1.440 1.365 1.294 1.227 1.163 1.103 1.046 0.991 0.940 0.891 0.845 0.801 0.760 0.721
-0.300 2.180 2.065 1.955 1.852 1.755 1.662 1.575 1.492 1.414 1.340 1.270 1.204 1.141 1.082 1.026 0.972 0.922 0.874 0.828 0.785 0.745
-0.350 2.265 2.143 2.030 1.922 1.821 1.724 1.633 1.547 1.466 1.388 1.316 1.247 1.181 1.120 1.061 1.006 0.953 0.903 0.856 0.812 0.770
-0.400 2.355 2.228 2.109 1.996 1.889 1.788 1.694 1.604 1.519 1.439 1.363 1.291 1.223 1.159 1.099 1.041 0.986 0.934 0.886 0.839 0.795
-0.450 2.448 2.316 2.191 2.073 1.961 1.856 1.757 1.663 1.575 1.491 1.412 1.337 1.267 1.200 1.137 1.077 1.020 0.967 0.916 0.868 0.822
-0.500 2.547 2.407 2.277 2.153 2.036 1.927 1.823 1.725 1.633 1.546 1.464 1.386 1.312 1.243 1.177 1.115 1.056 1.000 0.947 0.898 0.850
-0.550 2.651 2.505 2.368 2.238 2.116 2.001 1.893 1.791 1.694 1.603 1.517 1.436 1.359 1.287 1.219 1.154 1.093 1.035 0.980 0.928 0.880
-0.600 2.761 2.607 2.463 2.327 2.199 2.079 1.966 1.859 1.758 1.663 1.573 1.489 1.409 1.334 1.262 1.195 1.131 1.071 1.014 0.961 0.910
-0.650 2.876 2.715 2.563 2.421 2.286 2.161 2.042 1.930 1.825 1.726 1.632 1.544 1.461 1.382 1.308 1.238 1.172 1.109 1.050 0.994 0.941
-0.700 2.998 2.828 2.669 2.519 2.379 2.246 2.122 2.004 1.895 1.791 1.694 1.601 1.515 1.433 1.355 1.282 1.214 1.148 1.087 1.029 0.974
-0.750 3.128 2.948 2.780 2.623 2.475 2.336 2.206 2.083 1.968 1.860 1.758 1.662 1.571 1.486 1.405 1.329 1.257 1.190 1.126 1.065 1.008
-0.800 3.264 3.075 2.898 2.732 2.577 2.431 2.294 2.166 2.045 1.932 1.825 1.725 1.630 1.541 1.457 1.378 1.303 1.232 1.166 1.103 1.044
-0.850 3.409 3.209 3.022 2.848 2.684 2.531 2.387 2.253 2.126 2.007 1.896 1.791 1.692 1.599 1.511 1.428 1.351 1.277 1.208 1.142 1.081
-0.900 3.562 3.351 3.154 2.969 2.797 2.636 2.485 2.344 2.211 2.087 1.970 1.860 1.756 1.659 1.568 1.481 1.400 1.324 1.252 1.184 1.119
-0.950 3.726 3.501 3.293 3.098 2.917 2.747 2.588 2.440 2.301 2.170 2.047 1.932 1.824 1.723 1.627 1.537 1.452 1.372 1.297 1.226 1.160
-1.000 3.899 3.661 3.440 3.234 3.043 2.864 2.697 2.541 2.394 2.257 2.129 2.008 1.895 1.789 1.689 1.595 1.507 1.423 1.345 1.271 1.201
-1.050 4.084 3.831 3.597 3.379 3.177 2.988 2.812 2.647 2.493 2.349 2.215 2.088 1.970 1.858 1.754 1.656 1.563 1.476 1.395 1.318 1.245
-1.100 4.281 4.012 3.763 3.533 3.318 3.119 2.933 2.760 2.598 2.446 2.305 2.172 2.048 1.931 1.822 1.719 1.623 1.532 1.447 1.367 1.291
-1.150 4.492 4.206 3.941 3.696 3.468 3.257 3.061 2.878 2.708 2.548 2.400 2.260 2.130 2.008 1.893 1.786 1.685 1.590 1.501 1.417 1.339
-1.200 4.718 4.412 4.129 3.869 3.628 3.404 3.197 3.004 2.824 2.656 2.500 2.353 2.216 2.088 1.968 1.856 1.750 1.651 1.558 1.471 1.389
-1.250 4.961 4.633 4.332 4.054 3.798 3.561 3.341 3.136 2.947 2.770 2.605 2.451 2.307 2.173 2.047 1.929 1.819 1.715 1.618 1.526 1.441
-1.300 5.222 4.870 4.548 4.252 3.979 3.727 3.493 3.277 3.077 2.890 2.716 2.554 2.403 2.262 2.130 2.006 1.890 1.782 1.680 1.585 1.495
-1.350 5.504 5.125 4.780 4.463 4.172 3.903 3.656 3.427 3.214 3.017 2.834 2.663 2.504 2.355 2.217 2.087 1.966 1.852 1.746 1.646 1.552
-1.400 5.806 5.400 5.029 4.689 4.378 4.092 3.829 3.585 3.360 3.152 2.958 2.778 2.610 2.454 2.308 2.172 2.045 1.926 1.814 1.710 1.612
-1.450 6.137 5.697 5.297 4.932 4.599 4.294 4.013 3.754 3.515 3.294 3.090 2.899 2.723 2.558 2.405 2.262 2.128 2.003 1.886 1.777 1.675
-1.500 6.496 6.018 5.586 5.194 4.836 4.509 4.210 3.934 3.680 3.446 3.229 3.028 2.841 2.668 2.506 2.356 2.216 2.085 1.962 1.848 1.740
-1.550 6.887 6.367 5.899 5.475 5.091 4.741 4.420 4.126 3.856 3.607 3.377 3.164 2.967 2.784 2.614 2.455 2.308 2.170 2.042 1.921 1.809
-1.600 7.314 6.747 6.238 5.780 5.366 4.989 4.646 4.332 4.044 3.779 3.534 3.309 3.100 2.907 2.727 2.560 2.405 2.260 2.125 1.999 1.881
-1.650 7.784 7.162 6.608 6.111 5.663 5.257 4.888 4.552 4.244 3.962 3.702 3.463 3.241 3.037 2.847 2.671 2.507 2.355 2.213 2.081 1.957
-1.700 8.302 7.618 7.011 6.470 5.984 5.546 5.149 4.788 4.459 4.157 3.880 3.626 3.391 3.175 2.974 2.788 2.616 2.455 2.306 2.167 2.037
-1.750 8.876 8.119 7.453 6.861 6.333 5.858 5.430 5.042 4.689 4.366 4.071 3.800 3.551 3.321 3.109 2.912 2.730 2.561 2.404 2.257 2.121
-1.800 9.515 8.674 7.939 7.290 6.713 6.198 5.734 5.316 4.936 4.590 4.275 3.986 3.721 3.477 3.252 3.044 2.851 2.673 2.507 2.353 2.210
-1.850 10.230 9.291 8.476 7.761 7.129 6.567 6.064 5.611 5.202 4.831 4.493 4.185 3.902 3.642 3.403 3.183 2.979 2.791 2.616 2.454 2.303
-1.900 11.037 9.981 9.072 8.280 7.585 6.970 6.422 5.932 5.490 5.090 4.728 4.397 4.095 3.819 3.565 3.331 3.115 2.916 2.731 2.560 2.401
-1.950 11.953 10.757 9.737 8.856 8.088 7.412 6.813 6.279 5.801 5.370 4.980 4.625 4.303 4.007 3.737 3.488 3.259 3.048 2.853 2.672 2.505
-2.000 13.002 11.636 10.483 9.497 8.643 7.898 7.241 6.659 6.139 5.672 5.251 4.871 4.525 4.209 3.920 3.656 3.413 3.189 2.982 2.791 2.615
Table 11: Simulation results for the United Kingdom, 1973 (H/L = 0.351; c = 1.45).
7
9
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.746 1.683 1.623 1.564 1.508 1.454 1.402 1.351 1.303 1.256 1.211 1.168 1.126 1.086 1.046 1.009 0.972 0.937 0.904 0.871 0.840
-0.050 1.793 1.728 1.665 1.605 1.547 1.491 1.438 1.386 1.336 1.288 1.241 1.196 1.153 1.112 1.072 1.033 0.996 0.960 0.925 0.892 0.860
-0.100 1.841 1.774 1.710 1.648 1.588 1.530 1.475 1.421 1.370 1.320 1.272 1.226 1.182 1.139 1.098 1.058 1.020 0.983 0.947 0.913 0.880
-0.150 1.891 1.822 1.755 1.691 1.630 1.570 1.513 1.458 1.405 1.353 1.304 1.257 1.212 1.167 1.125 1.084 1.045 1.007 0.970 0.935 0.901
-0.200 1.943 1.872 1.803 1.736 1.673 1.611 1.552 1.495 1.441 1.388 1.337 1.289 1.242 1.196 1.153 1.111 1.070 1.031 0.994 0.958 0.923
-0.250 1.997 1.923 1.851 1.783 1.717 1.654 1.593 1.534 1.478 1.423 1.372 1.321 1.273 1.226 1.181 1.138 1.097 1.057 1.018 0.981 0.945
-0.300 2.053 1.976 1.902 1.831 1.764 1.698 1.635 1.575 1.517 1.461 1.407 1.355 1.305 1.257 1.211 1.167 1.124 1.083 1.043 1.005 0.968
-0.350 2.111 2.032 1.955 1.882 1.811 1.744 1.679 1.616 1.556 1.499 1.443 1.390 1.338 1.289 1.242 1.196 1.152 1.109 1.069 1.029 0.992
-0.400 2.171 2.089 2.010 1.934 1.861 1.791 1.724 1.660 1.598 1.538 1.481 1.426 1.373 1.322 1.273 1.226 1.181 1.137 1.095 1.055 1.016
-0.450 2.234 2.149 2.067 1.988 1.913 1.840 1.771 1.704 1.640 1.579 1.520 1.463 1.408 1.356 1.305 1.257 1.210 1.165 1.122 1.081 1.041
-0.500 2.300 2.211 2.126 2.044 1.966 1.891 1.819 1.750 1.684 1.621 1.560 1.501 1.445 1.391 1.339 1.289 1.241 1.195 1.150 1.108 1.067
-0.550 2.368 2.275 2.187 2.103 2.022 1.944 1.870 1.798 1.730 1.664 1.601 1.540 1.483 1.427 1.373 1.322 1.273 1.225 1.179 1.135 1.093
-0.600 2.439 2.342 2.251 2.163 2.079 1.999 1.922 1.848 1.777 1.709 1.644 1.582 1.522 1.464 1.409 1.356 1.305 1.256 1.209 1.164 1.120
-0.650 2.512 2.413 2.317 2.225 2.139 2.055 1.976 1.899 1.826 1.756 1.689 1.624 1.562 1.503 1.446 1.391 1.339 1.288 1.240 1.193 1.149
-0.700 2.590 2.486 2.387 2.292 2.201 2.115 2.032 1.953 1.877 1.804 1.735 1.668 1.604 1.543 1.484 1.428 1.374 1.322 1.272 1.224 1.178
-0.750 2.670 2.562 2.459 2.360 2.266 2.176 2.090 2.008 1.930 1.855 1.782 1.714 1.647 1.584 1.524 1.465 1.409 1.356 1.304 1.255 1.207
-0.800 2.754 2.642 2.534 2.431 2.334 2.240 2.151 2.065 1.984 1.907 1.832 1.761 1.692 1.627 1.564 1.504 1.447 1.391 1.338 1.287 1.238
-0.850 2.843 2.724 2.613 2.506 2.404 2.307 2.214 2.126 2.041 1.960 1.883 1.810 1.739 1.671 1.606 1.544 1.485 1.428 1.373 1.321 1.270
-0.900 2.935 2.812 2.695 2.583 2.477 2.376 2.279 2.188 2.100 2.017 1.937 1.860 1.787 1.717 1.650 1.586 1.525 1.466 1.409 1.355 1.303
-0.950 3.033 2.902 2.780 2.664 2.553 2.448 2.348 2.253 2.161 2.075 1.992 1.913 1.837 1.765 1.695 1.629 1.566 1.505 1.446 1.391 1.337
-1.000 3.135 2.999 2.871 2.748 2.633 2.524 2.419 2.320 2.226 2.135 2.049 1.967 1.889 1.814 1.742 1.674 1.608 1.545 1.485 1.427 1.372
-1.050 3.242 3.099 2.965 2.837 2.717 2.602 2.494 2.390 2.292 2.198 2.109 2.024 1.943 1.865 1.791 1.720 1.652 1.587 1.525 1.465 1.408
-1.100 3.354 3.205 3.064 2.930 2.804 2.685 2.571 2.464 2.361 2.264 2.171 2.083 1.998 1.918 1.841 1.768 1.697 1.630 1.566 1.505 1.446
-1.150 3.473 3.316 3.167 3.027 2.896 2.771 2.652 2.540 2.434 2.332 2.236 2.144 2.056 1.973 1.893 1.817 1.745 1.675 1.609 1.545 1.484
-1.200 3.599 3.433 3.277 3.130 2.992 2.861 2.737 2.620 2.509 2.403 2.303 2.207 2.117 2.030 1.947 1.869 1.793 1.722 1.653 1.587 1.525
-1.250 3.731 3.556 3.391 3.238 3.092 2.955 2.826 2.704 2.588 2.478 2.373 2.274 2.179 2.089 2.004 1.922 1.844 1.770 1.699 1.631 1.566
-1.300 3.871 3.686 3.513 3.351 3.198 3.054 2.919 2.791 2.670 2.555 2.446 2.343 2.245 2.151 2.062 1.977 1.897 1.820 1.746 1.676 1.609
-1.350 4.020 3.824 3.641 3.470 3.310 3.159 3.017 2.882 2.756 2.636 2.522 2.415 2.313 2.215 2.123 2.035 1.951 1.871 1.795 1.723 1.653
-1.400 4.178 3.970 3.777 3.596 3.427 3.268 3.119 2.978 2.846 2.721 2.602 2.490 2.383 2.282 2.186 2.095 2.008 1.925 1.846 1.771 1.699
-1.450 4.347 4.125 3.920 3.729 3.550 3.383 3.227 3.079 2.940 2.809 2.685 2.568 2.457 2.352 2.252 2.157 2.067 1.981 1.899 1.821 1.747
-1.500 4.526 4.290 4.072 3.870 3.681 3.505 3.340 3.185 3.039 2.902 2.772 2.650 2.534 2.425 2.321 2.222 2.128 2.039 1.954 1.874 1.797
-1.550 4.717 4.466 4.234 4.019 3.819 3.633 3.459 3.296 3.143 2.999 2.864 2.736 2.615 2.501 2.392 2.290 2.192 2.100 2.011 1.928 1.848
-1.600 4.924 4.654 4.406 4.178 3.966 3.769 3.585 3.413 3.252 3.101 2.959 2.826 2.699 2.580 2.467 2.360 2.259 2.162 2.071 1.984 1.901
-1.650 5.145 4.855 4.590 4.346 4.121 3.912 3.718 3.537 3.367 3.209 3.060 2.920 2.787 2.663 2.545 2.434 2.328 2.228 2.133 2.042 1.956
-1.700 5.383 5.071 4.787 4.526 4.286 4.064 3.859 3.667 3.489 3.322 3.165 3.018 2.880 2.750 2.626 2.510 2.400 2.296 2.197 2.103 2.014
-1.750 5.640 5.303 4.997 4.718 4.462 4.226 4.008 3.805 3.617 3.441 3.276 3.122 2.977 2.840 2.712 2.590 2.475 2.367 2.264 2.166 2.074
-1.800 5.919 5.554 5.224 4.924 4.650 4.398 4.166 3.951 3.752 3.566 3.393 3.231 3.078 2.935 2.801 2.674 2.554 2.441 2.334 2.232 2.136
-1.850 6.222 5.825 5.468 5.145 4.851 4.582 4.335 4.106 3.895 3.699 3.516 3.345 3.185 3.035 2.894 2.762 2.636 2.518 2.407 2.301 2.201
-1.900 6.553 6.119 5.732 5.383 5.066 4.778 4.514 4.271 4.047 3.839 3.646 3.466 3.298 3.140 2.992 2.853 2.723 2.599 2.483 2.373 2.268
-1.950 6.916 6.440 6.018 5.639 5.298 4.988 4.706 4.447 4.208 3.988 3.783 3.593 3.416 3.250 3.095 2.950 2.813 2.684 2.562 2.447 2.339
-2.000 7.316 6.792 6.329 5.917 5.548 5.214 4.911 4.634 4.380 4.145 3.929 3.728 3.541 3.366 3.203 3.051 2.907 2.772 2.645 2.525 2.412
Table 12: Simulation results for the United Kingdom, 1989 (H/L = 0.481; c = 1.45).
8
0
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.315 1.245 1.178 1.116 1.056 1.000 0.947 0.897 0.849 0.804 0.761 0.720 0.682 0.646 0.611 0.579 0.548 0.519 0.491 0.465 0.440
-0.050 1.365 1.291 1.223 1.157 1.096 1.037 0.981 0.929 0.879 0.832 0.788 0.746 0.706 0.668 0.633 0.599 0.567 0.537 0.508 0.481 0.455
-0.100 1.417 1.341 1.269 1.201 1.136 1.075 1.018 0.963 0.911 0.862 0.816 0.772 0.731 0.692 0.655 0.620 0.587 0.555 0.525 0.497 0.471
-0.150 1.473 1.393 1.318 1.246 1.179 1.115 1.055 0.999 0.945 0.894 0.846 0.800 0.757 0.716 0.678 0.641 0.607 0.574 0.544 0.514 0.487
-0.200 1.530 1.447 1.368 1.294 1.224 1.157 1.095 1.036 0.979 0.927 0.876 0.829 0.784 0.742 0.702 0.664 0.628 0.594 0.562 0.532 0.504
-0.250 1.591 1.504 1.422 1.344 1.270 1.201 1.136 1.074 1.016 0.960 0.908 0.859 0.812 0.768 0.727 0.688 0.650 0.615 0.582 0.551 0.521
-0.300 1.655 1.563 1.477 1.396 1.319 1.247 1.179 1.114 1.054 0.996 0.942 0.890 0.842 0.796 0.753 0.712 0.673 0.637 0.602 0.570 0.539
-0.350 1.722 1.626 1.536 1.451 1.371 1.295 1.223 1.156 1.093 1.033 0.976 0.923 0.873 0.825 0.780 0.737 0.697 0.659 0.624 0.590 0.558
-0.400 1.792 1.692 1.597 1.508 1.424 1.345 1.271 1.201 1.135 1.072 1.013 0.957 0.905 0.855 0.808 0.764 0.722 0.683 0.646 0.610 0.577
-0.450 1.867 1.761 1.662 1.569 1.481 1.398 1.320 1.247 1.178 1.112 1.051 0.993 0.938 0.886 0.838 0.792 0.748 0.707 0.668 0.632 0.597
-0.500 1.945 1.834 1.730 1.632 1.540 1.453 1.372 1.295 1.223 1.155 1.091 1.030 0.973 0.919 0.868 0.820 0.775 0.733 0.692 0.654 0.619
-0.550 2.027 1.910 1.801 1.698 1.602 1.511 1.426 1.346 1.270 1.200 1.132 1.069 1.009 0.953 0.900 0.851 0.803 0.759 0.717 0.678 0.640
-0.600 2.114 1.991 1.876 1.769 1.667 1.572 1.483 1.398 1.320 1.246 1.176 1.110 1.048 0.989 0.934 0.882 0.833 0.787 0.743 0.702 0.663
-0.650 2.206 2.076 1.956 1.842 1.736 1.636 1.542 1.455 1.372 1.294 1.221 1.152 1.087 1.026 0.969 0.915 0.864 0.816 0.770 0.727 0.687
-0.700 2.303 2.167 2.040 1.920 1.808 1.704 1.605 1.513 1.426 1.345 1.269 1.197 1.129 1.065 1.005 0.949 0.896 0.846 0.798 0.754 0.712
-0.750 2.406 2.262 2.128 2.002 1.884 1.775 1.671 1.575 1.484 1.399 1.319 1.243 1.173 1.106 1.044 0.985 0.929 0.877 0.828 0.782 0.738
-0.800 2.515 2.363 2.221 2.089 1.965 1.849 1.741 1.639 1.544 1.455 1.371 1.292 1.218 1.149 1.083 1.022 0.964 0.910 0.859 0.810 0.765
-0.850 2.631 2.470 2.320 2.180 2.050 1.928 1.814 1.707 1.607 1.514 1.426 1.344 1.266 1.194 1.125 1.061 1.001 0.944 0.891 0.840 0.793
-0.900 2.754 2.583 2.425 2.277 2.140 2.011 1.891 1.779 1.674 1.576 1.484 1.397 1.316 1.240 1.169 1.102 1.039 0.980 0.924 0.872 0.822
-0.950 2.885 2.704 2.536 2.380 2.234 2.099 1.973 1.855 1.744 1.641 1.544 1.454 1.369 1.290 1.215 1.145 1.079 1.017 0.959 0.904 0.853
-1.000 3.025 2.832 2.654 2.489 2.335 2.192 2.059 1.934 1.818 1.710 1.608 1.513 1.424 1.341 1.263 1.190 1.121 1.056 0.996 0.939 0.885
-1.050 3.174 2.969 2.780 2.604 2.442 2.290 2.150 2.018 1.896 1.782 1.676 1.576 1.483 1.395 1.313 1.237 1.165 1.097 1.034 0.974 0.919
-1.100 3.333 3.115 2.913 2.727 2.555 2.395 2.246 2.107 1.979 1.858 1.746 1.642 1.544 1.452 1.366 1.286 1.211 1.140 1.074 1.012 0.954
-1.150 3.504 3.270 3.056 2.858 2.675 2.505 2.348 2.202 2.066 1.939 1.821 1.711 1.608 1.512 1.422 1.338 1.259 1.185 1.116 1.051 0.990
-1.200 3.687 3.438 3.208 2.997 2.803 2.623 2.456 2.301 2.158 2.024 1.900 1.784 1.676 1.575 1.480 1.392 1.310 1.232 1.160 1.092 1.028
-1.250 3.884 3.617 3.372 3.146 2.939 2.748 2.571 2.407 2.255 2.114 1.983 1.861 1.747 1.641 1.542 1.449 1.363 1.282 1.206 1.135 1.068
-1.300 4.097 3.809 3.546 3.306 3.084 2.881 2.693 2.519 2.358 2.209 2.071 1.942 1.822 1.711 1.607 1.509 1.419 1.334 1.254 1.180 1.110
-1.350 4.327 4.017 3.734 3.476 3.240 3.023 2.823 2.638 2.468 2.310 2.164 2.028 1.902 1.784 1.675 1.573 1.477 1.388 1.305 1.227 1.154
-1.400 4.576 4.241 3.937 3.660 3.407 3.175 2.962 2.766 2.585 2.417 2.262 2.119 1.986 1.862 1.747 1.639 1.539 1.446 1.358 1.277 1.201
-1.450 4.846 4.483 4.155 3.857 3.585 3.337 3.110 2.901 2.709 2.531 2.367 2.215 2.074 1.944 1.822 1.709 1.604 1.506 1.414 1.329 1.249
-1.500 5.141 4.747 4.391 4.070 3.778 3.512 3.269 3.046 2.841 2.652 2.478 2.317 2.169 2.031 1.902 1.783 1.673 1.569 1.473 1.384 1.300
-1.550 5.463 5.033 4.647 4.300 3.985 3.699 3.439 3.200 2.982 2.781 2.596 2.426 2.268 2.122 1.987 1.862 1.745 1.636 1.535 1.441 1.353
-1.600 5.817 5.346 4.926 4.549 4.209 3.901 3.621 3.366 3.133 2.919 2.722 2.541 2.374 2.220 2.077 1.944 1.821 1.707 1.601 1.502 1.409
-1.650 6.207 5.690 5.230 4.820 4.452 4.119 3.818 3.544 3.294 3.066 2.856 2.664 2.486 2.323 2.172 2.032 1.902 1.781 1.670 1.565 1.469
-1.700 6.639 6.068 5.564 5.116 4.715 4.355 4.030 3.735 3.467 3.223 3.000 2.794 2.606 2.432 2.272 2.124 1.987 1.860 1.742 1.633 1.531
-1.750 7.119 6.486 5.930 5.439 5.002 4.611 4.259 3.942 3.654 3.392 3.153 2.934 2.733 2.549 2.379 2.222 2.077 1.943 1.819 1.704 1.596
-1.800 7.656 6.949 6.334 5.794 5.315 4.889 4.508 4.165 3.855 3.573 3.317 3.083 2.870 2.673 2.493 2.327 2.173 2.031 1.900 1.778 1.666
-1.850 8.260 7.467 6.782 6.185 5.659 5.193 4.778 4.406 4.071 3.768 3.494 3.243 3.015 2.806 2.614 2.437 2.275 2.125 1.986 1.858 1.739
-1.900 8.945 8.049 7.282 6.618 6.038 5.526 5.073 4.669 4.306 3.979 3.683 3.415 3.171 2.947 2.743 2.555 2.383 2.224 2.077 1.941 1.816
-1.950 9.726 8.706 7.842 7.100 6.456 5.893 5.396 4.955 4.561 4.207 3.888 3.600 3.338 3.099 2.881 2.681 2.498 2.329 2.173 2.030 1.897
-2.000 10.627 9.455 8.473 7.639 6.921 6.297 5.750 5.267 4.838 4.454 4.109 3.799 3.517 3.261 3.028 2.815 2.620 2.441 2.276 2.124 1.984
Table 13: Simulation results for Denmark, 1973 (H/L = 0.335; c = 1.2).
8
1
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.314 1.265 1.217 1.172 1.128 1.086 1.046 1.006 0.969 0.932 0.897 0.864 0.832 0.800 0.770 0.741 0.714 0.687 0.661 0.636 0.613
-0.050 1.351 1.300 1.251 1.204 1.159 1.115 1.073 1.033 0.994 0.957 0.921 0.886 0.853 0.821 0.790 0.760 0.732 0.704 0.678 0.652 0.628
-0.100 1.389 1.336 1.286 1.237 1.190 1.145 1.102 1.060 1.020 0.982 0.945 0.909 0.875 0.842 0.810 0.779 0.750 0.722 0.695 0.668 0.643
-0.150 1.428 1.374 1.321 1.271 1.223 1.176 1.132 1.089 1.047 1.008 0.969 0.933 0.897 0.863 0.831 0.799 0.769 0.740 0.712 0.685 0.659
-0.200 1.469 1.412 1.359 1.307 1.256 1.208 1.162 1.118 1.075 1.034 0.995 0.957 0.921 0.886 0.852 0.820 0.789 0.759 0.730 0.702 0.676
-0.250 1.512 1.453 1.397 1.343 1.291 1.242 1.194 1.148 1.105 1.062 1.021 0.982 0.945 0.909 0.874 0.841 0.809 0.778 0.748 0.720 0.693
-0.300 1.556 1.495 1.437 1.381 1.327 1.276 1.227 1.179 1.134 1.091 1.049 1.008 0.970 0.933 0.897 0.863 0.830 0.798 0.767 0.738 0.710
-0.350 1.601 1.538 1.478 1.421 1.365 1.311 1.261 1.212 1.165 1.120 1.077 1.035 0.996 0.957 0.920 0.885 0.851 0.819 0.787 0.757 0.728
-0.400 1.649 1.584 1.521 1.461 1.404 1.349 1.296 1.246 1.197 1.151 1.106 1.063 1.022 0.983 0.945 0.908 0.873 0.840 0.807 0.776 0.747
-0.450 1.698 1.631 1.566 1.504 1.444 1.387 1.333 1.280 1.230 1.182 1.136 1.092 1.050 1.009 0.970 0.932 0.896 0.861 0.828 0.796 0.766
-0.500 1.750 1.680 1.612 1.548 1.486 1.427 1.371 1.317 1.265 1.215 1.168 1.122 1.078 1.036 0.996 0.957 0.920 0.884 0.850 0.817 0.785
-0.550 1.804 1.731 1.661 1.594 1.530 1.469 1.410 1.354 1.301 1.249 1.200 1.153 1.107 1.064 1.022 0.982 0.944 0.907 0.872 0.838 0.806
-0.600 1.860 1.784 1.711 1.642 1.575 1.512 1.451 1.393 1.337 1.284 1.233 1.185 1.138 1.093 1.050 1.009 0.969 0.931 0.895 0.860 0.827
-0.650 1.919 1.839 1.764 1.692 1.623 1.557 1.494 1.433 1.376 1.321 1.268 1.218 1.169 1.123 1.079 1.036 0.995 0.956 0.919 0.883 0.848
-0.700 1.980 1.897 1.818 1.743 1.672 1.603 1.538 1.475 1.416 1.359 1.304 1.252 1.202 1.154 1.108 1.064 1.022 0.982 0.943 0.906 0.870
-0.750 2.044 1.957 1.876 1.797 1.723 1.651 1.584 1.519 1.457 1.398 1.341 1.287 1.236 1.186 1.139 1.093 1.050 1.008 0.968 0.930 0.893
-0.800 2.111 2.021 1.936 1.854 1.776 1.702 1.631 1.564 1.500 1.439 1.380 1.324 1.271 1.219 1.170 1.123 1.079 1.036 0.994 0.955 0.917
-0.850 2.182 2.088 1.998 1.913 1.831 1.755 1.681 1.611 1.545 1.481 1.420 1.362 1.307 1.254 1.203 1.155 1.108 1.064 1.021 0.981 0.942
-0.900 2.256 2.157 2.063 1.974 1.890 1.809 1.733 1.660 1.591 1.525 1.462 1.402 1.344 1.290 1.237 1.187 1.139 1.093 1.049 1.007 0.967
-0.950 2.334 2.230 2.131 2.038 1.951 1.867 1.787 1.711 1.639 1.571 1.505 1.443 1.384 1.327 1.272 1.221 1.171 1.124 1.078 1.035 0.993
-1.000 2.415 2.306 2.203 2.106 2.014 1.927 1.844 1.765 1.690 1.619 1.551 1.486 1.424 1.365 1.309 1.255 1.204 1.155 1.108 1.063 1.020
-1.050 2.501 2.387 2.279 2.177 2.080 1.989 1.903 1.820 1.742 1.668 1.598 1.530 1.466 1.405 1.347 1.291 1.238 1.187 1.139 1.093 1.048
-1.100 2.592 2.471 2.358 2.251 2.150 2.055 1.964 1.878 1.797 1.720 1.646 1.577 1.510 1.447 1.386 1.329 1.274 1.221 1.171 1.123 1.077
-1.150 2.687 2.560 2.441 2.329 2.223 2.123 2.029 1.939 1.854 1.774 1.697 1.625 1.556 1.490 1.427 1.367 1.310 1.256 1.204 1.155 1.107
-1.200 2.788 2.654 2.529 2.411 2.300 2.195 2.096 2.003 1.914 1.830 1.751 1.675 1.603 1.535 1.470 1.408 1.349 1.292 1.239 1.187 1.138
-1.250 2.895 2.753 2.621 2.497 2.380 2.270 2.167 2.069 1.977 1.889 1.806 1.727 1.652 1.581 1.514 1.450 1.388 1.330 1.274 1.221 1.171
-1.300 3.008 2.859 2.719 2.588 2.465 2.350 2.241 2.139 2.042 1.950 1.864 1.782 1.704 1.630 1.560 1.493 1.430 1.369 1.311 1.256 1.204
-1.350 3.128 2.970 2.822 2.684 2.554 2.433 2.319 2.212 2.110 2.015 1.924 1.839 1.758 1.681 1.608 1.538 1.472 1.410 1.350 1.293 1.239
-1.400 3.257 3.088 2.931 2.785 2.649 2.521 2.401 2.288 2.182 2.082 1.988 1.898 1.814 1.734 1.658 1.585 1.517 1.452 1.390 1.331 1.274
-1.450 3.394 3.214 3.047 2.892 2.748 2.613 2.487 2.369 2.257 2.153 2.054 1.960 1.872 1.789 1.710 1.634 1.563 1.496 1.431 1.370 1.312
-1.500 3.540 3.348 3.171 3.006 2.853 2.711 2.578 2.453 2.337 2.227 2.123 2.026 1.933 1.846 1.764 1.686 1.612 1.541 1.474 1.411 1.350
-1.550 3.697 3.491 3.302 3.127 2.965 2.814 2.674 2.543 2.420 2.304 2.196 2.094 1.997 1.906 1.820 1.739 1.662 1.589 1.519 1.453 1.391
-1.600 3.865 3.644 3.442 3.256 3.083 2.924 2.775 2.637 2.507 2.386 2.272 2.165 2.064 1.969 1.879 1.795 1.714 1.638 1.566 1.497 1.432
-1.650 4.046 3.808 3.592 3.393 3.209 3.040 2.883 2.736 2.600 2.472 2.353 2.240 2.135 2.035 1.941 1.853 1.769 1.690 1.614 1.543 1.476
-1.700 4.241 3.985 3.752 3.539 3.344 3.163 2.996 2.841 2.697 2.563 2.437 2.319 2.208 2.104 2.006 1.913 1.826 1.743 1.665 1.591 1.521
-1.750 4.453 4.175 3.924 3.696 3.487 3.294 3.117 2.953 2.800 2.658 2.526 2.402 2.286 2.176 2.074 1.977 1.886 1.800 1.718 1.641 1.568
-1.800 4.683 4.381 4.110 3.864 3.640 3.434 3.246 3.071 2.910 2.759 2.620 2.489 2.367 2.252 2.145 2.044 1.948 1.858 1.773 1.693 1.617
-1.850 4.934 4.605 4.311 4.045 3.804 3.584 3.382 3.197 3.025 2.866 2.719 2.581 2.453 2.332 2.219 2.113 2.013 1.919 1.831 1.747 1.668
-1.900 5.208 4.848 4.528 4.240 3.980 3.744 3.528 3.331 3.148 2.980 2.823 2.678 2.543 2.416 2.298 2.186 2.082 1.984 1.891 1.804 1.721
-1.950 5.511 5.115 4.764 4.452 4.170 3.916 3.685 3.473 3.279 3.100 2.934 2.781 2.638 2.504 2.380 2.263 2.154 2.051 1.954 1.863 1.777
-2.000 5.845 5.407 5.022 4.681 4.376 4.101 3.853 3.626 3.418 3.228 3.052 2.889 2.738 2.598 2.466 2.344 2.229 2.121 2.020 1.924 1.835
Table 14: Simulation results for Denmark, 1989 (H/L = 0.466; c = 1.2).
8
2
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.314 1.174 1.049 0.938 0.838 0.748 0.669 0.597 0.534 0.477 0.426 0.381 0.340 0.304 0.271 0.242 0.217 0.194 0.173 0.155 0.138
-0.050 1.397 1.248 1.114 0.995 0.889 0.794 0.709 0.633 0.565 0.505 0.451 0.403 0.360 0.321 0.287 0.256 0.229 0.204 0.183 0.163 0.146
-0.100 1.486 1.326 1.184 1.057 0.943 0.842 0.752 0.671 0.599 0.535 0.477 0.426 0.381 0.340 0.304 0.271 0.242 0.216 0.193 0.172 0.154
-0.150 1.581 1.410 1.258 1.123 1.001 0.894 0.797 0.711 0.635 0.567 0.506 0.451 0.403 0.360 0.321 0.287 0.256 0.228 0.204 0.182 0.162
-0.200 1.683 1.501 1.338 1.193 1.064 0.949 0.846 0.755 0.673 0.601 0.536 0.478 0.427 0.381 0.340 0.303 0.271 0.241 0.215 0.192 0.172
-0.250 1.793 1.598 1.424 1.269 1.131 1.008 0.899 0.801 0.715 0.637 0.568 0.507 0.452 0.403 0.360 0.321 0.286 0.255 0.228 0.203 0.181
-0.300 1.912 1.702 1.516 1.350 1.203 1.071 0.955 0.851 0.758 0.676 0.602 0.537 0.479 0.427 0.381 0.339 0.303 0.270 0.241 0.215 0.192
-0.350 2.039 1.814 1.615 1.437 1.279 1.139 1.015 0.904 0.805 0.717 0.639 0.569 0.508 0.452 0.403 0.359 0.320 0.286 0.255 0.227 0.203
-0.400 2.177 1.935 1.721 1.531 1.362 1.212 1.079 0.960 0.855 0.762 0.678 0.604 0.538 0.480 0.427 0.381 0.339 0.302 0.270 0.240 0.214
-0.450 2.325 2.066 1.836 1.631 1.451 1.291 1.148 1.021 0.909 0.809 0.720 0.641 0.571 0.509 0.453 0.403 0.359 0.320 0.285 0.254 0.227
-0.500 2.487 2.207 1.960 1.741 1.547 1.375 1.222 1.087 0.967 0.860 0.765 0.681 0.606 0.539 0.480 0.428 0.381 0.339 0.302 0.269 0.240
-0.550 2.661 2.360 2.094 1.858 1.650 1.465 1.302 1.157 1.028 0.914 0.813 0.723 0.643 0.572 0.509 0.453 0.404 0.359 0.320 0.285 0.254
-0.600 2.850 2.525 2.238 1.985 1.761 1.563 1.388 1.232 1.095 0.973 0.865 0.769 0.683 0.608 0.541 0.481 0.428 0.381 0.339 0.302 0.269
-0.650 3.054 2.704 2.395 2.122 1.881 1.668 1.480 1.313 1.166 1.036 0.920 0.817 0.726 0.646 0.574 0.510 0.454 0.404 0.359 0.320 0.285
-0.700 3.279 2.899 2.565 2.271 2.011 1.782 1.580 1.401 1.243 1.103 0.979 0.869 0.772 0.686 0.610 0.542 0.482 0.428 0.381 0.339 0.302
-0.750 3.523 3.111 2.750 2.431 2.151 1.905 1.687 1.495 1.325 1.175 1.043 0.925 0.822 0.730 0.648 0.576 0.512 0.455 0.404 0.359 0.320
-0.800 3.789 3.342 2.950 2.606 2.304 2.038 1.804 1.597 1.415 1.254 1.111 0.986 0.874 0.776 0.689 0.612 0.543 0.483 0.429 0.381 0.339
-0.850 4.080 3.595 3.169 2.797 2.470 2.182 1.929 1.707 1.511 1.338 1.185 1.050 0.931 0.826 0.733 0.650 0.577 0.513 0.455 0.405 0.360
-0.900 4.400 3.871 3.408 3.004 2.650 2.339 2.066 1.826 1.615 1.429 1.265 1.120 0.993 0.880 0.780 0.692 0.614 0.545 0.484 0.430 0.382
-0.950 4.752 4.174 3.670 3.230 2.846 2.509 2.214 1.955 1.727 1.527 1.351 1.195 1.058 0.938 0.831 0.736 0.653 0.579 0.514 0.456 0.405
-1.000 5.140 4.507 3.957 3.478 3.060 2.695 2.375 2.095 1.849 1.634 1.444 1.277 1.130 1.000 0.885 0.784 0.695 0.616 0.546 0.485 0.430
-1.050 5.570 4.875 4.273 3.750 3.295 2.898 2.551 2.248 1.982 1.749 1.544 1.364 1.206 1.067 0.944 0.836 0.740 0.656 0.581 0.515 0.457
-1.100 6.046 5.281 4.621 4.048 3.552 3.119 2.743 2.414 2.126 1.874 1.653 1.459 1.289 1.139 1.007 0.891 0.789 0.698 0.619 0.548 0.486
-1.150 6.576 5.732 5.005 4.377 3.834 3.362 2.952 2.595 2.283 2.010 1.771 1.562 1.379 1.217 1.076 0.951 0.841 0.744 0.659 0.583 0.517
-1.200 7.169 6.234 5.432 4.741 4.145 3.629 3.182 2.793 2.454 2.158 1.900 1.674 1.476 1.302 1.149 1.015 0.897 0.793 0.702 0.621 0.550
-1.250 7.834 6.794 5.906 5.144 4.489 3.923 3.434 3.010 2.641 2.320 2.040 1.795 1.581 1.393 1.229 1.085 0.958 0.846 0.748 0.662 0.586
-1.300 8.585 7.423 6.436 5.593 4.870 4.248 3.712 3.248 2.846 2.496 2.192 1.927 1.695 1.493 1.315 1.160 1.024 0.904 0.798 0.706 0.624
-1.350 9.435 8.132 7.030 6.094 5.294 4.608 4.019 3.510 3.071 2.690 2.359 2.071 1.820 1.601 1.409 1.241 1.095 0.966 0.852 0.753 0.665
-1.400 10.405 8.936 7.700 6.655 5.767 5.008 4.358 3.800 3.318 2.902 2.541 2.228 1.956 1.718 1.511 1.330 1.171 1.032 0.911 0.804 0.710
-1.450 11.519 9.851 8.458 7.287 6.296 5.455 4.736 4.121 3.592 3.136 2.742 2.400 2.104 1.846 1.622 1.426 1.255 1.105 0.974 0.859 0.758
-1.500 12.807 10.901 9.322 8.002 6.893 5.955 5.157 4.477 3.894 3.394 2.962 2.589 2.266 1.986 1.742 1.530 1.345 1.183 1.042 0.918 0.809
-1.550 14.310 12.115 10.312 8.817 7.568 6.517 5.629 4.874 4.230 3.679 3.205 2.797 2.444 2.139 1.874 1.644 1.443 1.268 1.116 0.982 0.865
-1.600 16.081 13.530 11.456 9.750 8.335 7.153 6.159 5.319 4.605 3.996 3.474 3.026 2.640 2.307 2.018 1.768 1.551 1.361 1.196 1.052 0.926
-1.650 18.194 15.196 12.787 10.826 9.214 7.876 6.758 5.818 5.024 4.349 3.773 3.280 2.856 2.492 2.177 1.904 1.667 1.462 1.283 1.127 0.991
-1.700 20.750 17.181 14.354 12.079 10.227 8.703 7.439 6.383 5.494 4.743 4.105 3.561 3.095 2.695 2.350 2.053 1.795 1.572 1.378 1.209 1.062
-1.750 23.894 19.578 16.217 13.551 11.405 9.657 8.218 7.024 6.026 5.186 4.477 3.874 3.360 2.920 2.542 2.217 1.936 1.693 1.482 1.299 1.140
-1.800 27.843 22.521 18.464 15.300 12.787 10.764 9.114 7.756 6.629 5.687 4.894 4.224 3.655 3.169 2.754 2.397 2.090 1.825 1.595 1.397 1.224
-1.850 32.935 26.209 21.218 17.405 14.428 12.062 10.154 8.599 7.318 6.254 5.364 4.616 3.984 3.447 2.988 2.596 2.260 1.970 1.720 1.503 1.316
-1.900 39.724 30.950 24.661 19.981 16.400 13.600 11.373 9.576 8.109 6.901 5.898 5.059 4.353 3.756 3.249 2.817 2.447 2.129 1.856 1.620 1.416
-1.950 49.192 37.246 29.073 23.195 18.809 15.447 12.815 10.719 9.027 7.645 6.506 5.560 4.769 4.104 3.541 3.062 2.655 2.306 2.006 1.749 1.526
-2.000 63.256 45.979 34.911 27.301 21.807 17.699 14.544 12.070 10.099 8.506 7.205 6.132 5.240 4.495 3.867 3.336 2.886 2.501 2.172 1.890 1.647
Table 15: Simulation results for Belgium, 1985 (H/L = 0.105; c = 1.2).
8
3
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.314 1.182 1.063 0.955 0.859 0.772 0.694 0.624 0.561 0.505 0.453 0.408 0.367 0.330 0.296 0.266 0.239 0.215 0.194 0.174 0.156
-0.050 1.395 1.253 1.126 1.012 0.910 0.817 0.735 0.660 0.593 0.533 0.479 0.431 0.387 0.348 0.313 0.281 0.253 0.227 0.204 0.183 0.165
-0.100 1.481 1.330 1.195 1.073 0.964 0.866 0.778 0.699 0.628 0.564 0.507 0.455 0.409 0.367 0.330 0.297 0.267 0.240 0.215 0.193 0.174
-0.150 1.573 1.412 1.267 1.138 1.022 0.917 0.824 0.740 0.664 0.597 0.536 0.481 0.432 0.388 0.349 0.313 0.281 0.253 0.227 0.204 0.183
-0.200 1.672 1.500 1.346 1.207 1.084 0.972 0.873 0.784 0.703 0.631 0.567 0.509 0.457 0.410 0.368 0.331 0.297 0.267 0.240 0.215 0.193
-0.250 1.778 1.594 1.429 1.282 1.150 1.031 0.925 0.830 0.745 0.669 0.600 0.538 0.483 0.434 0.389 0.350 0.314 0.282 0.253 0.227 0.204
-0.300 1.892 1.695 1.519 1.362 1.221 1.095 0.981 0.880 0.789 0.708 0.635 0.570 0.511 0.459 0.412 0.369 0.332 0.298 0.267 0.240 0.215
-0.350 2.014 1.804 1.615 1.447 1.296 1.162 1.041 0.934 0.837 0.750 0.673 0.603 0.541 0.485 0.435 0.391 0.350 0.314 0.282 0.253 0.227
-0.400 2.146 1.920 1.719 1.539 1.378 1.234 1.105 0.990 0.887 0.795 0.713 0.639 0.573 0.514 0.461 0.413 0.370 0.332 0.298 0.267 0.240
-0.450 2.288 2.046 1.830 1.637 1.465 1.311 1.174 1.051 0.941 0.843 0.755 0.677 0.607 0.544 0.487 0.437 0.392 0.351 0.315 0.282 0.253
-0.500 2.443 2.181 1.950 1.743 1.559 1.394 1.248 1.117 0.999 0.895 0.801 0.718 0.643 0.576 0.516 0.462 0.414 0.371 0.333 0.299 0.268
-0.550 2.609 2.329 2.079 1.857 1.660 1.484 1.327 1.187 1.061 0.950 0.850 0.761 0.681 0.610 0.546 0.489 0.438 0.393 0.352 0.316 0.283
-0.600 2.789 2.487 2.219 1.980 1.768 1.579 1.411 1.262 1.128 1.009 0.902 0.807 0.722 0.647 0.579 0.518 0.464 0.416 0.372 0.334 0.299
-0.650 2.984 2.658 2.369 2.113 1.885 1.683 1.503 1.342 1.199 1.072 0.958 0.857 0.766 0.686 0.614 0.549 0.492 0.440 0.394 0.353 0.316
-0.700 3.195 2.844 2.532 2.257 2.012 1.794 1.601 1.429 1.276 1.140 1.018 0.910 0.814 0.727 0.651 0.582 0.521 0.466 0.417 0.374 0.334
-0.750 3.426 3.046 2.710 2.412 2.148 1.914 1.707 1.522 1.358 1.212 1.083 0.967 0.864 0.772 0.690 0.617 0.552 0.494 0.442 0.395 0.354
-0.800 3.677 3.265 2.901 2.580 2.296 2.044 1.821 1.623 1.447 1.291 1.152 1.028 0.918 0.820 0.733 0.655 0.585 0.523 0.468 0.419 0.375
-0.850 3.951 3.504 3.110 2.763 2.456 2.185 1.944 1.731 1.543 1.375 1.226 1.094 0.976 0.871 0.778 0.695 0.621 0.555 0.496 0.444 0.397
-0.900 4.252 3.766 3.338 2.962 2.630 2.337 2.078 1.849 1.646 1.466 1.306 1.164 1.038 0.926 0.827 0.738 0.659 0.589 0.526 0.470 0.420
-0.950 4.582 4.052 3.587 3.178 2.819 2.502 2.222 1.975 1.757 1.563 1.392 1.240 1.105 0.985 0.879 0.784 0.700 0.625 0.558 0.498 0.445
-1.000 4.944 4.365 3.859 3.415 3.025 2.681 2.379 2.113 1.877 1.669 1.485 1.322 1.177 1.049 0.935 0.833 0.743 0.663 0.592 0.529 0.472
-1.050 5.344 4.710 4.157 3.673 3.249 2.877 2.550 2.262 2.008 1.783 1.585 1.410 1.255 1.117 0.995 0.887 0.790 0.705 0.629 0.561 0.501
-1.100 5.787 5.090 4.485 3.956 3.495 3.090 2.736 2.424 2.149 1.907 1.694 1.505 1.338 1.190 1.060 0.944 0.841 0.749 0.668 0.596 0.532
-1.150 6.278 5.511 4.846 4.268 3.764 3.324 2.938 2.600 2.303 2.041 1.811 1.608 1.428 1.270 1.129 1.005 0.895 0.797 0.710 0.633 0.564
-1.200 6.825 5.978 5.246 4.611 4.060 3.579 3.160 2.792 2.470 2.187 1.938 1.719 1.526 1.355 1.204 1.071 0.953 0.848 0.755 0.673 0.600
-1.250 7.437 6.497 5.689 4.991 4.386 3.860 3.402 3.002 2.653 2.346 2.077 1.840 1.631 1.448 1.285 1.142 1.015 0.903 0.804 0.715 0.637
-1.300 8.125 7.079 6.182 5.412 4.746 4.169 3.669 3.233 2.852 2.519 2.227 1.971 1.746 1.548 1.373 1.219 1.083 0.962 0.856 0.761 0.678
-1.350 8.902 7.731 6.734 5.880 5.145 4.511 3.962 3.485 3.070 2.708 2.391 2.114 1.870 1.656 1.468 1.302 1.155 1.026 0.912 0.811 0.721
-1.400 9.783 8.468 7.353 6.403 5.589 4.890 4.286 3.764 3.310 2.915 2.570 2.269 2.005 1.774 1.571 1.392 1.234 1.095 0.972 0.864 0.768
-1.450 10.791 9.304 8.051 6.990 6.085 5.311 4.645 4.071 3.574 3.142 2.767 2.439 2.153 1.902 1.682 1.489 1.319 1.169 1.037 0.921 0.818
-1.500 11.950 10.258 8.843 7.651 6.641 5.781 5.044 4.411 3.865 3.392 2.982 2.625 2.313 2.041 1.803 1.595 1.411 1.250 1.108 0.983 0.872
-1.550 13.294 11.354 9.746 8.401 7.268 6.307 5.489 4.789 4.187 3.668 3.218 2.829 2.489 2.194 1.935 1.709 1.511 1.337 1.184 1.049 0.931
-1.600 14.869 12.626 10.783 9.255 7.977 6.900 5.988 5.210 4.545 3.973 3.479 3.053 2.682 2.360 2.080 1.834 1.620 1.432 1.267 1.121 0.994
-1.650 16.732 14.112 11.985 10.236 8.785 7.572 6.549 5.682 4.944 4.311 3.768 3.300 2.895 2.543 2.237 1.971 1.738 1.535 1.356 1.199 1.062
-1.700 18.966 15.869 13.388 11.371 9.712 8.336 7.184 6.213 5.390 4.689 4.089 3.573 3.128 2.744 2.410 2.120 1.867 1.646 1.453 1.284 1.136
-1.750 21.685 17.973 15.044 12.695 10.783 9.211 7.906 6.813 5.892 5.111 4.446 3.876 3.387 2.965 2.600 2.283 2.008 1.769 1.559 1.376 1.216
-1.800 25.057 20.528 17.023 14.255 12.032 10.222 8.733 7.495 6.459 5.585 4.845 4.214 3.673 3.209 2.809 2.463 2.163 1.902 1.675 1.476 1.303
-1.850 29.335 23.689 19.424 16.117 13.502 11.399 9.686 8.276 7.103 6.121 5.293 4.591 3.992 3.480 3.040 2.661 2.333 2.048 1.801 1.585 1.397
-1.900 34.924 27.687 22.386 18.372 15.253 12.784 10.796 9.175 7.840 6.729 5.799 5.014 4.349 3.782 3.296 2.879 2.519 2.208 1.939 1.705 1.500
-1.950 42.506 32.891 26.123 21.147 17.370 14.430 12.099 10.220 8.688 7.424 6.373 5.492 4.749 4.118 3.581 3.121 2.726 2.385 2.090 1.835 1.613
-2.000 53.343 39.915 30.967 24.639 19.970 16.416 13.646 11.446 9.672 8.223 7.028 6.033 5.199 4.496 3.899 3.390 2.954 2.580 2.257 1.978 1.736
Table 16: Simulation results for Belgium, 1997 (H/L = 0.119; c = 1.2).
8
4
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.314 1.159 1.022 0.902 0.795 0.701 0.618 0.545 0.481 0.424 0.374 0.330 0.291 0.257 0.226 0.200 0.176 0.155 0.137 0.121 0.106
-0.050 1.401 1.235 1.089 0.960 0.846 0.746 0.658 0.580 0.511 0.450 0.397 0.350 0.309 0.272 0.240 0.212 0.187 0.164 0.145 0.128 0.113
-0.100 1.495 1.317 1.160 1.022 0.901 0.794 0.699 0.616 0.543 0.479 0.422 0.372 0.328 0.289 0.254 0.224 0.198 0.174 0.154 0.135 0.119
-0.150 1.596 1.405 1.237 1.089 0.959 0.845 0.744 0.655 0.577 0.509 0.448 0.395 0.348 0.306 0.270 0.238 0.210 0.185 0.163 0.143 0.126
-0.200 1.704 1.499 1.319 1.161 1.022 0.900 0.792 0.697 0.614 0.541 0.476 0.419 0.369 0.325 0.286 0.252 0.222 0.196 0.172 0.152 0.134
-0.250 1.821 1.601 1.408 1.239 1.090 0.959 0.844 0.742 0.653 0.575 0.506 0.446 0.392 0.345 0.304 0.268 0.236 0.208 0.183 0.161 0.142
-0.300 1.948 1.711 1.504 1.322 1.162 1.022 0.899 0.791 0.695 0.612 0.538 0.474 0.417 0.367 0.323 0.284 0.250 0.220 0.194 0.171 0.150
-0.350 2.084 1.830 1.607 1.412 1.241 1.090 0.958 0.842 0.741 0.651 0.573 0.504 0.443 0.390 0.343 0.302 0.266 0.234 0.206 0.181 0.159
-0.400 2.232 1.958 1.719 1.509 1.324 1.164 1.022 0.898 0.789 0.694 0.610 0.536 0.471 0.414 0.364 0.321 0.282 0.248 0.218 0.192 0.169
-0.450 2.393 2.097 1.839 1.613 1.415 1.243 1.091 0.958 0.841 0.739 0.649 0.570 0.501 0.441 0.387 0.341 0.300 0.263 0.232 0.204 0.179
-0.500 2.567 2.248 1.970 1.727 1.514 1.328 1.165 1.023 0.897 0.788 0.692 0.608 0.534 0.469 0.412 0.362 0.318 0.280 0.246 0.216 0.190
-0.550 2.756 2.412 2.111 1.849 1.620 1.420 1.245 1.092 0.958 0.840 0.737 0.647 0.568 0.499 0.438 0.385 0.338 0.297 0.261 0.230 0.202
-0.600 2.962 2.589 2.265 1.982 1.734 1.519 1.331 1.167 1.023 0.897 0.787 0.690 0.606 0.532 0.467 0.410 0.360 0.316 0.278 0.244 0.214
-0.650 3.187 2.783 2.431 2.126 1.859 1.627 1.424 1.248 1.093 0.958 0.839 0.736 0.645 0.566 0.497 0.436 0.383 0.336 0.295 0.259 0.228
-0.700 3.432 2.993 2.613 2.282 1.994 1.744 1.525 1.335 1.168 1.023 0.896 0.785 0.688 0.604 0.529 0.464 0.407 0.358 0.314 0.276 0.242
-0.750 3.701 3.224 2.811 2.453 2.141 1.870 1.635 1.429 1.250 1.094 0.958 0.839 0.735 0.644 0.564 0.495 0.434 0.381 0.334 0.293 0.257
-0.800 3.996 3.477 3.028 2.639 2.301 2.008 1.753 1.532 1.339 1.171 1.024 0.896 0.784 0.687 0.602 0.527 0.462 0.405 0.355 0.312 0.273
-0.850 4.320 3.753 3.264 2.841 2.475 2.158 1.882 1.643 1.435 1.253 1.096 0.958 0.838 0.734 0.642 0.562 0.493 0.432 0.378 0.332 0.291
-0.900 4.677 4.058 3.524 3.063 2.665 2.321 2.022 1.763 1.539 1.343 1.173 1.025 0.896 0.784 0.686 0.600 0.525 0.460 0.403 0.353 0.310
-0.950 5.072 4.393 3.809 3.307 2.873 2.499 2.175 1.895 1.652 1.440 1.257 1.098 0.959 0.838 0.733 0.641 0.561 0.491 0.430 0.376 0.330
-1.000 5.509 4.763 4.123 3.574 3.102 2.694 2.342 2.038 1.774 1.546 1.348 1.176 1.027 0.896 0.783 0.685 0.599 0.524 0.458 0.401 0.351
-1.050 5.995 5.173 4.471 3.869 3.352 2.908 2.525 2.194 1.908 1.661 1.447 1.261 1.100 0.960 0.838 0.732 0.640 0.559 0.489 0.428 0.374
-1.100 6.537 5.629 4.855 4.194 3.628 3.142 2.725 2.365 2.054 1.786 1.554 1.354 1.179 1.028 0.897 0.783 0.684 0.597 0.522 0.456 0.399
-1.150 7.144 6.137 5.282 4.554 3.933 3.401 2.944 2.552 2.214 1.923 1.672 1.454 1.266 1.103 0.961 0.838 0.731 0.639 0.558 0.487 0.426
-1.200 7.826 6.706 5.758 4.954 4.270 3.686 3.186 2.758 2.389 2.073 1.799 1.564 1.360 1.183 1.031 0.898 0.783 0.683 0.596 0.521 0.455
-1.250 8.596 7.345 6.291 5.400 4.645 4.002 3.453 2.984 2.582 2.236 1.939 1.683 1.462 1.271 1.106 0.963 0.839 0.731 0.638 0.556 0.486
-1.300 9.471 8.067 6.890 5.899 5.062 4.352 3.749 3.234 2.793 2.416 2.092 1.814 1.574 1.367 1.188 1.033 0.899 0.783 0.683 0.595 0.519
-1.350 10.470 8.886 7.565 6.459 5.529 4.743 4.076 3.510 3.027 2.614 2.260 1.957 1.696 1.471 1.277 1.110 0.965 0.840 0.731 0.637 0.555
-1.400 11.619 9.821 8.332 7.092 6.053 5.179 4.442 3.816 3.285 2.832 2.445 2.114 1.829 1.585 1.374 1.193 1.036 0.901 0.784 0.682 0.594
-1.450 12.949 10.895 9.206 7.808 6.644 5.669 4.850 4.158 3.572 3.073 2.649 2.286 1.976 1.710 1.481 1.284 1.114 0.968 0.841 0.732 0.637
-1.500 14.503 12.138 10.210 8.626 7.314 6.222 5.308 4.539 3.891 3.341 2.874 2.477 2.137 1.846 1.597 1.383 1.199 1.040 0.903 0.785 0.683
-1.550 16.337 13.590 11.372 9.564 8.078 6.848 5.824 4.967 4.247 3.639 3.124 2.687 2.315 1.997 1.725 1.492 1.292 1.119 0.971 0.843 0.732
-1.600 18.526 15.301 12.727 10.649 8.954 7.561 6.409 5.449 4.647 3.972 3.403 2.921 2.511 2.163 1.865 1.611 1.393 1.206 1.045 0.906 0.786
-1.650 21.176 17.342 14.323 11.913 9.967 8.379 7.075 5.995 5.097 4.345 3.713 3.180 2.729 2.346 2.020 1.742 1.504 1.300 1.125 0.975 0.845
-1.700 24.438 19.810 16.225 13.401 11.146 9.324 7.838 6.617 5.606 4.765 4.061 3.470 2.971 2.549 2.191 1.886 1.626 1.404 1.213 1.050 0.909
-1.750 28.536 22.843 18.522 15.173 12.533 10.423 8.719 7.328 6.186 5.240 4.453 3.795 3.242 2.775 2.381 2.046 1.761 1.518 1.310 1.132 0.979
-1.800 33.820 26.647 21.341 17.310 14.182 11.715 9.743 8.149 6.849 5.780 4.896 4.160 3.544 3.027 2.591 2.222 1.910 1.643 1.416 1.222 1.056
-1.850 40.862 31.540 24.871 19.929 16.169 13.250 10.946 9.103 7.614 6.399 5.400 4.573 3.885 3.309 2.826 2.419 2.074 1.782 1.533 1.321 1.140
-1.900 50.671 38.042 29.401 23.202 18.602 15.097 12.374 10.223 8.502 7.111 5.975 5.042 4.270 3.627 3.089 2.638 2.257 1.935 1.662 1.430 1.232
-1.950 65.209 47.061 35.401 27.394 21.636 17.355 14.090 11.551 9.544 7.938 6.639 5.578 4.707 3.985 3.385 2.883 2.461 2.106 1.805 1.550 1.333
-2.000 88.860 60.350 43.693 32.931 25.514 20.167 16.185 13.145 10.778 8.907 7.408 6.196 5.206 4.392 3.718 3.158 2.689 2.295 1.964 1.683 1.445
Table 17: Simulation results for Chile, 1960 (H/L = 0.081; c = 1.2).
8
5
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.315 1.230 1.152 1.078 1.010 0.945 0.885 0.828 0.775 0.726 0.679 0.636 0.595 0.557 0.522 0.488 0.457 0.428 0.401 0.375 0.351
-0.050 1.373 1.285 1.202 1.125 1.054 0.985 0.922 0.863 0.808 0.756 0.708 0.662 0.620 0.580 0.543 0.508 0.475 0.445 0.416 0.390 0.365
-0.100 1.435 1.342 1.255 1.174 1.099 1.028 0.962 0.900 0.842 0.788 0.737 0.690 0.645 0.604 0.565 0.529 0.495 0.463 0.433 0.405 0.379
-0.150 1.500 1.402 1.311 1.226 1.147 1.073 1.003 0.938 0.878 0.821 0.768 0.718 0.672 0.629 0.588 0.550 0.515 0.481 0.450 0.422 0.394
-0.200 1.569 1.466 1.370 1.281 1.197 1.120 1.047 0.979 0.915 0.856 0.800 0.749 0.700 0.655 0.612 0.573 0.536 0.501 0.469 0.438 0.410
-0.250 1.641 1.533 1.432 1.338 1.251 1.169 1.093 1.021 0.955 0.892 0.834 0.780 0.729 0.682 0.638 0.596 0.558 0.522 0.488 0.456 0.427
-0.300 1.718 1.604 1.498 1.399 1.307 1.221 1.141 1.066 0.996 0.931 0.870 0.813 0.760 0.711 0.664 0.621 0.581 0.543 0.508 0.475 0.444
-0.350 1.799 1.679 1.567 1.463 1.365 1.276 1.192 1.113 1.040 0.971 0.907 0.848 0.792 0.740 0.692 0.647 0.605 0.565 0.528 0.494 0.462
-0.400 1.884 1.757 1.640 1.531 1.429 1.333 1.244 1.163 1.086 1.014 0.947 0.884 0.826 0.772 0.721 0.674 0.630 0.589 0.550 0.514 0.481
-0.450 1.975 1.842 1.717 1.602 1.494 1.394 1.301 1.215 1.134 1.058 0.988 0.923 0.862 0.805 0.752 0.702 0.656 0.613 0.573 0.535 0.500
-0.500 2.072 1.930 1.799 1.677 1.563 1.459 1.360 1.269 1.185 1.106 1.032 0.963 0.899 0.840 0.784 0.732 0.684 0.639 0.597 0.557 0.521
-0.550 2.174 2.025 1.886 1.757 1.637 1.526 1.423 1.327 1.238 1.155 1.078 1.006 0.939 0.876 0.818 0.763 0.713 0.666 0.622 0.581 0.542
-0.600 2.283 2.124 1.978 1.842 1.715 1.598 1.489 1.388 1.294 1.207 1.126 1.050 0.980 0.914 0.853 0.796 0.743 0.694 0.648 0.605 0.565
-0.650 2.399 2.230 2.075 1.931 1.798 1.674 1.559 1.453 1.354 1.262 1.177 1.097 1.023 0.954 0.890 0.831 0.775 0.723 0.675 0.630 0.589
-0.700 2.522 2.344 2.179 2.027 1.885 1.755 1.633 1.521 1.417 1.321 1.230 1.147 1.069 0.997 0.929 0.867 0.809 0.755 0.704 0.657 0.613
-0.750 2.654 2.464 2.289 2.127 1.978 1.840 1.712 1.593 1.483 1.381 1.287 1.199 1.117 1.041 0.971 0.905 0.844 0.787 0.734 0.685 0.639
-0.800 2.794 2.592 2.406 2.235 2.077 1.930 1.795 1.670 1.554 1.446 1.346 1.254 1.168 1.088 1.014 0.945 0.881 0.821 0.766 0.715 0.667
-0.850 2.945 2.729 2.531 2.349 2.181 2.026 1.883 1.751 1.628 1.514 1.409 1.312 1.221 1.138 1.060 0.987 0.920 0.858 0.799 0.745 0.695
-0.900 3.106 2.876 2.665 2.471 2.292 2.128 1.977 1.836 1.707 1.587 1.476 1.373 1.278 1.190 1.108 1.032 0.961 0.895 0.834 0.778 0.725
-0.950 3.279 3.033 2.808 2.601 2.412 2.237 2.076 1.927 1.790 1.664 1.546 1.438 1.338 1.245 1.158 1.078 1.004 0.935 0.871 0.812 0.757
-1.000 3.464 3.202 2.961 2.741 2.539 2.353 2.182 2.024 1.879 1.745 1.621 1.507 1.401 1.303 1.212 1.128 1.050 0.977 0.910 0.848 0.790
-1.050 3.664 3.382 3.125 2.890 2.674 2.476 2.294 2.127 1.973 1.831 1.700 1.579 1.467 1.364 1.268 1.180 1.098 1.022 0.951 0.885 0.825
-1.100 3.881 3.577 3.301 3.049 2.819 2.608 2.414 2.237 2.073 1.923 1.784 1.656 1.538 1.429 1.328 1.235 1.148 1.068 0.994 0.925 0.861
-1.150 4.114 3.788 3.491 3.221 2.974 2.749 2.543 2.354 2.180 2.020 1.873 1.738 1.613 1.498 1.391 1.293 1.202 1.117 1.039 0.967 0.900
-1.200 4.367 4.015 3.695 3.405 3.141 2.900 2.680 2.478 2.294 2.124 1.968 1.825 1.692 1.570 1.458 1.354 1.258 1.169 1.087 1.011 0.940
-1.250 4.642 4.261 3.916 3.604 3.320 3.062 2.827 2.612 2.415 2.234 2.069 1.917 1.777 1.648 1.529 1.419 1.318 1.224 1.137 1.057 0.983
-1.300 4.942 4.528 4.155 3.818 3.513 3.236 2.984 2.755 2.545 2.352 2.176 2.015 1.866 1.730 1.604 1.488 1.381 1.282 1.191 1.106 1.028
-1.350 5.270 4.819 4.415 4.051 3.722 3.424 3.154 2.908 2.683 2.478 2.291 2.119 1.961 1.817 1.683 1.561 1.448 1.343 1.247 1.158 1.076
-1.400 5.629 5.137 4.697 4.302 3.947 3.626 3.336 3.072 2.832 2.613 2.413 2.230 2.063 1.909 1.768 1.638 1.518 1.408 1.307 1.213 1.126
-1.450 6.024 5.485 5.005 4.576 4.192 3.845 3.532 3.249 2.992 2.758 2.544 2.349 2.171 2.008 1.858 1.720 1.593 1.477 1.370 1.271 1.179
-1.500 6.460 5.867 5.342 4.875 4.457 4.082 3.745 3.440 3.164 2.913 2.684 2.476 2.286 2.113 1.953 1.807 1.673 1.550 1.436 1.332 1.235
-1.550 6.944 6.289 5.713 5.202 4.747 4.340 3.975 3.646 3.349 3.079 2.835 2.613 2.410 2.225 2.055 1.900 1.758 1.627 1.507 1.397 1.295
-1.600 7.483 6.757 6.121 5.560 5.063 4.621 4.224 3.869 3.548 3.259 2.997 2.759 2.542 2.344 2.164 1.999 1.848 1.709 1.582 1.465 1.358
-1.650 8.086 7.277 6.573 5.955 5.410 4.927 4.496 4.111 3.764 3.453 3.171 2.915 2.683 2.473 2.280 2.105 1.944 1.797 1.662 1.538 1.424
-1.700 8.766 7.859 7.075 6.392 5.792 5.263 4.793 4.374 3.999 3.662 3.358 3.084 2.836 2.610 2.405 2.217 2.046 1.890 1.747 1.616 1.495
-1.750 9.538 8.514 7.636 6.876 6.214 5.631 5.117 4.661 4.254 3.889 3.561 3.266 2.999 2.757 2.538 2.338 2.156 1.989 1.837 1.698 1.570
-1.800 10.419 9.255 8.266 7.417 6.681 6.039 5.474 4.975 4.531 4.135 3.781 3.463 3.175 2.916 2.681 2.467 2.273 2.095 1.934 1.786 1.650
-1.850 11.433 10.100 8.978 8.023 7.202 6.490 5.867 5.319 4.835 4.404 4.020 3.675 3.366 3.087 2.834 2.605 2.398 2.209 2.036 1.879 1.735
-1.900 12.614 11.071 9.789 8.708 7.786 6.992 6.302 5.699 5.167 4.697 4.279 3.906 3.572 3.271 2.999 2.754 2.532 2.330 2.146 1.979 1.825
-1.950 14.003 12.198 10.718 9.485 8.443 7.553 6.785 6.118 5.534 5.019 4.563 4.157 3.795 3.470 3.178 2.914 2.676 2.460 2.264 2.085 1.922
-2.000 15.659 13.519 11.793 10.374 9.188 8.184 7.325 6.584 5.938 5.372 4.873 4.431 4.038 3.686 3.371 3.087 2.831 2.599 2.389 2.199 2.025
Table 18: Simulation results for Chile, 1996 (H/L = 0.267; c = 1.2).
8
6
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.314 1.163 1.030 0.912 0.807 0.714 0.632 0.559 0.495 0.438 0.388 0.343 0.304 0.269 0.238 0.211 0.186 0.165 0.146 0.129 0.114
-0.050 1.400 1.239 1.096 0.970 0.858 0.759 0.671 0.594 0.525 0.465 0.411 0.364 0.322 0.285 0.252 0.223 0.197 0.175 0.155 0.137 0.121
-0.100 1.493 1.320 1.167 1.032 0.912 0.807 0.713 0.631 0.558 0.493 0.437 0.386 0.341 0.302 0.267 0.236 0.209 0.185 0.164 0.145 0.128
-0.150 1.592 1.406 1.243 1.099 0.971 0.858 0.759 0.671 0.593 0.524 0.463 0.410 0.362 0.320 0.283 0.250 0.221 0.196 0.173 0.153 0.135
-0.200 1.699 1.500 1.325 1.170 1.034 0.913 0.807 0.713 0.630 0.557 0.492 0.435 0.384 0.340 0.300 0.265 0.235 0.207 0.183 0.162 0.143
-0.250 1.814 1.601 1.413 1.247 1.101 0.972 0.859 0.758 0.670 0.592 0.523 0.462 0.408 0.360 0.319 0.281 0.249 0.220 0.194 0.172 0.152
-0.300 1.938 1.709 1.508 1.330 1.174 1.036 0.914 0.807 0.712 0.629 0.556 0.490 0.433 0.383 0.338 0.299 0.264 0.233 0.206 0.182 0.161
-0.350 2.073 1.827 1.610 1.419 1.252 1.104 0.974 0.859 0.758 0.669 0.590 0.521 0.460 0.406 0.359 0.317 0.280 0.247 0.218 0.193 0.170
-0.400 2.218 1.953 1.720 1.516 1.336 1.177 1.039 0.915 0.807 0.712 0.628 0.554 0.489 0.432 0.381 0.336 0.297 0.262 0.231 0.204 0.181
-0.450 2.375 2.090 1.840 1.619 1.425 1.257 1.107 0.976 0.860 0.758 0.668 0.589 0.520 0.459 0.405 0.357 0.315 0.278 0.245 0.217 0.191
-0.500 2.546 2.238 1.968 1.732 1.524 1.342 1.181 1.040 0.916 0.808 0.712 0.627 0.553 0.488 0.430 0.379 0.335 0.295 0.260 0.230 0.203
-0.550 2.731 2.399 2.108 1.853 1.629 1.433 1.261 1.110 0.977 0.861 0.758 0.668 0.588 0.519 0.457 0.403 0.355 0.314 0.276 0.244 0.215
-0.600 2.933 2.573 2.259 1.984 1.743 1.532 1.348 1.185 1.043 0.918 0.808 0.711 0.626 0.552 0.486 0.428 0.378 0.333 0.294 0.259 0.228
-0.650 3.152 2.763 2.423 2.127 1.867 1.640 1.441 1.267 1.113 0.979 0.861 0.758 0.667 0.588 0.517 0.456 0.402 0.354 0.312 0.275 0.242
-0.700 3.393 2.970 2.602 2.281 2.001 1.756 1.541 1.354 1.190 1.045 0.919 0.808 0.711 0.626 0.551 0.485 0.427 0.376 0.331 0.292 0.257
-0.750 3.655 3.196 2.797 2.449 2.146 1.882 1.651 1.448 1.272 1.117 0.981 0.863 0.758 0.667 0.587 0.516 0.454 0.400 0.352 0.310 0.273
-0.800 3.942 3.443 3.009 2.632 2.304 2.018 1.769 1.551 1.361 1.194 1.048 0.921 0.809 0.711 0.625 0.550 0.484 0.426 0.375 0.330 0.290
-0.850 4.258 3.713 3.242 2.832 2.476 2.167 1.897 1.662 1.457 1.278 1.121 0.984 0.864 0.759 0.667 0.586 0.515 0.453 0.399 0.351 0.309
-0.900 4.605 4.010 3.496 3.051 2.664 2.329 2.037 1.783 1.561 1.368 1.199 1.052 0.923 0.810 0.711 0.625 0.549 0.483 0.424 0.373 0.328
-0.950 4.988 4.337 3.775 3.290 2.870 2.505 2.189 1.914 1.674 1.466 1.284 1.125 0.986 0.865 0.759 0.667 0.585 0.514 0.452 0.397 0.349
-1.000 5.413 4.698 4.083 3.552 3.094 2.698 2.354 2.056 1.797 1.572 1.376 1.204 1.055 0.925 0.811 0.712 0.625 0.548 0.482 0.423 0.372
-1.050 5.884 5.097 4.422 3.841 3.341 2.909 2.535 2.212 1.931 1.687 1.475 1.291 1.130 0.989 0.867 0.760 0.667 0.585 0.513 0.451 0.396
-1.100 6.408 5.540 4.797 4.160 3.612 3.141 2.734 2.382 2.077 1.813 1.583 1.384 1.210 1.059 0.927 0.812 0.712 0.624 0.548 0.481 0.422
-1.150 6.995 6.033 5.213 4.512 3.912 3.395 2.951 2.568 2.236 1.950 1.701 1.485 1.298 1.135 0.993 0.869 0.761 0.667 0.585 0.513 0.450
-1.200 7.653 6.584 5.676 4.903 4.242 3.676 3.190 2.772 2.411 2.099 1.829 1.596 1.393 1.217 1.064 0.930 0.814 0.713 0.624 0.547 0.480
-1.250 8.395 7.202 6.194 5.338 4.609 3.987 3.454 2.996 2.602 2.263 1.970 1.716 1.496 1.306 1.140 0.997 0.871 0.762 0.667 0.585 0.512
-1.300 9.237 7.900 6.775 5.824 5.018 4.331 3.745 3.243 2.813 2.442 2.123 1.847 1.609 1.403 1.224 1.068 0.933 0.816 0.714 0.625 0.547
-1.350 10.196 8.690 7.429 6.369 5.474 4.714 4.068 3.517 3.044 2.639 2.291 1.991 1.732 1.508 1.314 1.147 1.001 0.874 0.764 0.668 0.585
-1.400 11.296 9.589 8.170 6.983 5.985 5.142 4.427 3.819 3.301 2.857 2.476 2.149 1.867 1.623 1.413 1.231 1.074 0.937 0.818 0.715 0.625
-1.450 12.568 10.621 9.014 7.678 6.561 5.621 4.828 4.156 3.584 3.097 2.679 2.322 2.014 1.750 1.521 1.324 1.153 1.006 0.877 0.766 0.669
-1.500 14.049 11.813 9.981 8.469 7.212 6.161 5.277 4.532 3.900 3.363 2.904 2.512 2.176 1.888 1.639 1.425 1.240 1.080 0.941 0.821 0.717
-1.550 15.792 13.200 11.097 9.375 7.953 6.771 5.783 4.953 4.252 3.658 3.153 2.723 2.355 2.039 1.768 1.535 1.334 1.161 1.011 0.881 0.768
-1.600 17.866 14.831 12.395 10.419 8.801 7.465 6.354 5.426 4.646 3.987 3.430 2.956 2.552 2.206 1.910 1.656 1.438 1.249 1.087 0.946 0.824
-1.650 20.366 16.769 13.920 11.634 9.778 8.258 7.004 5.960 5.089 4.356 3.738 3.215 2.770 2.391 2.067 1.789 1.551 1.346 1.169 1.017 0.885
-1.700 23.430 19.103 15.731 13.059 10.914 9.173 7.746 6.568 5.589 4.771 4.083 3.503 3.012 2.595 2.239 1.935 1.675 1.452 1.259 1.094 0.951
-1.750 27.258 21.959 17.909 14.750 12.246 10.234 8.601 7.262 6.157 5.238 4.471 3.826 3.282 2.821 2.430 2.096 1.812 1.568 1.358 1.178 1.023
-1.800 32.158 25.520 20.570 16.781 13.824 11.478 9.592 8.061 6.806 5.770 4.908 4.188 3.583 3.073 2.642 2.275 1.962 1.695 1.467 1.271 1.102
-1.850 38.629 30.069 23.882 19.259 15.718 12.950 10.753 8.987 7.552 6.376 5.404 4.597 3.922 3.355 2.877 2.473 2.129 1.836 1.586 1.372 1.188
-1.900 47.535 36.057 28.102 22.338 18.024 14.715 12.126 10.070 8.417 7.073 5.971 5.061 4.304 3.672 3.141 2.693 2.314 1.992 1.718 1.484 1.283
-1.950 60.508 44.265 33.643 26.253 20.886 16.861 13.770 11.350 9.427 7.879 6.621 5.589 4.737 4.029 3.436 2.939 2.520 2.165 1.863 1.606 1.387
-2.000 81.059 56.153 41.206 31.378 24.516 19.520 15.767 12.881 10.620 8.822 7.374 6.196 5.231 4.433 3.769 3.215 2.749 2.357 2.024 1.742 1.502
Table 19: Simulation results for The Netherlands, 1983 (H/L = 0.087; c = 1.2).
8
7
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.315 1.245 1.179 1.117 1.058 1.002 0.949 0.898 0.851 0.806 0.763 0.723 0.684 0.648 0.614 0.582 0.551 0.522 0.494 0.468 0.443
-0.050 1.365 1.292 1.223 1.158 1.097 1.038 0.983 0.931 0.881 0.835 0.790 0.748 0.709 0.671 0.635 0.601 0.570 0.539 0.511 0.484 0.458
-0.100 1.417 1.341 1.269 1.201 1.137 1.077 1.019 0.965 0.913 0.864 0.818 0.775 0.733 0.695 0.657 0.622 0.589 0.558 0.528 0.500 0.473
-0.150 1.472 1.393 1.318 1.247 1.180 1.117 1.057 1.000 0.946 0.896 0.848 0.802 0.759 0.719 0.680 0.644 0.610 0.577 0.546 0.517 0.490
-0.200 1.529 1.446 1.368 1.294 1.224 1.158 1.096 1.037 0.981 0.928 0.878 0.831 0.786 0.744 0.704 0.667 0.631 0.597 0.565 0.535 0.506
-0.250 1.590 1.503 1.421 1.344 1.271 1.202 1.137 1.075 1.017 0.962 0.910 0.861 0.815 0.771 0.729 0.690 0.653 0.618 0.585 0.553 0.524
-0.300 1.653 1.562 1.477 1.396 1.320 1.248 1.180 1.116 1.055 0.998 0.943 0.892 0.844 0.799 0.755 0.715 0.676 0.639 0.605 0.572 0.542
-0.350 1.720 1.625 1.535 1.450 1.371 1.295 1.224 1.158 1.094 1.035 0.978 0.925 0.875 0.827 0.782 0.740 0.700 0.662 0.626 0.592 0.560
-0.400 1.790 1.690 1.596 1.508 1.424 1.345 1.271 1.202 1.136 1.073 1.015 0.959 0.907 0.857 0.811 0.766 0.725 0.685 0.648 0.613 0.580
-0.450 1.864 1.759 1.660 1.568 1.480 1.398 1.320 1.247 1.179 1.114 1.053 0.995 0.940 0.888 0.840 0.794 0.751 0.710 0.671 0.635 0.600
-0.500 1.941 1.831 1.728 1.631 1.539 1.453 1.372 1.296 1.224 1.156 1.092 1.032 0.975 0.921 0.871 0.823 0.778 0.735 0.695 0.657 0.621
-0.550 2.023 1.907 1.799 1.697 1.601 1.511 1.426 1.346 1.271 1.200 1.133 1.070 1.011 0.955 0.903 0.853 0.806 0.762 0.720 0.680 0.643
-0.600 2.110 1.988 1.874 1.767 1.666 1.571 1.483 1.399 1.320 1.247 1.177 1.111 1.049 0.991 0.936 0.884 0.835 0.789 0.746 0.705 0.666
-0.650 2.201 2.072 1.952 1.840 1.734 1.635 1.542 1.454 1.372 1.295 1.222 1.153 1.089 1.028 0.971 0.917 0.866 0.818 0.773 0.730 0.690
-0.700 2.297 2.162 2.036 1.917 1.806 1.702 1.604 1.513 1.427 1.346 1.270 1.198 1.130 1.067 1.007 0.951 0.898 0.848 0.801 0.757 0.715
-0.750 2.400 2.257 2.123 1.999 1.881 1.773 1.670 1.574 1.484 1.399 1.319 1.244 1.174 1.108 1.045 0.987 0.931 0.879 0.830 0.784 0.741
-0.800 2.508 2.357 2.216 2.084 1.962 1.847 1.739 1.638 1.544 1.455 1.371 1.293 1.220 1.150 1.085 1.024 0.966 0.912 0.861 0.813 0.768
-0.850 2.623 2.463 2.314 2.175 2.046 1.925 1.812 1.706 1.607 1.514 1.426 1.344 1.267 1.195 1.127 1.063 1.003 0.946 0.893 0.843 0.796
-0.900 2.745 2.576 2.418 2.272 2.135 2.008 1.889 1.777 1.673 1.575 1.484 1.398 1.317 1.242 1.171 1.104 1.041 0.982 0.926 0.874 0.825
-0.950 2.875 2.695 2.529 2.374 2.229 2.095 1.970 1.852 1.743 1.640 1.544 1.454 1.370 1.291 1.216 1.146 1.081 1.019 0.961 0.907 0.856
-1.000 3.013 2.823 2.646 2.482 2.329 2.187 2.055 1.932 1.816 1.709 1.608 1.513 1.425 1.342 1.264 1.191 1.123 1.058 0.998 0.941 0.888
-1.050 3.161 2.958 2.771 2.596 2.435 2.285 2.145 2.015 1.894 1.780 1.675 1.575 1.483 1.396 1.314 1.238 1.166 1.099 1.036 0.977 0.921
-1.100 3.318 3.103 2.903 2.718 2.547 2.389 2.241 2.104 1.976 1.856 1.745 1.641 1.544 1.452 1.367 1.287 1.212 1.142 1.076 1.014 0.956
-1.150 3.488 3.257 3.045 2.848 2.667 2.498 2.342 2.197 2.062 1.936 1.819 1.710 1.607 1.512 1.422 1.339 1.260 1.187 1.118 1.053 0.992
-1.200 3.670 3.423 3.196 2.987 2.794 2.615 2.450 2.296 2.154 2.021 1.897 1.782 1.675 1.574 1.481 1.393 1.311 1.234 1.162 1.094 1.031
-1.250 3.865 3.600 3.357 3.134 2.929 2.739 2.564 2.401 2.250 2.110 1.980 1.859 1.746 1.640 1.542 1.450 1.364 1.283 1.208 1.137 1.071
-1.300 4.076 3.791 3.531 3.292 3.073 2.871 2.685 2.513 2.353 2.205 2.068 1.940 1.821 1.710 1.606 1.510 1.419 1.335 1.256 1.182 1.112
-1.350 4.303 3.996 3.717 3.461 3.227 3.012 2.814 2.631 2.462 2.305 2.160 2.025 1.900 1.783 1.674 1.573 1.478 1.389 1.306 1.229 1.156
-1.400 4.550 4.218 3.917 3.643 3.393 3.163 2.952 2.757 2.578 2.412 2.258 2.116 1.983 1.860 1.746 1.639 1.539 1.446 1.359 1.278 1.202
-1.450 4.817 4.458 4.134 3.839 3.570 3.324 3.099 2.891 2.701 2.525 2.362 2.211 2.071 1.942 1.821 1.709 1.604 1.506 1.415 1.330 1.251
-1.500 5.109 4.719 4.367 4.049 3.760 3.497 3.256 3.035 2.832 2.645 2.472 2.313 2.165 2.028 1.901 1.782 1.672 1.570 1.474 1.385 1.301
-1.550 5.427 5.002 4.621 4.277 3.966 3.683 3.424 3.188 2.972 2.773 2.590 2.420 2.264 2.119 1.985 1.860 1.744 1.636 1.536 1.442 1.354
-1.600 5.777 5.312 4.897 4.524 4.187 3.883 3.605 3.353 3.121 2.909 2.714 2.535 2.369 2.216 2.074 1.942 1.820 1.706 1.601 1.502 1.410
-1.650 6.162 5.651 5.197 4.792 4.427 4.098 3.800 3.529 3.282 3.055 2.847 2.657 2.481 2.318 2.168 2.029 1.900 1.780 1.669 1.566 1.469
-1.700 6.588 6.025 5.527 5.084 4.688 4.332 4.010 3.719 3.453 3.211 2.990 2.786 2.599 2.427 2.268 2.121 1.985 1.859 1.742 1.633 1.531
-1.750 7.062 6.437 5.889 5.403 4.972 4.585 4.237 3.923 3.638 3.379 3.142 2.925 2.726 2.543 2.374 2.219 2.075 1.942 1.818 1.703 1.597
-1.800 7.592 6.895 6.288 5.754 5.282 4.861 4.483 4.144 3.837 3.558 3.305 3.073 2.861 2.666 2.487 2.322 2.170 2.029 1.899 1.778 1.665
-1.850 8.187 7.406 6.730 6.140 5.621 5.161 4.751 4.383 4.051 3.752 3.479 3.232 3.005 2.798 2.607 2.432 2.271 2.122 1.984 1.856 1.738
-1.900 8.861 7.979 7.223 6.568 5.995 5.490 5.042 4.643 4.284 3.960 3.668 3.402 3.160 2.938 2.735 2.549 2.378 2.220 2.074 1.940 1.815
-1.950 9.631 8.627 7.775 7.043 6.408 5.852 5.361 4.925 4.536 4.186 3.870 3.585 3.325 3.088 2.872 2.674 2.492 2.325 2.170 2.028 1.896
-2.000 10.516 9.364 8.397 7.575 6.867 6.251 5.711 5.234 4.810 4.430 4.089 3.782 3.503 3.250 3.018 2.807 2.614 2.436 2.272 2.121 1.982
Table 20: Simulation results for The Netherlands, 1994 (H/L = 0.337; c = 1.2).
8
8
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.315 1.224 1.140 1.062 0.989 0.921 0.858 0.799 0.744 0.693 0.645 0.601 0.560 0.521 0.486 0.452 0.421 0.392 0.365 0.340 0.317
-0.050 1.376 1.281 1.193 1.111 1.034 0.963 0.896 0.835 0.777 0.724 0.674 0.627 0.584 0.544 0.506 0.471 0.439 0.409 0.381 0.354 0.330
-0.100 1.442 1.342 1.249 1.162 1.082 1.007 0.937 0.872 0.812 0.756 0.703 0.655 0.610 0.567 0.528 0.492 0.458 0.426 0.397 0.369 0.344
-0.150 1.511 1.406 1.308 1.216 1.132 1.053 0.980 0.912 0.848 0.790 0.735 0.684 0.636 0.592 0.551 0.513 0.477 0.444 0.414 0.385 0.358
-0.200 1.584 1.473 1.370 1.274 1.184 1.102 1.025 0.953 0.887 0.825 0.768 0.714 0.664 0.618 0.575 0.535 0.498 0.463 0.431 0.401 0.373
-0.250 1.662 1.544 1.436 1.334 1.240 1.153 1.073 0.997 0.927 0.862 0.802 0.746 0.694 0.645 0.600 0.558 0.520 0.483 0.450 0.418 0.389
-0.300 1.744 1.620 1.505 1.398 1.299 1.208 1.123 1.043 0.970 0.902 0.838 0.780 0.725 0.674 0.627 0.583 0.542 0.504 0.469 0.436 0.406
-0.350 1.831 1.700 1.578 1.466 1.361 1.265 1.175 1.092 1.015 0.943 0.877 0.815 0.757 0.704 0.655 0.609 0.566 0.526 0.489 0.455 0.423
-0.400 1.924 1.785 1.657 1.538 1.428 1.325 1.231 1.144 1.062 0.987 0.917 0.852 0.792 0.736 0.684 0.636 0.591 0.549 0.511 0.475 0.442
-0.450 2.022 1.875 1.739 1.613 1.497 1.390 1.290 1.198 1.112 1.033 0.960 0.891 0.828 0.769 0.715 0.664 0.617 0.574 0.533 0.496 0.461
-0.500 2.126 1.970 1.827 1.694 1.571 1.458 1.352 1.255 1.165 1.082 1.004 0.932 0.866 0.804 0.747 0.694 0.645 0.599 0.557 0.517 0.481
-0.550 2.237 2.072 1.920 1.779 1.649 1.529 1.418 1.316 1.221 1.133 1.051 0.976 0.906 0.841 0.781 0.725 0.674 0.626 0.581 0.540 0.502
-0.600 2.356 2.180 2.019 1.870 1.733 1.605 1.487 1.380 1.280 1.187 1.101 1.022 0.948 0.880 0.817 0.758 0.704 0.654 0.607 0.564 0.524
-0.650 2.483 2.296 2.125 1.966 1.821 1.686 1.562 1.448 1.342 1.244 1.154 1.070 0.992 0.921 0.854 0.793 0.736 0.683 0.634 0.589 0.547
-0.700 2.618 2.420 2.237 2.069 1.914 1.772 1.641 1.520 1.408 1.305 1.209 1.121 1.039 0.964 0.894 0.830 0.770 0.714 0.663 0.616 0.572
-0.750 2.763 2.551 2.357 2.178 2.014 1.863 1.724 1.596 1.478 1.369 1.268 1.175 1.089 1.010 0.936 0.868 0.805 0.747 0.693 0.643 0.597
-0.800 2.918 2.692 2.485 2.295 2.121 1.960 1.813 1.677 1.552 1.437 1.330 1.232 1.142 1.058 0.980 0.909 0.843 0.782 0.725 0.673 0.624
-0.850 3.084 2.843 2.622 2.420 2.234 2.064 1.907 1.763 1.631 1.509 1.396 1.293 1.197 1.109 1.027 0.952 0.882 0.818 0.758 0.703 0.652
-0.900 3.264 3.005 2.768 2.553 2.355 2.174 2.007 1.855 1.714 1.585 1.466 1.357 1.256 1.162 1.077 0.997 0.924 0.856 0.794 0.736 0.682
-0.950 3.456 3.179 2.926 2.695 2.484 2.291 2.114 1.952 1.803 1.666 1.540 1.424 1.318 1.219 1.129 1.045 0.968 0.897 0.831 0.770 0.714
-1.000 3.664 3.366 3.095 2.848 2.623 2.417 2.228 2.056 1.898 1.752 1.619 1.496 1.384 1.280 1.184 1.096 1.014 0.939 0.870 0.806 0.747
-1.050 3.889 3.568 3.277 3.012 2.771 2.551 2.350 2.167 1.999 1.844 1.703 1.573 1.453 1.344 1.242 1.149 1.063 0.984 0.911 0.844 0.782
-1.100 4.132 3.786 3.473 3.189 2.931 2.695 2.481 2.285 2.106 1.942 1.792 1.654 1.528 1.411 1.304 1.206 1.115 1.032 0.955 0.884 0.818
-1.150 4.396 4.022 3.685 3.379 3.102 2.850 2.621 2.412 2.221 2.046 1.887 1.741 1.606 1.483 1.370 1.266 1.170 1.082 1.001 0.926 0.857
-1.200 4.684 4.279 3.914 3.585 3.287 3.016 2.771 2.547 2.344 2.158 1.988 1.833 1.690 1.560 1.440 1.330 1.229 1.135 1.050 0.971 0.898
-1.250 4.998 4.558 4.162 3.807 3.486 3.195 2.932 2.693 2.475 2.277 2.096 1.931 1.779 1.641 1.514 1.397 1.290 1.192 1.101 1.018 0.942
-1.300 5.341 4.862 4.433 4.048 3.701 3.389 3.106 2.849 2.616 2.405 2.212 2.035 1.875 1.727 1.593 1.469 1.356 1.252 1.156 1.068 0.987
-1.350 5.719 5.194 4.727 4.310 3.935 3.597 3.293 3.017 2.768 2.541 2.335 2.147 1.976 1.820 1.676 1.545 1.425 1.315 1.214 1.121 1.036
-1.400 6.134 5.559 5.049 4.595 4.188 3.823 3.495 3.199 2.931 2.688 2.468 2.267 2.084 1.918 1.766 1.627 1.499 1.383 1.275 1.177 1.087
-1.450 6.594 5.961 5.402 4.906 4.464 4.069 3.714 3.395 3.107 2.846 2.610 2.395 2.200 2.023 1.861 1.713 1.578 1.454 1.341 1.237 1.141
-1.500 7.104 6.405 5.791 5.248 4.766 4.336 3.952 3.607 3.296 3.016 2.763 2.533 2.325 2.135 1.963 1.805 1.662 1.530 1.410 1.300 1.199
-1.550 7.674 6.898 6.220 5.623 5.096 4.628 4.210 3.837 3.501 3.199 2.927 2.681 2.458 2.255 2.071 1.904 1.751 1.611 1.484 1.367 1.260
-1.600 8.313 7.447 6.695 6.037 5.459 4.947 4.492 4.086 3.724 3.398 3.105 2.840 2.601 2.384 2.188 2.009 1.846 1.698 1.562 1.438 1.325
-1.650 9.034 8.063 7.225 6.496 5.858 5.297 4.800 4.359 3.965 3.613 3.297 3.012 2.755 2.523 2.313 2.122 1.948 1.790 1.646 1.514 1.394
-1.700 9.853 8.756 7.817 7.006 6.301 5.683 5.138 4.657 4.228 3.846 3.505 3.198 2.921 2.672 2.447 2.242 2.057 1.889 1.735 1.595 1.468
-1.750 10.790 9.542 8.484 7.577 6.792 6.109 5.510 4.983 4.516 4.101 3.730 3.399 3.101 2.833 2.591 2.372 2.174 1.994 1.830 1.682 1.546
-1.800 11.870 10.440 9.239 8.218 7.341 6.583 5.921 5.342 4.831 4.378 3.976 3.617 3.295 3.006 2.746 2.511 2.299 2.107 1.932 1.774 1.629
-1.850 13.130 11.474 10.099 8.942 7.957 7.111 6.377 5.738 5.177 4.682 4.244 3.854 3.505 3.194 2.913 2.661 2.434 2.228 2.042 1.872 1.719
-1.900 14.613 12.676 11.088 9.767 8.652 7.702 6.885 6.177 5.559 5.016 4.537 4.112 3.734 3.397 3.095 2.823 2.579 2.358 2.159 1.978 1.814
-1.950 16.385 14.087 12.235 10.712 9.442 8.370 7.454 6.665 5.981 5.383 4.858 4.395 3.984 3.618 3.291 2.998 2.735 2.498 2.284 2.091 1.916
-2.000 18.535 15.768 13.578 11.806 10.347 9.127 8.094 7.212 6.451 5.790 5.212 4.704 4.256 3.858 3.504 3.187 2.904 2.649 2.420 2.212 2.025
Table 21: Simulation results for Canada 1987 (H/L = 0.241; c = 1.2).
8
9
l = h
φ1 = φ2 1.000 1.050 1.100 1.150 1.200 1.250 1.300 1.350 1.400 1.450 1.500 1.550 1.600 1.650 1.700 1.750 1.800 1.850 1.900 1.950 2.000
0.000 1.315 1.228 1.147 1.072 1.001 0.935 0.874 0.816 0.762 0.712 0.665 0.621 0.580 0.542 0.506 0.473 0.442 0.413 0.386 0.360 0.337
-0.050 1.374 1.283 1.199 1.119 1.045 0.976 0.912 0.851 0.795 0.743 0.693 0.648 0.605 0.565 0.528 0.493 0.460 0.430 0.401 0.375 0.350
-0.100 1.438 1.342 1.253 1.169 1.092 1.019 0.952 0.888 0.829 0.774 0.723 0.675 0.630 0.589 0.550 0.513 0.479 0.447 0.418 0.390 0.364
-0.150 1.504 1.404 1.310 1.222 1.141 1.065 0.994 0.927 0.866 0.808 0.754 0.704 0.657 0.613 0.573 0.535 0.499 0.466 0.435 0.406 0.379
-0.200 1.575 1.469 1.370 1.278 1.192 1.112 1.038 0.968 0.904 0.843 0.787 0.734 0.685 0.639 0.597 0.557 0.520 0.485 0.453 0.423 0.395
-0.250 1.649 1.538 1.434 1.337 1.247 1.163 1.084 1.011 0.943 0.880 0.821 0.766 0.715 0.667 0.622 0.580 0.542 0.506 0.472 0.440 0.411
-0.300 1.729 1.611 1.501 1.399 1.304 1.216 1.133 1.057 0.985 0.919 0.857 0.799 0.746 0.695 0.649 0.605 0.565 0.527 0.491 0.459 0.428
-0.350 1.812 1.688 1.572 1.464 1.364 1.271 1.185 1.105 1.030 0.960 0.895 0.834 0.778 0.726 0.677 0.631 0.588 0.549 0.512 0.478 0.446
-0.400 1.901 1.769 1.647 1.534 1.428 1.330 1.239 1.155 1.076 1.003 0.935 0.871 0.812 0.757 0.706 0.658 0.614 0.572 0.534 0.498 0.464
-0.450 1.995 1.856 1.726 1.607 1.496 1.393 1.297 1.208 1.125 1.048 0.977 0.910 0.848 0.790 0.736 0.686 0.640 0.597 0.556 0.519 0.484
-0.500 2.094 1.947 1.811 1.684 1.567 1.458 1.357 1.264 1.177 1.096 1.021 0.950 0.885 0.825 0.769 0.716 0.668 0.622 0.580 0.541 0.504
-0.550 2.200 2.045 1.900 1.767 1.643 1.528 1.422 1.323 1.231 1.146 1.067 0.993 0.925 0.862 0.803 0.748 0.697 0.649 0.605 0.564 0.525
-0.600 2.313 2.148 1.995 1.854 1.723 1.602 1.489 1.385 1.289 1.199 1.116 1.039 0.967 0.900 0.838 0.781 0.727 0.677 0.631 0.588 0.548
-0.650 2.433 2.258 2.096 1.946 1.808 1.680 1.561 1.451 1.349 1.255 1.167 1.086 1.011 0.941 0.876 0.815 0.759 0.707 0.658 0.613 0.571
-0.700 2.562 2.375 2.203 2.044 1.897 1.762 1.637 1.521 1.413 1.314 1.222 1.136 1.057 0.983 0.915 0.852 0.793 0.738 0.687 0.640 0.596
-0.750 2.699 2.500 2.317 2.149 1.993 1.850 1.717 1.595 1.481 1.377 1.279 1.189 1.106 1.028 0.957 0.890 0.828 0.771 0.717 0.668 0.622
-0.800 2.845 2.633 2.439 2.260 2.095 1.943 1.803 1.673 1.553 1.443 1.340 1.245 1.157 1.076 1.000 0.930 0.865 0.805 0.749 0.697 0.649
-0.850 3.002 2.776 2.568 2.379 2.203 2.042 1.893 1.756 1.630 1.513 1.404 1.304 1.212 1.126 1.047 0.973 0.905 0.841 0.783 0.728 0.677
-0.900 3.171 2.929 2.708 2.505 2.319 2.148 1.990 1.844 1.710 1.587 1.472 1.367 1.269 1.179 1.095 1.018 0.946 0.879 0.818 0.761 0.707
-0.950 3.352 3.093 2.857 2.640 2.442 2.260 2.092 1.938 1.796 1.665 1.544 1.433 1.330 1.235 1.147 1.065 0.989 0.920 0.855 0.795 0.739
-1.000 3.546 3.269 3.016 2.785 2.574 2.380 2.202 2.038 1.887 1.749 1.621 1.503 1.394 1.294 1.201 1.115 1.035 0.962 0.894 0.831 0.772
-1.050 3.757 3.459 3.188 2.941 2.715 2.508 2.318 2.144 1.984 1.837 1.702 1.577 1.462 1.356 1.258 1.168 1.084 1.006 0.935 0.868 0.807
-1.100 3.984 3.663 3.372 3.107 2.865 2.645 2.443 2.257 2.088 1.932 1.788 1.656 1.534 1.422 1.319 1.223 1.135 1.054 0.978 0.908 0.844
-1.150 4.230 3.884 3.571 3.286 3.027 2.791 2.576 2.378 2.198 2.032 1.880 1.740 1.611 1.492 1.383 1.282 1.189 1.103 1.024 0.950 0.882
-1.200 4.497 4.123 3.785 3.479 3.201 2.949 2.718 2.508 2.315 2.139 1.977 1.829 1.692 1.567 1.451 1.345 1.246 1.156 1.072 0.995 0.923
-1.250 4.788 4.382 4.017 3.688 3.389 3.118 2.871 2.646 2.441 2.253 2.081 1.923 1.779 1.646 1.523 1.411 1.307 1.211 1.123 1.042 0.966
-1.300 5.105 4.665 4.269 3.913 3.591 3.300 3.035 2.794 2.575 2.375 2.192 2.024 1.870 1.729 1.600 1.481 1.371 1.270 1.177 1.091 1.012
-1.350 5.453 4.972 4.543 4.157 3.810 3.496 3.212 2.954 2.719 2.505 2.310 2.132 1.968 1.819 1.681 1.555 1.439 1.332 1.234 1.143 1.060
-1.400 5.834 5.309 4.841 4.423 4.047 3.708 3.402 3.125 2.874 2.645 2.437 2.247 2.073 1.914 1.768 1.634 1.511 1.398 1.294 1.199 1.110
-1.450 6.255 5.679 5.168 4.712 4.304 3.938 3.608 3.310 3.040 2.795 2.572 2.369 2.184 2.015 1.860 1.718 1.588 1.468 1.358 1.257 1.164
-1.500 6.721 6.086 5.526 5.028 4.584 4.187 3.831 3.509 3.219 2.956 2.718 2.501 2.303 2.123 1.958 1.807 1.669 1.543 1.426 1.319 1.221
-1.550 7.239 6.537 5.919 5.374 4.890 4.459 4.072 3.725 3.412 3.130 2.874 2.642 2.431 2.239 2.063 1.903 1.756 1.622 1.498 1.385 1.281
-1.600 7.818 7.037 6.355 5.755 5.225 4.755 4.335 3.959 3.621 3.317 3.042 2.793 2.568 2.362 2.175 2.004 1.848 1.706 1.575 1.455 1.345
-1.650 8.468 7.595 6.838 6.176 5.594 5.079 4.622 4.213 3.848 3.520 3.224 2.956 2.714 2.495 2.295 2.113 1.947 1.795 1.656 1.529 1.413
-1.700 9.203 8.221 7.376 6.642 6.000 5.435 4.935 4.491 4.094 3.739 3.420 3.132 2.872 2.637 2.423 2.229 2.052 1.891 1.743 1.608 1.485
-1.750 10.040 8.928 7.979 7.161 6.449 5.827 5.279 4.794 4.362 3.977 3.632 3.322 3.042 2.790 2.561 2.353 2.164 1.992 1.836 1.692 1.561
-1.800 10.999 9.731 8.659 7.741 6.949 6.261 5.657 5.126 4.655 4.236 3.862 3.527 3.226 2.954 2.709 2.487 2.285 2.101 1.934 1.782 1.643
-1.850 12.110 10.650 9.429 8.394 7.508 6.743 6.076 5.491 4.976 4.519 4.113 3.750 3.425 3.132 2.868 2.630 2.414 2.218 2.040 1.877 1.729
-1.900 13.408 11.711 10.310 9.134 8.136 7.280 6.540 5.895 5.328 4.829 4.386 3.992 3.640 3.324 3.040 2.784 2.553 2.343 2.153 1.980 1.822
-1.950 14.945 12.949 11.324 9.978 8.846 7.884 7.057 6.342 5.717 5.169 4.685 4.256 3.874 3.532 3.226 2.950 2.702 2.477 2.274 2.089 1.921
-2.000 16.790 14.409 12.504 10.947 9.654 8.565 7.637 6.840 6.148 5.544 5.013 4.545 4.129 3.758 3.427 3.130 2.863 2.621 2.403 2.206 2.026
Table 22: Simulation results for Canada 1997 (H/L = 0.256; c = 1.2).
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